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ABSTRACT 
THE IMPACT OF ONLINE INFLUENCE STRATEGIES ON CONSUMER 
RESPONSE AND PRIVACY EXPECTATIONS  
May 2011  
JASON A GABISCH, B.S., B.A., UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE  
M.B.A., UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor George R. Milne 
 
 Identifying effective strategies for encouraging individuals to disclose their 
personal information on the Internet is important for marketers. In today's information-
based economy, access to consumer data is imperative for organizations in conducting 
marketing activities. However, the extant privacy literature has found conflicting results 
regarding the effectiveness of safety cues (e.g., privacy policies) and rewards (e.g., 
discounts) for encouraging consumers to provide their personal information to Web sites 
(Andrade et al. 2002). There is also scant research on the implications of compensating 
consumers for their information, and its subsequent impact on privacy control 
expectations. 
 This dissertation consists of two essays that examine how consumers respond to 
marketers' strategies for encouraging self-disclosure on the Internet, and how these 
strategies affect expectations for privacy control. Essay 1 employs regulatory focus 
theory for investigating the impact of consumers' goals (privacy protection vs. acquisition 
of benefits) on how they respond to marketers’ online influence strategies and brand 
reputation. The use of safety cues, rewards, and brand reputation have been identified in 
  
vii 
the privacy literature as important factors that influence consumers' trust, privacy 
concern, and willingness to provide personal information (Milne and Culnan 2004). 
Essay 2 draws on theories of social exchange and social contracts for examining how the 
value and type of compensation received influences the degree to which consumers 
believe they own the information provided to marketers and their expectations for control 
over how their information is used. Although consumers frequently trade their personal 
information for benefits online, it has been suggested in the privacy literature that the 
point at which consumers own and control information about themselves and when that 
information becomes the property of marketers is unclear (Sheehan and Hoy 2000).  
 This dissertation employs a mixed methods approach that includes a series of 
scenario-based experiments using survey panel data, and in-depth interviews. The results 
of essay 1 provide evidence of the importance of consumer goals in decisions to disclose 
personal information to marketers. Findings from essay 2 reveal that privacy exchanges 
may affect the degree to which consumers believe ownership and control over their 
information is shared with marketers. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Brief Overview of Information Privacy 
 Information privacy refers to the ability of individuals to control what information 
is collected about them, and to control how that information is accessed and used by 
others. As consumers exchange more information online, privacy concerns and the 
protection of privacy have become an important issue affecting the relationship between 
consumers and commercial Web sites. Many online activities such as purchase 
transactions, registering for Web sites, and joining online communities require that 
Internet users disclose personal information in order to take advantage of these benefits. 
Companies collect information from consumers for the development of targeted 
advertising, personalizing Web site experiences, and customizing products. A market for 
information has developed in the current technological environment that involves 
frequent exchanges of personal information between consumers and companies (Olivero 
and Lunt 2004). 
 Internet privacy is emerging as an important issue in marketing, as the Internet is 
redefining how privacy is perceived and how personal information is used by both 
consumers and companies. Traditional privacy theories during the 1970's conceptualized 
privacy as the " right to be let alone" and the "concealment of information" (Westin 1967; 
Altman 1975). These classical definitions of privacy tended to focus on the shielding of 
private information, and protection of oneself from others. However, more recent 
definitions of privacy view personal information as an economic asset that can be traded 
by individuals for benefits, and used by companies to generate revenue (Lessig 2002). In 
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fact, some researchers have suggested that privacy exchange is unavoidable in the current 
Internet environment as Internet users must be willing to tradeoff their personal 
information in order to participate in most online activities (Rust, Kannan, and Peng 
2002; Joinson and Paine 2007). It can be argued that the concept of privacy is 
transitioning from an entirely protective perspective to a new transactional perspective, 
where personal information is seen as a unit of exchange. Individuals frequently provide 
information online and sacrifice some of their privacy in return for services or benefits 
that they desire. The Internet is altering the balance between privacy protection and the 
desire for disclosure. 
 While the exchange of personal information allows consumers to take advantage 
of benefits and participate online it also makes them vulnerable to misuse of their 
information and loss of privacy control (Joinson and Paine 2007). Although consumers 
are providing more personal information on the Internet they are also growing more 
concerned about their privacy and demanding more control over how their information is 
used (Sheehan and Hoy 2000; Jupiter Research 2002; Harris Interactive 2002). Many 
consumers are unwilling to provide personal information to commercial Web sites unless 
those Web sites can establish that they are trustworthy and able to protect the consumer's 
privacy. Thus, a primary focus for commercial Web sites is identifying strategies for 
collecting consumer information that are also able to build trust and reduce privacy 
concerns (Olivero and Lunt 2004). Marketers also recognize the importance of 
establishing a brand image and reputation that mitigates consumers' perceived risk of 
disclosing information online. Despite the importance of developing effective strategies 
(e.g., privacy policies, rewards) for encouraging consumers to reveal personal 
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information the privacy literature has offered little guidance for marketers on how to 
implement these strategies, and empirical findings on the effectiveness of these strategies 
has been inconclusive. 
 
1.2 Overview of Essays 
 Although it is becoming common for consumers to exchange their personal 
information online for perceived benefits, the extant privacy literature offers only a 
limited understanding of how privacy exchanges affect self-disclosure and expectations 
for privacy (Hann et al. 2003; Olivero and Lunt 2004). This dissertation contributes to 
this discourse and consists of two essays that examine the privacy exchange process.  
 Essay 1 investigates how marketers encourage consumers to provide their 
personal information online. This essay addresses conflicting findings in the literature 
regarding the effectiveness of various strategies (e.g., privacy policies, rewards) for 
building trust, reducing privacy concerns, and increasing the willingness of consumers to 
disclose personal information to commercial Web sites. A framework is developed that 
examines the relationships between the type of influence strategy used by marketers, the 
company's brand reputation, and consumer trade-offs between privacy protection and 
attaining benefits. Regulatory Focus Theory (RFT: Higgins 1997), an emerging theory in 
social psychology, is used to examine the importance of compatibility between marketers' 
influence strategies, brand reputation, and consumers' goals. This essay also addresses a 
methodological gap in the privacy literature by empirically examining the causal 
relationship between marketers' influence strategies and consumer response. 
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 Essay 2 explores the outcomes of privacy exchanges by examining the effect of 
compensation on consumers' expectations for information ownership and privacy control, 
following the provision of their information to commercial Web sites. A number of 
researchers have called for additional studies on the implications of gathering personal 
information by offering financial benefits, as the effects on consumers' privacy 
perceptions are not well understood (Andrade, Kaltcheva, and Weitz 2002; Hann et al. 
2002; Olivero and Lunt 2004; Joinson and Paine 2007). To date, there has been very little 
empirical research that has examined how compensating consumers for their personal 
information may affect their expectations for privacy. This paper addresses this gap in the 
literature by drawing on social exchange theory for examining how the value and type of 
compensation received influences the extent to which consumers believe they should 
have ownership and control over the information they provide to Web sites. 
 
1.3 Contributions 
 This dissertation contributes to the privacy literature by providing insights into the 
development of effective strategies for the collection of consumer information on the 
Internet and the impact of these influence strategies on consumers' privacy perceptions 
and disclosure behavior. Essay 1 addresses a gap in the privacy and persuasion literature 
by examining the fit between consumers' regulatory focus, marketers' influence 
strategies, and the company's brand reputation. The compatibility between consumers' 
motivations and marketers' influence strategies are likely to impact the effectiveness of 
efforts to encourage self-disclosure. This work answers the call by Wirtz and Lwin 
(2009) for additional research that examines the role that consumer goals (privacy 
  
5
protection, attainment of benefits) play in privacy exchanges and cost-benefit tradeoffs. 
This essay calls attention to the importance of examining consumers' psychological 
factors (i.e., goals, motivations) for examining why marketers' online strategies differ in 
their ability to promote trust, reduce privacy concerns, and encourage self-disclosure. 
Consumers' psychological characteristics are likely to help explain how consumers 
respond to marketers' influence strategies. In addition, essay 1 examines the relationship 
between regulatory focus and brand reputation, a relationship that has not been tested in 
the marketing literature. Investigating the fit between regulatory focus and brand cues 
helps to address Swaminathan et al.'s (2009) call for research that explores how 
individual characteristics affect the relationship between brands and brand outcomes. 
This essay is the first to explore the interactions between influence strategies, brand 
reputation, and regulatory focus. 
 Essay 2 begins to fill a major gap in the privacy literature by investigating the 
increasingly essential, yet understudied, areas of information ownership and privacy 
control. Perceptions of information ownership and expectations for privacy control play a 
vital role in exchange relationships between marketers and consumers. However, it is not 
always clear what responsibilities and rights companies have for protecting and using 
consumer data. This study examines how the act of compensating consumers for their 
personal information affects the degree to which consumers believe they are either 
sacrificing control over their privacy, or sharing control with marketers. Information 
ownership is conceptualized as a belief system for allocating rights to control and use 
consumer information. Essay 2 contributes to social exchange theory by examining how 
the type and value of compensation affects consumers' information ownership 
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perceptions and expectations for privacy control. This essay addresses Sheehan and Hoy's 
(2000) call for research that examines consumers' perceived value of economic and non-
economic compensation in privacy exchanges. This research explores the types of 
compensation that are most valued by consumers and how they affect consumers' privacy 
expectations. 
 
1.4 Organization 
 This dissertation follows a two essay format and the remainder is organized into 
three chapters. Essay one, "The Impact of Regulatory Focus on Consumers' Response to 
Online Influence Strategies and Brand Reputation," is presented in Chapter 2. In this 
essay, three experimental studies are employed for understanding how consumer goals 
impact the effectiveness of marketers' strategies for encouraging self-disclosure. 
Additionally, this essay investigates the ways that consumers can respond to marketers' 
persuasion attempts. Essay two, "The Impact of Compensation on Information 
Ownership Perceptions and Privacy Control Expectations," is presented in Chapter 3. 
This empirical essay is comprised of four experimental studies, and in-depth interviews, 
for examining consumers' expectations for ownership and control over the information 
they trade to marketers for acquiring desired benefits. Chapter 4 concludes this 
dissertation by highlighting theoretical and managerial contributions, addressing 
limitations, and offering directions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY FOCUS ON CONSUMERS' RESPONSE TO 
ONLINE INFLUENCE STRATEGIES AND BRAND REPUTATION 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 Companies use a number of strategies to encourage consumers to disclose their 
personal information online. For instance, some companies offer incentives (e.g., 
discounts, coupons, rebates) in exchange for consumer information, while other 
companies display safety cues (e.g., privacy statements, third-party trust seals) that claim 
to protect consumers' online privacy. Despite the prevalence of these strategies, existing 
research has found conflicting results regarding the effectiveness of these various 
strategies for building trust, reducing privacy concerns, and increasing the willingness of 
consumers to provide their personal information on the Internet (Andrade et al. 2002; 
Sultan et al. 2002; Montoya-Weiss et al. 2003; Schlosser, White, and Lloyd 2006). While 
the use of rewards and privacy policies have been widely advocated in the privacy 
literature, some studies have found consumers to consider offers of a reward with 
suspicion, and the majority of people have been found not to read privacy policies 
(Hoffman, Novak, and Peralta 1999; Andrade et al. 2002; Milne and Culnan 2004). In 
fact, even when these strategies are employed by marketers, consumers have been found 
to frequently respond to marketers' requests for personal information by refusing to 
provide information or providing incomplete, or false information (Sheehan and Hoy 
1999; Milne, Rohm, and Bahl 2004). 
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  Identifying effective strategies for encouraging people to disclose their personal 
information is important for marketers, because collecting information about consumers 
on the Internet allows them to develop marketing communications and build relationships 
with customers. Personalization, market segmentation, and targeted marketing all rely on 
the extent to which consumers are willing to disclose accurate information about 
themselves. Thus, a critical question facing marketers is under what conditions are certain 
influence strategies most effective for encouraging consumers to provide their personal 
information online? Does the persuasiveness of these strategies depend on consumers' 
goals in the Internet environment, and are they thus more effective when compatible with 
those goals? These questions are addressed in this essay through three experiments that 
test the persuasiveness of marketers' online strategies for encouraging self-disclosure and 
the moderating role of consumers' regulatory focus. 
 Theories of self-disclosure suggest that consumers' willingness to disclose 
personal information is based on their assessments of the costs and benefits (Milne and 
Gordon 1993; Sheehan and Hoy 2000; Hann et al. 2002; Xie et al. 2006; Acquisti et al. 
2009). Thus, companies who interact with consumers over the Internet use a number of 
approaches to alter this cost-benefit tradeoff and encourage consumers to self-disclose. 
Three approaches identified in the privacy literature for encouraging self-disclosure of 
personal information - safety cues (e.g., privacy policy, trust seals), the offer of a reward, 
and the reputation of the company - are examined in this research. Some companies 
increase the perceived benefits of self-disclosure by offering rewards (e.g., coupons or 
gifts) in exchange for personal information. Other companies reduce the perceived costs 
of self-disclosure by posting extensive privacy policies and trust seals that claim to 
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protect consumer privacy. Developing a reputation for trustworthiness is another way 
companies encourage self-disclosure. Even though self-disclosure is important for 
marketers, research on the compatibility between consumer goals and marketer strategies 
for encouraging self-disclosure is limited. While a number of studies have explored the 
effects of demographic information (e.g., age, gender, income) on self-disclosure, there is 
a lack of research on how psychological factors (e.g., goals, motivations) contribute to 
our understanding of online privacy exchanges (Wirtz and Lwin 2009). 
 The primary objective of this research is to explore the impact of consumer goals 
on the effectiveness of influence strategies for addressing privacy concerns, increasing 
trust, and promoting information disclosure on the Internet. Regulatory focus theory 
(Higgins 1997) is applied in this research for addressing gaps in the privacy literature by 
investigating how consumer goals may help to explain contradictory findings concerning 
the effectiveness of strategies for encouraging self-disclosure. Regulatory focus theory 
has emerged as a powerful theory for predicting how persuasion attempts may depend on 
the extent to which an individual is motivated by protection or achievement (Zhao and 
Pechmann 2007). The application of regulatory focus theory may be useful for 
understanding the effects of marketers' persuasion attempts on self-disclosure decisions, 
because online privacy exchanges involve risk-benefit tradeoffs between the protection of 
an individual's privacy and the acquisition of desired benefits. This research has 
implications for companies that collect personal information from consumers online. 
Marketers have control over the types of influence strategies they use to encourage 
consumers to provide their personal information online, and it may be possible that the 
effectiveness of these strategies are contingent upon consumer goals. 
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2.2 Background Literature 
2.2.1 Regulatory Focus Theory 
 This essay applies regulatory focus theory (Higgins 1997) for predicting 
consumers' privacy perceptions, and intended behavioral response to marketers' online 
influence strategies. Higgins' regulatory focus theory has been found to be useful for 
predicting the effectiveness of persuasion attempts in the marketing literature (Kirmani 
and Campbell 2004), and has been used extensively throughout several marketing areas 
including adoption of new products (Herzenstein et al. 2007), advertising (Zhao and 
Pechmann 2007), and retailing (Arnold and Reynolds 2009). While regulatory focused 
theory has recently been introduced to the e-commerce (Noort, Kerkhof, and Fennis 
2008) and privacy literature (Wirtz and Lwin 2009), the potential role of regulatory focus 
in predicting self-disclosure on the Internet has not been examined.  
 Regulatory focus theory suggests that there are two types of consumers with 
different motivational orientations: promotion-focused consumers and prevention-
focused consumers. A person's regulatory focus refers to the extent to which a person's 
goal is either to avoid losses (prevention focus) or achieve gains (promotion focus), and 
thus influences which types of information a person searches for and is important to 
them. A person's regulatory focus can be the result of either personal characteristics or 
situational influences that temporarily encourage a particular focus (Higgins et al. 1994; 
Zhu and Meyers-Levy 2007). It has been estimated that approximately half of consumers 
are chronically promotion-focus, and the other half are prevention-focused, and several 
studies have shown that regulatory focus can be successfully manipulated through the use 
of priming techniques (Lockwood, Jordan, and Kunda 2002; Zhao and Pechmann 2007). 
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 Promotion-focused consumers and prevention-focused consumers differ in how 
they weigh costs and benefits (Herzenstein, Posavac, and Brakus 2007). Promotion-
focused consumers are motivated by achievements and are sensitive to opportunities for 
advancement, whereas prevention-focused consumers are motivated to avoid threats to 
security and safety and are sensitive to risk (Zhao and Pechmann 2007). Promotion-
focused consumers are also more likely to focus on gains such as benefits and rewards, 
while prevention-focused consumers focus on losses, costs, and risks (Lee, Keller, and 
Sternthal 2010). Regulatory fit (Higgins 2000) occurs when an individual's regulatory 
focus and the type of information processed are compatible. For example, individuals 
with a prevention focus are more attentive to informational cues that address safety and 
security needs, while promotion-focused individuals are more receptive to information 
that addresses their needs for advancement and achievement.  
 Applying the principle of regulatory fit may be helpful for understanding 
individuals' behavior in response to marketers' strategies for encouraging self-disclosure 
on the Web. Regulatory focus theory is highly applicable to investigating privacy 
exchanges and tradeoffs, because it involves consumers' motivations and goals for 
privacy protection and the acquisition of benefits. Individuals' attitudes towards losses 
and gains are likely to be an important variable in decisions to disclose personal 
information (Acquisti 2004), because privacy exchanges involve tradeoffs between costs 
and benefits (Milne and Gordon 1993). Specifically, privacy exchanges involve 
sacrificing privacy for future benefits, and according to exchange theory if perceived 
benefits outweigh the loss of privacy the consumer is likely to provide personal 
information.  
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 Research has shown that it is important for marketers to adapt influence strategies 
to consumers with different characteristics (McFarland, Challagalla, and Shervani 2006). 
Because a person's regulatory focus determines what information is important, it is 
expected that safety cues (privacy policies, trust seals) and a company's reputation for 
trustworthiness will fit with a prevention focus and therefore will be more important for 
influencing prevention-focused consumers' privacy concerns and willingness to self-
disclose. On the other hand offering rewards for self-disclosure may be more effective for 
promotion-focused consumers. As a consequence, it is proposed in this research that the 
persuasiveness of marketers' influence strategies for encouraging self-disclosure depends 
on the consumer's goals in the online environment. It is expected that when influence 
strategies are compatible with consumer goals they will be more persuasive, in terms of 
building trust, reducing privacy concerns, and promoting self-disclosure. 
 
2.2.2 Influence Strategies 
 Web sites can use various influence strategies to encourage consumers to provide 
their personal information including requests for disclosure, offering rewards, posting 
privacy statements, requiring information for site registration, and displaying third-party 
seals of approval on the Web site (Milne 2000). Some of these influence strategies, 
however, may be perceived by consumers to be manipulative, pushy, and high pressure, 
while other strategies are perceived to be helpful in that they consider the consumer's 
need for security (Kirmani and Campbell 2004). Influence strategies may differ in their 
effect on consumers' trust, privacy concerns, and willingness to provide information 
online (Hann et al. 2002; Petty and Andrews 2008; Milne et al. 2009). For example, 
  
13 
Andrade et al. (2002) found that posting a privacy policy on a Web site reduces the level 
of concern over disclosing personal information, but offering a reward heightens privacy 
concern and reduces self-disclosure. Ward, Bridges, and Chitty (2005) also found that 
offering incentives led to a marginal increase in levels of privacy concern. Some 
consumers consider offers of a reward with suspicion, as a ploy for getting individuals to 
reveal sensitive personal information. People often believe incentives are not provided 
without some catch such as leading to unwanted marketing solicitations or other 
concealed uses for the consumer's information. A few studies have found users to be 
unwilling to "sell" their personal data to Web sites for monetary incentives or access 
privileges (Hoffman et al. 1999; Ward et al. 2005), because the use of incentives are not 
effective in allaying their privacy concerns. 
  The use of rewards to elicit self-disclosure may be a double-edged sword. On one 
hand rewards may increase the attractiveness of disclosing information, but on the other 
hand the exchange of information for a reward may make the perception of risk more 
salient (Olivero and Lunt 2004). Web sites that offer rewards or require personal 
information for use of the Web site may be viewed by some consumers to be self-
interested and opportunistic, and thus less trustworthy. A number of researchers have 
called for additional research on the implications of gathering personal information by 
offering incentives, as the effects on consumers' privacy perceptions are not well 
understood (Andrade et al. 2002; Hann et al. 2002; Olivero and Lunt 2004; Joinson and 
Paine 2007). 
 The literature in marketing channels and personal selling categorize marketers' 
influence strategies into coercive and non-coercive strategies, in order to examine the 
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effects of these strategies on consumer relationships (Payan and McFarland 2005; 
McFarland et al. 2006). Coercive strategies consist of promises and threats, whereas non-
coercive influence strategies consist of requests, information provision, and 
recommendations (Frazier and Summers 1984; Payan and McFarland 2005). Types of 
influence strategies, definitions, and examples of these strategies in the privacy exchange 
context are presented in Table 2.1. Non-coercive influence strategies attempt to persuade 
the consumer to perform a specific action. Coercive influence strategies promise future 
incentives for compliance, or threats of future penalties for lack of compliance (Frazier 
and Summers 1986). The influence strategy framework is used in the current research to 
classify Web site's influence strategies for encouraging self-disclosure into coercive and 
non-coercive strategies. 
 
 Coercive Influence Strategies. Promises involve offers of an incentive for 
complying with a request. It is becoming common for companies to offer incentives in 
order to induce customers to reveal information about themselves (Acquisti and Varian 
2005). Benefits for providing information many include economic (e.g. coupons, rebates, 
special offers) and non-economic (convenience, customization, personalization, access to 
exclusive content) incentives. Threats indicate a future penalty or denial of benefits for 
noncompliance. Threats are similar to promises in that threats often involve the 
deprivation of rewards if a request is not followed (Vankatesh et al. 1995; McFarland et 
al. 2006). For instance, many Web sites require consumers to provide personal 
information to register with the Web site and access certain types of information on the 
Web site. This type of data collection serves to penalize people who choose not to 
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provide their personal information by denying  them access to Web site content and 
functionality (Sheehan 2005). 
 
 Non-Coercive Influence Strategies. For requests the company simply states the 
actions it would like the consumer to take without any mention of rewards or penalties. 
For instance, some Web sites explicitly ask consumers through the use of web forms to 
provide their personal information, but without the use of incentives or threats. 
Recommendations are suggestions for how a consumer may realize benefits for taking 
certain actions. Recommendations differ from promises in that incentives are not 
guaranteed or exchanged. Web sites can recommend to consumers that providing their 
personal information may improve their experience on the site (e.g., convenience, 
customization, personalization). Information provision is where the company shares 
information to influence the consumer's perceptions without stating a request. In the 
context of online privacy, Web sites can provide information in order to signal the Web 
site's privacy and security policies. For instance, Web sites can post privacy policies 
detailing how information will be collected and used (Milne, Rohm, and Bahl 2004), and 
display privacy seals of trust which provide consumers with a guarantee of privacy 
protection (Caudill and Murphy 2000). Some Web sites also provide customer 
testimonials about their security and privacy policies (Montoya-Weiss et al. 2003). 
 
2.3 Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses 
 Self-disclosure has been defined in the privacy literature as the willingness of an 
individual to provide information about themselves to others (Jourard 1971). In general, 
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research on self-disclosure has adopted a social exchange theory perspective (Kelley and 
Thibaut 1978) which suggests that consumers assess the costs and benefits before 
disclosing personal information (Hann et al. 2002; Xie et al. 2006; Acquisti et al. 2009). 
Some approaches that companies can take to alter the consumer's cost-benefit analysis 
and encourage self-disclosure are: 1) providing safety cues (e.g., privacy statements, trust 
seals) indicating how the disclosed information will be protected, 2) offering a reward for 
disclosing information, and 3) developing a reputation for trustworthiness. A number of 
studies have shown that firms can use these approaches to enhance the willingness of 
consumers to disclose personal information by reducing privacy concerns and building 
trust (Milne and Boza 1998; Sheehan and Hoy 1999; Malhotra et al. 2004; Eastlick et al. 
2006; Lwin et al. 2007; Wirtz and Lwin 2009). 
 This research views the effectiveness of these strategies for addressing consumers' 
privacy concerns and inducing them to provide personal information as being contingent 
on consumers' goals in the Internet environment. The framework developed in this paper 
identifies consumer goals (i.e., regulatory focus) for safety and the acquisition of benefits 
as a moderating variable in order to investigate under which conditions influence 
strategies and brand reputation improve trust, reduce privacy concern, and lead to self-
disclosure. Compatibility between a consumer's goals, marketers' influence strategies, 
and a company's reputation are expected to improve trust and reduce concern for self-
disclosure. As consumers' perceptions of trust increase, and their privacy concerns are 
reduced, they should be more willing to disclose personal information (Wirtz and Lwin 
2009). However, as trust decreases and privacy concerns increase consumers are likely to 
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take protective actions by refusing to provide information, providing false information, or 
providing incomplete information. The conceptual model is presented in Figure 2.1. 
 
2.3.1 Main Effects of Influence Strategy 
 A primary focus for commercial Web sites is identifying strategies for collecting 
consumer information that are also able to reduce privacy concerns and develop trust 
(Olivero and Lunt 2004; Lwin et al. 2007). The type of influence strategy used by 
marketers is likely to affect consumers' trust and privacy concerns. The use of non-
coercive influence strategies (e.g., requests, recommendations, information provision) 
have been found to result in positive relational outcomes, while the use of coercive 
influence strategies (e.g., promises, threats) can have a negative effect on relationships 
(Payan and McFarland 2005). For instance, Hausman and Johnston (2009) found 
coercive strategies to have a negative effect on trust, while non-coercive strategies had a 
positive effect. These findings are consistent with those in the privacy literature, as non-
coercive strategies such as posting privacy policies and privacy seals have been found to 
increase trust and reduce privacy concerns (Andrade et al. 2002; Milne and Culnan 2004; 
Rifon, LaRose, and Choi 2005), while rewards and threats may have the opposite effect 
(Andrade et al. 2002; Ward et al. 2005).  
 In this research, it is expected that the use of coercive influence strategies (e.g., 
rewards, threats) for encouraging consumers to provide their personal information online 
will lead to a reduction in trust, an increase in privacy concern, and a reduction in self-
disclosure. On the other hand, the use of non-coercive types of influence strategies (e.g., 
privacy policies, trust seals) are expected to be more effective in establishing trust, 
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reducing privacy concerns, and increasing self-disclosure. Furthermore, it is predicted 
that coercive strategies will cause consumers to take protective actions by providing 
incomplete or false information in order to protect their privacy while maintaining their 
ability to participate in the online environment. 
 
H1: Compared with a coercive influence strategy, a non-coercive influence strategy will   
 lead consumers to have:  
 (a) higher levels of trust.  
 (b) lower privacy concerns.  
 (c) greater willingness to provide personal information.  
 (d) lower propensity to provide incomplete information. 
 (e) lower propensity to provide false information. 
 
 
2.3.2 Main Effects of Brand Reputation 
 In addition to marketers' use of influence strategies, companies can also build 
trust and reduce privacy concerns by improving their brand image and reputation 
(Chellappa and Sin 2005). A brand's reputation frequently serves as a cue for consumers 
in deciding whether to interact with a company (Venable et al. 2005). A company's brand 
reputation has been defined in the marketing literature as the extent to which people 
believe a firm is honest and concerned about its customers (Doney and Cannon 1997; 
Xie, Teo, and Wan 2006).  
 A company's brand reputation has been found to signal trustworthiness, 
reliability, and credibility (Chaudhuri 2002;  Moorman et al. 1992; Veloutsou and 
Moutinho 2009). Consumers use brand reputation as a means of inferring quality about a 
company (Herbing and Milewicz 1995). Because brands differ in terms of their image 
and personality, consumers have been found to consider some brands to be more 
trustworthy than other brands (Delgado-Ballester et al. 2003; Kwon and Lennon 2009). 
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Internet users are likely to reveal personal information online only if they can trust the 
commercial Web site that is requesting their information. A company's reputation for 
trustworthiness has been found to alter consumers' cost-benefit analysis in privacy 
exchanges and encourage them to disclose personal information (Andrade et al. 2002; 
Milne and Culnan 2004), because the reputation of the firm reduces the perceived risks of 
disclosure.  
 It is expected that consumers will be more apt to share their personal information 
with reputable companies because these companies can be trusted with their information 
and decrease concerns for self-disclosure. It is also predicted that consumers will be less 
likely to provide incomplete or false information when dealing with a reputable company. 
 
H2: Compared with a weak brand reputation, a strong brand reputation will lead 
 consumers to have:  
 (a) higher levels of trust.  
 (b) lower privacy concerns.  
 (c) greater willingness to provide personal information.  
 (d) lower propensity to provide incomplete information. 
 (e) lower propensity to provide false information. 
 
2.3.3 Main and Mediating Effects of Trust and Privacy Concern 
 In order to achieve a better understanding of how marketers' influence strategies 
and brand reputation impact consumers' willingness to disclose personal information, it is 
essential to uncover the underlying mechanisms and processes through which this 
relationship operates. Specifically, it is suggested in this research that the impact of 
influence strategies and brand reputation on consumer response is mediated by trust and 
privacy concern. Correlational studies have examined the relationship between marketers' 
strategies and privacy concerns, and between privacy concerns and consumer response. 
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However, as Sheehan and Hoy (1999) note, causality can not be inferred from 
correlational studies. The current research examines the role of privacy concern and trust 
in determining how consumers respond to marketers' influence attempts and a company's 
brand reputation. Privacy concern and trust beliefs are likely to affect consumers' 
behavioral responses, and are expected to mediate the effect of influence strategies and 
brand reputation on consumer response strategies. 
 Trust and privacy concern are two important factors that affect a consumer's 
willingness to disclose information to a Web site (Milne and Boza 1999; Gefen 2000; 
Wirtz and Lwin 2009). Trust is an important asset in social exchange relationships on the 
Internet because electronic transactions often involve a high degree of uncertainty and 
lack of legal protection (Luo 2002). By reducing privacy concerns and building trust, 
marketers can encourage consumers to provide information to Web sites. Trust has been 
conceptualized as confidence in and reliance on an exchange partner (Moorman, 
Deshpande, and Zaltman 1993). When a consumer believes that a company has the 
ability to protect their personal information, and the company has the consumer's best 
interest in mind, the consumer will be more likely to disclose information (Malhotra, 
Kim, and Agarwal 2004). Privacy concern refers to consumers' apprehension and 
uneasiness over the collection and use of their personal information (Westin 2003; Wirtz 
and Lwin 2009). Online surveys have found privacy concern to be an important issue for 
consumers in using the Internet to interact with companies (Jupiter Research 2002; Harris 
Interactive 2002). Specifically, privacy concerns have been found to have a negative 
effect on consumers' trust in a Web site, leading consumers to refuse disclosure of 
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personal information or the provision of incomplete or false information (Sheehan and 
Hoy 1999; Merzger 2004; Chellappa and Sin 2005).  
 Consumers can respond to marketers' influence strategies by either complying 
with the marketer's request or taking protective action. In the Internet privacy context a 
consumer can comply with a marketer by agreeing to disclose personal information. 
However, when faced with privacy concerns online users may take steps to protect their 
privacy by refusing to provide information, providing inaccurate information, or 
providing incomplete information to a Web site (Sheehan and Hoy 1999; Milne 1997; 
Milne 2000; Milne et al. 2004). Several studies have found that consumers frequently 
provide false and incomplete information to Web sites (Pitkow and Kehoe 1997; Sheehan 
and Hoy 1999). Some consumers provide incomplete and false information in order to 
participate in online activities but maintain control over their information and privacy 
(Cespedes and Smith 1993).  
 It is expected that as privacy concerns increase consumers will be less willing to 
disclose personal information and more likely to take protective actions by providing 
incomplete or false information. However, trust will lead the consumer to comply with 
the marketer's request by disclosing their personal information. It is proposed that 
reducing privacy concerns and building trust will lead to greater self-disclosure. 
 
H3: Compared to lower levels of trust, higher levels of trust will lead consumers to have:  
 (a) greater willingness to provide personal information. 
 (b) lower propensity to provide incomplete information. 
 (c) lower propensity to provide false information. 
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H4: Compared to higher levels of privacy concern, lower levels of privacy concern will 
 lead consumers to have:  
 (a) greater willingness to provide personal information. 
 (b) lower propensity to provide incomplete information. 
 (c) lower propensity to provide false information. 
 
H5: Trust mediates the effects of influence strategy on: 
 (a) willingness to provide personal information. 
 (b) propensity to provide incomplete information. 
 (c) propensity to provide false information. 
 
H6: Trust mediates the effects of brand reputation on: 
 (a) willingness to provide personal information. 
 (b) propensity to provide incomplete information. 
 (c) propensity to provide false information. 
 
H7: Concern mediates the effects of influence strategy on: 
 (a) willingness to provide personal information. 
 (b) propensity to provide incomplete information. 
 (c) propensity to provide false information. 
 
H8: Concern mediates the effects of brand reputation on: 
 (a) willingness to provide personal information. 
 (b) propensity to provide incomplete information. 
 (c) propensity to provide false information. 
 
 
 
2.3.4 Interaction Effects between Influence Strategy and Regulatory Focus 
 The extant privacy research has found conflicting findings on the use of safety 
cues and incentives for building trust and reducing privacy concerns (Andrade et al. 
2002; Sultan et al. 2002; Montoya-Weiss et al. 2003; Schlosser et al. 2006). For instance, 
some studies have found the use of incentives to invoke suspicion and lead to higher 
privacy concerns (Andrade et al. 2002; Ward et al. 2005). Research on the effectiveness 
of privacy policies and trust seals have also produced conflicting results in terms of their 
ability to establish trust and mitigate concerns (Berendt et al. 2005; Hui et al.  2007).  
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 Principles of regulatory fit may help to explain an individual's perceptions of trust 
and privacy concern in response to these various online influence strategies. An 
individual's regulatory focus determines what information is important and how they 
respond to marketers' persuasion attempts (Kirmani and Zhu 2007). For instance, 
prevention-focused individuals have been shown to foster a preferential search for 
information related to safety and security (Noort et al. 2008). Thus, it is expected that for 
prevention-focused consumers safety cues will be more important for building trust, and 
reducing privacy concern, than for promotion-focused consumers. Consumers with a 
prevention-focus have also been found to be more skeptical and sensitive to marketers' 
manipulative intent (Kirmani and Zhu 2007), and so the use of incentives may lead to a 
larger negative response for prevention-focused individuals. On the other hand, a 
promotion-focus may help to mitigate the undesirable effects of coercive influence 
strategies on trust and concern. In contexts in which risks are salient (e.g., online self-
disclosure), a promotion-focus has been found to help mitigate risk (Kirmani and Zhu 
2007; Noort et al. 2008). In general, studies have found prevention-focused consumers to 
be more responsive to safety information, and promotion-focused consumers to not differ 
significantly in their reaction to safety and non-safety cues (Pham and Higgins 2005; 
Noort et al. 2008).  
 It is predicted in this essay that the main effect of influence strategy on trust and 
privacy concern is moderated by a consumer's regulatory focus (prevention vs. 
promotion). Specifically, non-coercive strategies (e.g., privacy policies, trust seals) 
should be more effective in building trust and reducing concern for prevention-focused 
individuals, than for promotion-focused individuals, because individuals with a 
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prevention-focus are highly responsive to safety information. On the other hand, coercive 
strategies are expected to lead to lower levels of trust, and higher levels of concern, for 
prevention-focused individuals, as compared to promotion-focused individuals, because 
they are sensitive to manipulative content.  
 
H9a: When consumers have a prevention-focus (but not a promotion-focus), a non- 
coercive (vs. coercive) influence strategy will lead to higher levels of trust. 
 
H9b: When consumers have a prevention-focus (but not a promotion-focus), a non- 
coercive (vs. coercive) influence strategy will lead to lower levels of concern. 
 
 
 
2.3.5 Interaction Effects between Brand Reputation and Regulatory Focus 
 Considerations regarding safety and risk continue to pose a challenge for 
marketers in collecting consumers data on the Internet (Noort et al. 2008). Findings 
indicate that a strong brand reputation can serve as an effective strategy for reducing 
consumers' risk perceptions on the Internet (Van den Poel and Leunis 1999; Tan 1999). 
Consumers frequently use brand reputations as cues for deciding whether to interact with 
companies (Venable et al. 2005; Lwin and Williams 2006). Consumers are more likely to 
trust and exchange information with companies that they perceive to be trustworthy and 
reputable. When dealing with a reputable company, privacy concerns and perceived risk 
of self-disclosure are typically reduced.  
 However, research has found that consumer characteristics may moderate the 
effect of brand cues on decisions to interact with a company. Theories of self-congruity 
have demonstrated that consumers may respond differently to various brands depending 
on whether the brand is perceived to match their personal goals and aspirations (Malhotra 
1988; Sirgy 1982). For instance, Swaminathan, Stilley, and Ahluwalia (2009) found that 
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risk adverse individuals preferred companies that had a safe brand image. Their findings 
suggest that not all consumers are equally sensitive to a brand's reputation. In addition, 
Love et al. (2010) found that prevention-focused consumers are less willing to interact 
with unfamiliar firms than promotion-focused consumers. Brands may differ to the extent 
to which they are perceived to be safe, secure, and reliable (Aaker 1997). The 
compatibility of these brand cues with a consumer's goals for protection or achievement 
may affect their willingness to interact with the brand. For prevention-focused individuals 
who seek information pertaining to their safety and protection on the Internet, a 
company's strong reputation for trustworthiness may play an important role in their 
decision to disclose personal information. The ability to trust a brand helps to satisfy 
these prevention-oriented goals. 
 It is predicted in this essay that the main effect of brand reputation on trust and 
privacy concern is moderated by a consumer's regulatory focus. Specifically, a strong 
brand reputation should be more effective in building trust and reducing concern for 
prevention-focused individuals, than for promotion-focused individuals, because 
individuals with a prevention-focus are highly responsive to safety and protective cues. 
On the other hand, a weak brand reputation is expected to lead to lower levels of trust, 
and higher levels of concern, for prevention-focused individuals, as compared to 
promotion-focused individuals, because prevention-focused individuals are more 
sensitive to risk.  
 
H10a: When consumers have a prevention-focus (but not a promotion-focus), a strong  
(vs. weak) brand reputation will lead to higher levels of trust. 
 
H10b: When consumers have a prevention-focus (but not a promotion-focus), a strong  
(vs. weak) brand reputation will lead to lower levels of concern. 
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2.3.6 Interaction Effects between Influence Strategy and Brand Reputation 
 It is proposed that brand reputation moderates the effect of coercive (e.g., 
rewards) and non-coercive (e.g., privacy notices) influence strategies on trust and privacy 
concerns. In other words, the effectiveness of various influence strategies for building 
trust and reducing privacy concerns may depend on the reputation of the company. In 
their study on product warranties, Lwin and Williams (2006) found that warranties were 
effective at reducing consumers' perceived risk only for online retailers with a strong 
reputation. In addition, Xie et al. (2006) found that privacy notices were more effective 
for soliciting personally identifiable information when companies had a strong reputation 
compared to when the company was unfamiliar to the person. Based on these findings 
from the literature, a company's reputation may impact the effectiveness of various 
strategies for encouraging consumers to disclose personal information on the Internet. 
 Consumers often rely on the reputation of the firm as a signal that provides 
assurances that their information is safe (Gefen et al. 2003; Shapiro 1987). For instance, 
Milne and Culnan (2004) argue that a strong reputation can serve as a substitute for 
reading privacy notices, and thus may lower the need for these types of companies to 
invest in other instruments. However, firms which do not have a strong reputation 
frequently employ other instruments, such as rewards and privacy notices, to entice 
consumers to disclose their personal information online (Xie et al. 2006). Because 
coercive (e.g., rewards) types of influence strategies have been found by some consumers 
to be manipulative and incites suspicion, this type of strategy may be inappropriate for 
new online businesses that are looking to engender trust, reduce privacy concerns, and 
attract consumers to disclose their personal information. 
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 It is predicted in this essay that a two-way interaction effect may exist between 
influence strategy and brand reputation. Specifically, the main effect of influence strategy 
on trust and privacy concern may be moderated by the strength of the firm's brand 
reputation. Non-coercive strategies (e.g., privacy policies, trust seals) should be more 
effective in building trust and reducing concern for firms with a strong brand reputation, 
as compared to firms with a weak brand reputation, because a strong brand reputation 
offers legitimacy to these self-proclaimed safety cues. On the other hand, Coercive 
strategies (e.g., rewards) are expected to lead to lower levels of trust, and higher levels of 
concern, for companies with a weak brand reputation, as compared to companies with a 
strong brand reputation, because the use of rewards by a company with a weak brand 
reputation may heighten consumer skepticism. A strong brand reputation may be able to 
mitigate the negative effects of coercive strategies (e.g., rewards) on trust and privacy 
concern. In summary, both non-coercive and coercive influence strategies are predicted 
to lead to higher levels of trust, and lower levels of concern, for a company that has a 
strong brand reputation, as compared to a company with a weak brand reputation. 
 A three-way interaction between influence strategies, brand reputation, and 
regulatory focus is also tested, as they may function synergistically in influencing trust 
and privacy concerns. It is expected when prevention-focused individuals are dealing 
with an established company that is employing a non-coercive strategy it will lead to 
higher levels of trust and lower levels of privacy concern. On the other hand, when 
prevention-focused individuals are dealing with an unfamiliar company that is employing 
a coercive influence strategy it will lead to a lower levels of trust and higher levels of 
privacy concern. 
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H11a: Compared with a weak brand reputation, a strong brand reputation leads to higher 
 levels of trust for both a non-coercive and coercive influence strategy. 
 
H11b: Compared with a weak brand reputation, a strong brand reputation leads to lower 
 levels of concern for both a non-coercive and coercive influence strategy. 
 
H12:   A marketer's influence strategy is the most persuasive when viewers' regulatory 
 focus, the type of influence strategy, and brand reputation function synergistically 
 (i.e., a three-way interaction effect). Specifically: 
 
(a) When consumers have a prevention-focus (but not a promotion-focus), a non-
coercive (vs. coercive) influence strategy will lead to higher levels of trust, when 
the company has a strong (vs. weak) brand reputation. 
 
(a) When consumers have a prevention-focus (but not a promotion-focus), a non-
coercive (vs. coercive) influence strategy will lead to lower levels of concern, 
when the company has a strong (vs. weak) brand reputation. 
 
 
2.4 Method 
 The effects of online influence strategies and brand reputation on trust, privacy 
concern, and response intentions are tested in a series of three experimental studies. 
Study 1 examines the main effects of influence strategy (H1), and the moderating effect 
of regulatory focus (H9). Study 2 investigates the main effects of brand reputation (H2), 
and the moderating effects of regulatory focus (H10). Study 3 offers a replication and 
extension of the findings by investigating the two-way interaction between influence 
strategy and brand reputation (H11), and the three-way interaction between each of the 
exogenous variables (i.e., influence strategy, brand reputation, regulatory focus) in the 
model (H12). The main effects (H3-H4) and mediating effects (H5-H8) of trust and 
privacy concern are tested across each of the three studies. Table 2.2 offers a visual 
representation of each of the hypothesized relationships, and Table 2.3 presents a 
summary of each study. 
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2.5 Study 1 - Assessing the Effects of Influence Strategies 
 
 This study examines the effect of online influence strategies on trust, privacy 
concern, and consumer response. Compared with a coercive influence strategy, it is 
expected that a non-coercive influence strategy will lead to greater levels of trust (H1a), a 
reduction in privacy concerns (H1b), and greater willingness to provide personal 
information (H1c). Non-coercive influence strategies are also expected to lead to a lower 
propensity to provide incomplete (H1d), and false (H1e) information. The moderating 
effect of regulatory focus is also investigated in this study. A two-way interaction 
between influence strategy and regulatory focus on trust (H9a) and privacy concern 
(H9b) is expected. Specifically, when consumers have a prevention-focus, a non-coercive 
(vs. coercive) influence strategy is predicted to lead to higher levels of trust, and lower 
levels of privacy concern. The type of influence strategy is not expected to have an effect 
on trust and concern for promotion-focused consumers. 
 
2.5.1 Design and Procedure 
 Ninety-three respondents (35 male, 58 female, 25.8% ages 25-34) participated in 
this study through an online questionnaire. Demographic information for respondents is 
presented in Table 2.4. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in a 2 
(regulatory focus: prevention vs. promotion) x 2 (influence strategy: non-coercive vs. 
coercive) between-subjects factorial design in exchange for a small monetary reward. 
Influence strategy was a manipulated factor and regulatory focus was measured. 
 This study employed an experimental design with a scenario-based method. 
Scenarios have been found to offer a sense of realism and to be effective for evaluating 
perceptions, attitudes, and behavioral intentions in Internet privacy research (Sheehan and 
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Hoy 2000; Xie et al. 2006; Milne and Bahl 2010). In this study two types of scenarios 
were created according to the type of influence strategy. A between-subjects design was 
employed in which respondents were presented with only one of the two scenarios. In 
each scenario participants were asked to imagine a situation in which they were asked to 
fill out a customer satisfaction survey while browsing a retail company's Web site. The 
retail company was described as one that sold a variety of products including clothing, 
housewares, electronics, and food. After reading the scenario respondents then completed 
ratings of their perceptions of trust, privacy concern, and response intentions, along with 
manipulation check measures and a standard set of demographics. Respondents were then 
thanked and compensated for their time. In accordance with past studies the regulatory 
focus scale (Lockwood, Jordon, and Kunda 2002) was completed by respondents before 
being presented with a scenario, so as to avoid any confounding effects on the item 
responses. Appendix A presents the stimulus materials and scales used in Essay 1. 
 
2.5.2 Independent Variables and Manipulations 
 Influence Strategy. Influence strategy was manipulated at two levels, non-
coercive and coercive. The non-coercive strategy was operationalized by asking 
participants to imagine the following: "The company's Web site displays a privacy 
statement and privacy seal assuring you that your personal information will be protected." 
The coercive strategy included the statement, "The company's Web site requires you to 
provide your personal information in order to have full access to the site content. In 
return for providing your personal information the Web site promises that you will 
receive a special discount."  
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 A pretest (n = 103) was conducted in order to determine which types of influence 
strategies respondents perceived to be non-coercive and coercive. Participants rated ten 
different influence strategy scenarios on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all descriptive, 7 = 
extremely descriptive) for the following six characteristics: manipulative, trustworthy, 
sincere, suspicious, thoughtful, and coercive. Pretest and t-test (p < .01) results revealed 
that privacy seals (Mnon-coercive = 13.68, Mcoercive = 8.63) and privacy statements (Mnon-
coercive = 13.65, Mcoercive = 8.67) were considered by participants to be the least coercive 
types of influence strategies. Limited access to site content (Mnon-coercive = 7.45, Mcoercive = 
16.48) and the promise of a special discount (Mnon-coercive = 7.92, Mcoercive = 16.14)  were 
considered by participants to be the most coercive types of influence strategies. The 
pretest results were used to develop the experimental scenarios used in Essay 1.  
 Regulatory Focus. Regulatory focus was measured with the regulatory focus 
questionnaire (Lockwood et al. 2002), which includes two psychometrically distinct 
subscales: promotion and prevention. The regulatory focus scale has been validated in 
previous research (Lockwood et al. 2002; Yeo and Park 2006; Zhao and Pechmann 2007; 
Haws, Dholaki, and Bearden 2010). The Lockwood scale was selected for this analysis, 
because the scale incorporates key terms and concepts from regulatory focus theory 
directly into the scale item wording (Lockwood et al. 2002; Haws et al. 2010). The scale 
includes 18 items, half of which measure promotion focus and the other half of which 
measure prevention focus. Following previous work (Haws et al. 2010), four items 
specific to student subjects were not included in this essay, because the analysis involves 
adult samples. Using a 9-point Likert scale (1 = not at all true of me, 9 = very true of me), 
participants indicated the extent to which they endorsed items relevant to a promotion 
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focus (e.g., "In general, I am focused on achieving positive outcomes in my life," 
"Overall, I am more oriented toward achieving success than preventing failures.") and 
items relevant to a prevention focus (e.g., "In general, I am focused on preventing 
negative events in my life," "I am more oriented toward preventing losses than I am 
toward achieving gains"). Following previous research (e.g., Higgins et al. 2001; 
Lockwood et al. 2002; Zhao and Pechmann 2007; Herzenstein, Posavac, and Brakus 
2007), participants were classified as promotion or prevention focused according to a 
median split (Mdn = 1.28) on the difference between their subscale scores. In this study 
49.5% of respondents had a prevention-focus, and 50.5% had a promotion-focus. 
Reliability for both the prevention (α = .81) and promotion (α = .87) subscales in this 
study were acceptable. 
 
2.5.3 Dependent Variable Measures 
 Privacy Perceptions (e.g., Trust, Privacy Concern). Constructs used to assess 
privacy perceptions include trust and privacy concern. Each of these factors was 
measured on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) using three 
items adopted from the literature (Malhotra, Kim, and Agarwal 2004; Pan and Zinkham 
2006; Wirtz and Lwin 2009). Trust was used to measure the extent to which respondents 
felt secure about sharing their personal information with the company's Web site. Privacy 
concern assessed respondents' apprehension and uneasiness over providing the company's 
Web site with their personal information. Examples of items to measure trust include, "I 
can count on this company's Web site to protect my privacy," and "The company's Web 
site is trustworthy". Examples of items to assess privacy concern include, "I would think 
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twice before providing this company's Web site with my personal information," and "I 
would be concerned about giving information to this company's Web site". Reliability for 
both trust (α = .92) and privacy concern (α = .91) were acceptable. 
 Response Intentions (e.g., willingness to provide, incomplete, falsify). Constructs 
used to assess response intentions include willingness to provide personal information, 
propensity to provide incomplete, and false information. These factors were used to 
assess respondents' compliant and protective behavioral intentions in response to the 
experimental scenarios. Each of these constructs was measured on a 7-point Likert scale 
(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) using three items adapted from Malhotra et al. 
2004. Example items include: "I am likely to share my personal information when 
registering with the company's Web site," "I would provide incomplete personal 
information when registering with the company's Web site," and "I would consider 
falsifying my personal information when registering with the company's Web site". 
Reliability for willingness (α = .96), incomplete (α = .86), and falsify (α = .96) were 
acceptable.    
 
2.5.4 Manipulation Checks 
 Analysis of variance showed that, as intended, the prevention-focus compatible 
Web site with non-coercive strategies was perceived as less coercive (F(1,91) = 7.88, p = 
.006; Mnon-coercive = 3.50, SD = 1.64 vs. Mcoercive = 4.57, SD = 1.98), safer (F(1,91) = 8.11, 
p = .005; Mnon-coercive = 4.16, SD = 1.56 vs. Mcoercive = 3.20, SD = 1.56), and more 
trustworthy (F(1,91) = 9.46, p = .003; Mnon-coercive = 4.12, SD = 1.55 vs. Mcoercive = 3.09, 
SD = 1.59) than the Web site with coercive influence strategies. Hence, the influence 
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strategies were successfully manipulated in this study. Results of the manipulation checks 
are presented in Table 2.5. 
 
2.5.5 Measurement Model 
 As an assessment of construct validity, an exploratory factor analysis of all 
constructs achieves the expected factor solutions. A confirmatory factor analysis was 
conducted for all theoretical constructs in the study to examine the structure of the 
measures and to assess their convergent and discriminant validity. The tests were based 
on the covariance matrix and the maximum likelihood method, and were run using 
LISREL 8.80 (Joreskog and Sorbom 1988). The measurement model gives good fit 
indices: χ2 = 93.78, df = 80, p = .13 and the ratio of χ2 to degree of freedom (1.17) is at 
the level generally required for such analysis. Moreover, other indicators of fit indicate 
that the fit of the measurement model is acceptable, CFI = .99, NFI = .96, GFI = .88, 
AFGI = .82, RMSEA = .04. Based on these results, the measurement model provides a 
satisfactory fit to the data. 
 According to Bagozzi et al. (1991), a construct exhibits substantial convergent 
validity if the t-test value associated with the factor loading of the variables is above 1.96. 
For all items, the t-values were greater than 1.96. Moreover, reliability estimates for each 
construct using coefficient alpha (Cronbach 1951) and composite reliabilities all exceed 
the threshold 0.70 level (Nunnally 1978). All shared variances extracted for each 
construct are acceptable as they exceed the recommended 0.50 value (Fornell and 
Larcker 1981; Bagozzi and Yi 1988). Thus, it can be concluded that these constructs have 
good convergent validity. A correlation matrix of all variables is summarized in Table 
2.6, while Table 2.7 summarizes the statistical outcomes of the measurement model.  
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 According to Anderson and Gerbing (1988) and Bagozzi et al. (1991), 
discriminant validity is good if the correlation between two dimensions is not 1. All 
constructs met this criteria. The second test used is in line with Fornell and Larcker's 
approach (1981). The AVE between two constructs is compared to the square of the 
correlation between the two constructs. This is done to verify that the shared variances 
between all possible pairs of constructs are lower than the average variance extracted for 
the individual constructs . For all the constructs, the AVE is greater than the square 
correlation. It can be seen from Table 2.8 that the measures in this study display 
sufficient discriminant validity (Fornell and Larcker 1981). In summary, all measures 
possess adequate reliability and validity. 
 
2.5.6 Results of Study 1 
 The data were analyzed by MANOVA to assess the multivariate and univariate 
effects of influence strategy. The multivariate and univariate results are presented in 
Tables 2.9 and 2.10. Trust and privacy concern were included as dependent variables in 
the multivariate analysis. Multivariate effects of influence strategy (Wilks' λ = .90, F = 
4.73, p = .011) and the two-way interaction between influence strategy and regulatory 
focus (Wilks' λ = .88, F = 5.82, p = .004) were found to be significant. Follow-up tests to 
the multivariate analysis are presented in Table 2.11, and provide additional evidence for 
the main effect of influence strategy, and the interaction between influence strategy and 
regulatory focus, on trust. Subsequent univariate analyses were conducted to assess the 
distinct effects for each dependent variable, and are discussed in the following sections. 
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2.5.6.1 Main Effects of Influence Strategy 
  An analysis of variance found that non-coercive influence strategies lead to 
higher levels of trust (Mnon-coercive = 4.06, Mcoercive = 3.32; F(1,91) = 5.69, p = .019), and 
lower levels of privacy concern (Mnon-coercive = 5.01, Mcoercive = 5.63; F(1,91) = 3.99, p = 
.049), compared to coercive influence strategies. Thus, both hypothesis H1a and H1b are 
both supported. The results also demonstrate that non-coercive influence strategies lead 
to a greater willingness to provide personal information (Mnon-coercive = 4.02, Mcoercive = 
3.30; F(1,91) = 4.30, p = .041) than coercive strategies. The hypothesized effect of 
influence strategy on propensity to provide incomplete (Mnon-coercive = 4.27, Mcoercive = 
4.69; F(1,91) = 1.724, p = .192), and false information (Mnon-coercive = 3.94, Mcoercive = 
3.62; F(1,91) = 3.16, p = .079), was not found. These findings provide full support for 
hypothesis H1c, and no support for H1d and H1e. Cell means and standard deviations are 
presented in Table 2.12. 
 
2.5.6.2 Moderating Effects of Regulatory Focus 
 The main effects of influence strategy on trust and privacy concern are qualified 
by the expected interaction effects. The results of a two-way analysis of variance found a 
significant interaction effect between influence strategy and regulatory focus on trust 
(F(1,89) = 11.74, p = .001). Simple effects analysis revealed that for prevention-focused 
respondents a non-coercive strategy led to more trust than a coercive strategy (Mnon-coercive 
= 4.20, Mcoercive = 2.28; F(1,89) = 14.87, p = .000). For promotion-focused respondents, 
non-coercive strategies did not differ from coercive strategies in terms of affecting trust 
(Mnon-coercive = 3.89, Mcoercive = 4.01; F(1,89) = .04, p = .836). These findings provide 
support for H9a, which states that when consumers have a prevention-focus (but not a 
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promotion-focus), a non-coercive (vs. coercive) influence strategy will lead to higher 
levels of trust. 
 An interaction effect was also found between influence strategy and regulatory 
focus on concern (F(1,89) = 5.75, p = .019). Simple effects analysis revealed that for 
prevention-focused respondents a non-coercive strategy led to less concern than a 
coercive strategy (Mnon-coercive = 4.96, Mcoercive = 6.45; F(1,89) = 7.95, p = .006). For 
promotion-focused respondents, non-coercive strategies did not differ from coercive 
strategies in terms of affecting concern (Mnon-coercive = 5.07, Mcoercive = 5.09; F(1,89) = .02, 
p = .896). These findings provide support for H9b, which states that when consumers 
have a prevention-focus (but not a promotion-focus), a non-coercive (vs. coercive) 
influence strategy will lead to lower levels of concern. 
 A supplemental analysis found an interaction effect between influence strategy 
and regulatory focus on willingness to provide information (F(1,89) = 8.63, p = .004). 
Simple effects analysis revealed that for prevention-focused respondents a non-coercive 
strategy led to more willingness to provide than a coercive strategy (Mnon-coercive = 3.97, 
Mcoercive = 2.07; F(1,89) = 9.57, p = .003). For promotion-focused respondents, non-
coercive strategies did not differ from coercive strategies in terms of affecting willingness 
to provide (Mnon-coercive = 4.08, Mcoercive = 4.12; F(1,89) = .01, p = .932). These results are 
analogous to those for trust and privacy concern. 
 
2.5.6.3 Main and Mediating Effects of Trust and Concern 
 The effects of trust (H3) and privacy concern (H4) on response intentions were 
tested using multiple regression analysis. In support of H3a, trust was found to have a 
positive effect (β = .415, t(92) = 4.30, p = .000) on willingness to provide personal 
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information. Hypothesis H3b was found to be partially supported, as trust had a negative 
effect (β = -.238, t(92) = -1.85, p = .067) on propensity to provide incomplete 
information, at the p < .10 level. Hypothesis H3c is not supported as an unexpected 
positive effect of trust was found on propensity to provide false information (β = .467, 
t(92) = 3.53, p = .001). In support of H4a and H4b, concern was found to have a negative 
effect (β = -.409, t(92) = -4.24, p = .000) on willingness to provide personal information, 
and a positive effect (β = .304, t(92) = 2.36, p = .020) on propensity to provide 
incomplete information. Hypothesis H4c was not supported as concern did not have a 
significant effect (β = .019, t(92) = .146, p = .884) on propensity to provide false 
information. In general, the expected results were found for the effects of trust and 
concern on willingness to disclose, and propensity to provide incomplete information, but 
not for the propensity to provide false information. 
 To assess whether perceptions of trust (H5) and privacy concern (H7) mediate the 
effects of influence strategy on response intentions mediation analyses were conducted 
using the bootstrapping method suggested by Zhao, Lynch, and Chen (2010). On the 
basis of this framework mediation is strongest when there is an indirect effect but no 
direct effect, which indicates full mediation. When there are both indirect and direct 
effects it is partial mediation. Thus, in order to establish mediation, all that matters is that 
the indirect effect is significant.  
 Trust is found to partially mediate the effect of influence strategies on willingness 
to provide personal information (βaxb = -.571, 95% CI = -1.16 to -.090), and to fully 
mediate the effect of influence strategies on propensity to provide incomplete (βaxb = 
.336, 95% CI = .051 to .763), and false (βaxb = -.184, 95% CI = -.407 to -.031) 
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information. Thus, H5a is partially supported, while H5b and H5c are fully supported. 
Concern is found to partially mediate the effects of influence strategies on willingness to 
provide personal information (βaxb = -.479, 95% CI = -.974 to -.018), and fully mediates 
the effect on propensity to provide incomplete information (βaxb = .296, 95% CI = .300 to 
.669). However, concern is not found to mediate the effect of influence strategy on 
propensity to provide false information. These findings provide partial support for H7a, 
full support for H7b, and no support for H7c. A summary of the mediating effects of trust 
and concern can be seen in Table 2.13. 
 
2.5.7 Discussion 
 The results from Study 1 provide support for a main effect of influence strategy 
on trust, concern, and consumer response. Specifically, a non-coercive (vs. coercive) 
influence strategy leads to a greater level of trust (H1a), and a reduction in privacy 
concern (H1b). A non-coercive strategy was also found to lead to a greater willingness to 
provide personal information. These findings have important implications, as they 
demonstrate that non-coercive strategies (e.g., privacy policies, trust seals), as compared 
to coercive strategies (e.g., rewards, threats), may be more effective at establishing trust, 
reducing privacy concerns, and encouraging self-disclosure. These results demonstrate 
the relative effectiveness of various influence strategies for encouraging self-disclosure 
on the Internet, and may be useful for marketers in understanding their effects on 
consumers' privacy attitudes and self-disclosure behavior. 
 The results of this study also provide evidence that trust (H3) and privacy concern 
(H4) have an effect on consumers' response intentions. Trust and concern are also found 
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to mediate the effect of influence strategies on consumer response (H5, H7). These 
findings suggest that trust and concern are important factors that affect how consumers 
respond to marketers' strategies for encouraging self-disclosure. 
 The findings provide support for the moderating effects of regulatory focus on 
trust and concern, as a two-way interaction was found between influence strategy and 
regulatory focus on trust and concern. In support of H9a and H9b, when consumers have 
a prevention-focus (but not a promotion-focus), a non-coercive (vs. coercive) influence 
strategy leads to higher levels of trust, and lower levels of concern. A supplemental 
analysis found similar findings for the two-way interaction between influence strategy 
and regulatory focus on willingness to provide information. These findings suggest that 
prevention-focused consumers are more responsive to the types of influence strategies 
used by marketers for encouraging self-disclosure on the Internet, because they are more 
sensitive to safety and non-safety information. On the other hand, promotion-focused 
respondents are unaffected by the types of influence strategies used. 
 In summary, full support is found for H1a, H1b, H1c, H3a, H4a, H4b, H5b, H5c, 
H7b, H9a, and H9b; partial support is found for H3b, H5a, and H7a; and no support for 
H1d, H1e, H3c, H4c, and H7c. In general, the empirical findings from this study provide 
evidence of a main effect of influence strategy, and moderating effect of regulatory focus, 
and warrants further investigation into these relationships. 
 
2.6 Study 2 - Assessing the Effects of Brand Reputation 
 
 Study 2 extends the findings from Study 1 by examining the effects of brand 
reputation on trust, privacy concern, and consumer response. Compared with a weak 
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brand reputation, it is expected that a strong brand reputation will lead to greater levels of 
trust (H2a), a reduction in privacy concerns (H2b), and greater willingness to provide 
personal information (H2c). A strong brand reputation is also expected to lead to a lower 
propensity to provide incomplete (H2d), and false (H2e) information. The moderating 
effect of regulatory focus is also investigated in this study. A two-way interaction 
between brand reputation and regulatory focus on trust (H10a) and privacy concern 
(H10b) is expected. Specifically, when consumers have a prevention-focus, a strong (vs. 
weak) brand reputation will lead to higher levels of trust, and lower levels of concern. A 
company's brand reputation is not expected to have an effect on trust and concern for 
promotion-focused consumers. 
 
2.6.1 Design and Procedure 
 One hundred twenty-four respondents (50 males, 74 females, 33.9% ages 25-34) 
participated in this study through an online questionnaire. Participants were randomly 
assigned to conditions in a 2 (regulatory focus: prevention vs. promotion) x 2 (brand 
reputation: weak vs. strong) between-subjects factorial design. Brand reputation was a 
manipulated factor and regulatory focus was measured. This study employed a similar 
procedure to that of Study 1.  
 
2.6.2 Independent Variables and Manipulations 
 Brand Reputation. Brand reputation was manipulated at two levels, weak and 
strong. The weak reputation condition was constructed to represent a company's Web site 
as having an inferior reputation, and the strong reputation a superior reputation. The weak 
reputation condition was operationalized by asking participants to imagine the following: 
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"This Web site belongs to a new retail company, which has been in business for 6 
months." The strong reputation condition included the statement, "This Web site belongs 
to one of the largest and most successful retailers in the U.S. The company has been in 
business for over 50 years." This procedure for manipulating brand reputation has been 
found to be effective for manipulating respondents' reputation perceptions towards a 
retail Web site (Xie et al. 2006; Eastlick, Lotz, and Warrington 2006). 
 Regulatory Focus. Regulatory focus was measured with the regulatory focus 
questionnaire (Lockwood et al. 2002). In this study 53.2% of respondents had a 
prevention-focus, and 46.8% had a promotion-focus.  Reliability for both the prevention 
(α = .79) and promotion (α = .89) subscales in this study were acceptable. 
 
2.6.3 Dependent Variable Measures 
 Privacy perceptions and response intentions were measured the same way as in 
Study 1. The measures for trust (α = .90), privacy concern (α = .83), willingness to 
provide personal information (α = .97), incomplete information (α = .89), and false 
information (α = .96) demonstrated acceptable reliability in this study. 
 
2.6.4 Manipulation Checks 
 Analysis of variance showed that, as intended, respondents in the strong brand 
reputation condition perceived the company's Web site to be more credible (F(1,122) = 
68.88, p = .000; Mweak = 3.64, SD = 1.10 vs. Mstrong = 5.32, SD = 1.11), and reputable 
(F(1,122) = 66.97, p = .000; Mweak = 3.61, SD = 1.07 vs. Mstrong = 5.24, SD = 1.11) than 
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in the weak reputation condition. Hence, brand reputation was successfully manipulated 
in this study. 
 
2.6.5 Measurement Model 
 As an assessment of construct validity, an exploratory factor analysis of all 
constructs achieves the expected factor solutions. A confirmatory factor analysis was 
conducted for all theoretical constructs in the study to examine the structure of the 
measures and to assess their convergent and discriminant validity. The measurement 
model gives good fit indices: χ2 = 147.43, df = 80, p = .00 and the ratio of χ2 to degree of 
freedom (1.84) is at the level generally required for such analysis. Moreover, other 
indicators of fit indicate that the fit of the measurement model is acceptable, CFI = .98, 
NFI = .95, GFI = .86, AFGI = .79, RMSEA = .08. Reliability estimates for each construct 
using coefficient alpha and composite reliabilities all exceed the threshold 0.70 level. 
Based on these results, all measures in this study possess adequate reliability and validity. 
Table 2.14 presents the statistical outcomes of the measurement model. 
 
2.6.6 Results of Study 2 
 The data were analyzed by MANOVA to assess the multivariate and univariate 
effects of brand reputation. Trust and privacy concern were included as dependent 
variables in the multivariate analysis. Multivariate effects of brand reputation (Wilks' λ = 
.82, F = 12.73, p = .000) and the two-way interaction between brand reputation and 
regulatory focus (Wilks' λ = .87, F = 8.73, p = .000) were found to be significant. Follow-
up tests to the multivariate analysis are presented in Table 2.11, and provide additional 
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evidence for the main effect of brand reputation, and the interaction between brand 
reputation and regulatory focus, on trust and concern. Subsequent univariate analyses 
were conducted to assess the distinct effects for each dependent variable, as discussed in 
the following sections. 
 
2.6.6.1 Main Effects of Brand Reputation 
 An analysis of variance found that a strong brand reputation leads to higher levels 
of trust (Mweak = 3.08, Mstrong = 4.26; F(1,122) = 22.85, p = .000), and lower levels of 
privacy concern (Mweak = 5.60, Mstrong = 4.65; F(1,122) = 14.39, p = .000), compared to a 
weak brand reputation. Thus, both hypothesis H2a and H2b are supported. The results 
also demonstrate that a strong brand reputation leads to greater willingness to provide 
personal information (Mweak = 3.00, Mstrong = 4.00; F(1,122) = 12.04, p = .001), than a 
weak brand reputation. Partial support was found for the effect of brand reputation on the 
propensity to provide incomplete information (Mweak = 4.89, Mstrong = 4.38; F(1,122) = 
2.84, p = .095) at the p < .10 level. The hypothesized effect of brand reputation on 
propensity to provide false information was not found (Mweak = 3.60, Mstrong = 4.15; 
F(1,122) = 17.93, p = .000). These findings provide full support for hypothesis H2c, 
partial support for H2d, and no support for H2e. Cell means and standard deviations are 
presented in Table 2.15. 
 
2.6.6.2 Moderating Effects of Regulatory Focus 
 The main effects of brand reputation on trust and privacy concern are qualified by 
the expected interaction effects. The results of a two-way analysis of variance found a 
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significant interaction effect between brand reputation and regulatory focus on trust 
(F(1,120) = 11.26, p = .001). Simple effects analysis revealed that for prevention-focused 
respondents a strong brand reputation leads to more trust than a weak brand reputation 
(Mweak = 3.00, Mstrong = 4.89; F(1,120) = 31.77, p = .000). For promotion-focused 
respondents, a weak brand reputation did not differ from a strong brand reputation in 
terms of affecting trust (Mweak = 3.16, Mstrong = 3.46; F(1,120) = 1.61, p = .207). These 
findings provide support for H10a, which states that when consumers have a prevention-
focus (but not a promotion-focus), a strong (vs. weak) brand reputation will lead to higher 
levels of trust. 
 An interaction effect was also found between brand reputation and regulatory 
focus on concern (F(1,120) = 12.89, p = .000). Simple effects analysis revealed that for 
prevention-focused respondent a strong brand reputation leads to less concern than a 
weak brand reputation (Mweak = 5.67, Mstrong = 3.96; F(1,120) = 25.31, p = .000). For 
promotion-focused respondents, a weak brand reputation did not differ from a strong 
brand reputation in terms of concern (Mweak = 5.53, Mstrong = 5.53; F(1,120) = .22, p = 
.640). These findings provide support for H10b, which states that when consumers have a 
prevention-focus (but not a promotion-focus), a strong (vs. weak) brand reputation will 
lead to lower levels of concern. 
 A supplemental analysis found an interaction effect between brand reputation and 
regulatory focus on willingness to provide information (F(1,120) = 10.10, p = .002). 
Simple effects analysis revealed that for prevention-focused respondents a strong brand 
reputation leads to more willingness to provide than a weak brand reputation (Mweak = 
2.86, Mstrong = 4.65; F(1,120) = 20.77, p = .000). For promotion-focused respondents, a 
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weak brand reputation did not differ from a strong brand reputation in terms of affecting 
willingness to provide (Mweak = 3.15, Mstrong = 3.18; F(1,120) = .13, p = .718). These 
results are analogous to those for trust and privacy concern. 
 
2.6.6.3 Main and Mediating Effects of Trust and Concern 
 The effects of trust (H3) and privacy concern (H4) on response intentions were 
tested using multiple regression analysis. In support of H3a, trust was found to have a 
positive effect (β = .440, t(122) = 6.23, p = .000) on willingness to provide personal 
information. Hypothesis H3b was not supported, as trust did not have a significant effect 
on propensity to provide incomplete information (β = .074, t(122) = -.800, p = .426). 
Hypothesis H3c is not supported as an unexpected positive effect of trust was found on 
propensity to provide false information (β = .549, t(122) = 6.19, p = .000). In support of 
H4a and H4b, concern was found to have a negative effect (β = -.418, t(122) = -5.92, p = 
.000) on willingness to provide personal information, and a positive effect (β = .446, 
t(122) = 4.80, p = .000) on propensity to provide incomplete information. Hypothesis 
H4c was not supported as concern did not have a significant effect (β = -.009, t(122) = -
.097, p = -.923) on propensity to provide false information. In general, the expected 
results were found for the effects on willingness to disclose, partial support for propensity 
to provide incomplete information, and no support for propensity to provide false 
information. 
 To assess whether perceptions of trust (H6) and privacy concern (H8) mediate the 
effects of brand reputation on response intentions mediation analyses were conducted 
using the bootstrapping method suggested by Zhao et al. (2010). Trust is found to 
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partially mediate the effect of brand reputation on willingness to provide personal 
information (βaxb = .844, 95% CI = .469 to 1.29), and false information (βaxb = .295, 95% 
CI = .159 to .497), and to fully mediate the effect of brand reputation on propensity to 
provide incomplete information (βaxb = -.388, 95% CI = -.755 to -.135). Thus, H6a and 
H6c are partially supported, and H6b is fully supported. Concern is found to partially 
mediate the effect of brand reputation on willingness to provide personal information 
(βaxb = .664, 95% CI = .223 to 1.07), and false information (βaxb = .098, 95% CI = .016 to 
.235), and to fully mediate the effect of brand reputation on propensity to provide 
incomplete information (βaxb = -.529, 95% CI = -.949 to -.236). Thus, H8a and H8c are 
partially supported, and H8b is fully supported. A summary of the mediating effects of 
trust and concern can be seen in Table 2.13. 
 
2.6.7 Discussion 
 The results from Study 2 provide support for a main effect of brand reputation on 
trust, concern, and consumer response. Specifically, a strong (vs. weak) brand reputation 
leads to a greater level of trust (H2a), and a reduction in privacy concern (H2b). A strong 
brand reputation was also found to lead to a greater willingness to provide personal 
information (H2c), and less propensity to provide incomplete (H2d) information. These 
findings have important implications, as they demonstrate that a strong brand reputation 
may be more effective at establishing trust, reducing privacy concerns, and encouraging 
self-disclosure. 
 The results of this study also provide evidence that trust (H3) and privacy concern 
(H4) have an effect on consumers' response intentions. Trust and concern are found to 
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mediate the effect of brand reputation on consumer response (H6, H8). These findings 
suggest that trust and concern are important factors that affect how consumers respond to 
a company's brand reputation, and its effects on self-disclosure. 
 The findings provide support for the moderating effects of regulatory focus on 
trust and concern, as a two-way interaction was found between brand reputation and 
regulatory focus on trust and privacy concern. In support of H10a and H10b, when 
consumers have a prevention-focus (but not a promotion-focus), a strong (vs. weak) 
brand reputation leads to higher levels of trust, and lower levels of concern. A 
supplemental analysis found similar findings for the two-way interaction between brand 
reputation and regulatory focus on willingness to provide information. These findings 
suggest that prevention-focused consumers are more responsive to a company's brand 
reputation, because they are more sensitive to safety and non-safety cues. On the other 
hand, promotion-focused respondents are unaffected by a company's reputation for 
trustworthiness.  
 In summary, full support is found for hypotheses H2a, H2b, H2c, H3a, H4a, H4b, 
H6b, H8b, H10a, and H10b; partial support is found for H2d, H6a, H6c, H8a, and H8c; 
and no support for H2e, H3b, H3c, and H4c. In general, the empirical findings from this 
study provide evidence of a main effect of brand reputation, and a moderating effect of 
regulatory focus. 
 
2.7 Study 3 - Assessing the Effects of Influence Strategy and Brand Reputation 
 
 Study 3 extends the findings from the previous studies by examining the two-way 
interaction effect between influence strategy and brand reputation on trust (H11a) and 
privacy concern (H11b). In addition a three-way interaction between influence strategy, 
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brand reputation, and regulatory focus is investigated (H12). All main effects and two-
way interactions in Study 1 and Study 2 are replicated in this study. 
 
2.7.1 Design and Procedure 
 One hundred fifty-three respondents (64 males, 89 females, 36.6% ages 25-34) 
participated in this study through an online questionnaire. Participants were randomly 
assigned to conditions in a  2 (influence strategy: non-coercive vs. coercive) x 2 (brand 
reputation: weak vs. strong) x 2 (regulatory focus: prevention vs. promotion) between-
subjects factorial design. Influence strategy and brand reputation were manipulated 
factors and regulatory focus was measured. Participants were presented with only one of 
four scenarios. This study employed a similar procedure to that of Studies 1 and 2.  
 
2.7.2 Independent Variables and Manipulations 
 Influence strategy was manipulated the same as in study 1 with two levels, non-
coercive and coercive. Brand reputation was manipulated the same as in study 2 with two 
levels, weak and strong. Regulatory focus was measured with the regulatory focus 
questionnaire (Lockwood et al. 2002). In this study 38.6% of respondents had a 
prevention-focus, and 61.4% had a promotion-focus. Reliability for both the prevention 
(α = .81) and promotion (α = .90) subscales in this study were acceptable. 
 
2.7.3 Dependent Variable Measures 
 Privacy perceptions and response intentions were measured the same way as in 
Studies 1 and 2. The measures for trust (α = .87), privacy concern (α = .91), willingness 
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to provide personal information (α = .98), incomplete information (α = .92), and false 
information (α = .96) demonstrated acceptable reliability in this study. 
 
2.7.4 Manipulation Checks 
 Analysis of variance showed that, as intended, the prevention-focus compatible 
Web site with non-coercive strategies was perceived as less coercive (F(1,151) = 8.14, p 
= .005; Mnon-coercive = 3.69, SD = 1.65 vs. Mcoercive = 4.50, SD = 1.87), safer (F(1,151) = 
15.32, p = .000; Mnon-coercive = 4.25, SD = 1.50 vs. Mcoercive = 3.26, SD = 1.63), and more 
trustworthy (F(1,151) = 9.71, p = .002; Mnon-coercive = 4.18, SD = 1.44 vs. Mcoercive = 3.37, 
SD = 1.77), than the Web site with coercive influence strategies. Analysis of variance 
also showed, as intended, that respondents in the strong brand reputation condition 
perceived the company's Web site to be more credible (F(1,151) = 53.84, p = .000; Mweak 
= 3.40, SD = 1.42 vs. Mstrong = 5.08, SD = 1.40), and reputable (F(1,151) = 80.40, p = 
.000; Mweak = 3.44, SD = 1.31 vs. Mstrong = 5.36, SD = 1.32), than in the weak reputation 
condition. Hence, influence strategy and brand reputation were successfully manipulated 
in this study. 
 
2.7.5 Measurement Model 
 As an assessment of construct validity, an exploratory factor analysis of all 
constructs achieves the expected factor solutions. A confirmatory factor analysis was 
conducted for all theoretical constructs in the study to examine the structure of the 
measures and to assess their convergent and discriminant validity. The measurement 
model gives good fit indices: χ2 = 114.65, df = 80, p = .00 and the ratio of χ2 to degree of 
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freedom (1.43) is at the level generally required for such analysis. Moreover, other 
indicators of fit indicate that the fit of the measurement model is acceptable, CFI = .99, 
NFI = .97, GFI = .91, AFGI = .86, RMSEA = .05. Reliability estimates for each construct 
using coefficient alpha and composite reliabilities all exceed the threshold 0.70 level. 
Based on these results, all measures in this study possess adequate reliability and validity. 
Table 2.16 presents the statistical outcomes of the measurement model. 
 
2.7.6 Results of Study 3 
 The data were analyzed by MANOVA to assess the multivariate and univariate 
effects of influence strategy and brand reputation. Trust and privacy concern were 
included as dependent variables in the multivariate analysis. Multivariate effects of 
influence strategy (Wilks' λ = .92, F = 6.09, p = .003), brand reputation (Wilks' λ = .91, F 
= 6.56, p = .002), and the two-way interaction between influence strategy and brand 
reputation (Wilks' λ = .90, F = 7.81, p = .001) were found to be significant. A three-way 
interaction was not found to be significant (Wilks' λ = 1.00, F < 1). Follow-up tests to the 
multivariate analysis are presented in Table 2.11, and provide additional evidence for the 
main effect of influence strategy on trust, and the main effects of brand reputation on 
trust and concern. Subsequent univariate analysis was conducted to assess the distinct 
effects for each dependent variable, as discussed in the following sections.  
 
2.7.6.1 Main Effects of Influence Strategy and Brand Reputation 
 An analysis of variance found that a non-coercive influence strategy (Mnon-coercive 
= 3.86, Mcoercive = 3.15; F(1,151) = 9.82, p = .002), and strong brand reputation (Mweak = 
3.11, Mstrong  = 3.94; F(1,151) = 13.77, p = .000), lead to a greater level of trust. Thus, 
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both hypotheses H1a and H2a are supported. Also, as predicted in hypotheses H1b and 
H2b, a non-coercive influence strategy (Mnon-coercive = 4.84, Mcoercive = 5.42; F(1,151) = 
5.02, p = .026), and strong brand reputation (Mweak = 5.46, Mstrong  = 4.77; F(1,151) = 
7.33, p = .008), lead to a greater reduction in concern. 
 The results demonstrate that a non-coercive influence strategy (Mnon-coercive = 3.78, 
Mcoercive = 2.97; F(1,151) = 8.08, p = .005), and strong brand reputation (Mweak = 2.92, 
Mstrong  = 3.88; F(1,151) = 11.76, p = .001), lead to greater willingness to provide 
information. These findings provide support for hypotheses H1c and H2c. No support 
was found for the main effect of influence strategy on propensity to provide incomplete 
information, however partial support was found for the propensity to provide false 
information (Mnon-coercive = 3.12, Mcoercive = 3.71; F(1,151) = 3.64, p = .058) at the p < .10 
level. No support was found for the main effect of brand reputation on the propensity to 
provide incomplete and false information. These findings provide partial support for H1e, 
and no support for H1d, H2d, and H2e. Cell means and standard deviations are presented 
in Table 2.17. 
  
2.7.6.2 Moderating Effects of Regulatory Focus 
 As additional support for Studies 1 and 2, two-way interactions were found 
between influence strategy and regulatory focus (F(1,149) = 5.13, p = .025), and between 
brand reputation and regulatory focus (F(1,149) = 4.75, p = .031) on trust.  
 Simple effects analysis revealed that for prevention-focused respondents a non-
coercive strategy led to more trust than a coercive strategy (Mnon-coercive = 3.72, Mcoercive = 
2.47; F(1,149) = 18.01, p = .000). For promotion-focused respondents, non-coercive 
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strategies did not differ from coercive strategies in terms of affecting trust (Mnon-coercive = 
3.91, Mcoercive = 3.87; F(1,149) = .82, p = .366). These findings provide support for H9a, 
which states that when consumers have a prevention-focus (but not a promotion-focus), a 
non-coercive (vs. coercive) influence strategy will lead to higher levels of trust.  
 Simple effects analysis also revealed that for prevention-focused respondents a 
strong brand reputation leads to more trust than a weak brand reputation (Mweak = 3.35, 
Mstrong = 4.40; F(1,149) = 15.94, p = .000). For promotion-focused respondents, a weak 
brand reputation did not differ from a strong brand reputation in terms of affecting trust 
(Mweak = 2.75, Mstrong = 3.17; F(1,149) = 1.65, p = .201). These findings provide support 
for H10a, which states that when consumers have a prevention-focus (but not a 
promotion-focus), a strong (vs. weak) brand reputation will lead to higher levels of trust. 
 Two-way interactions were also found between  influence strategy and regulatory 
focus (F(1,149) = 4.28, p = .040), and between brand reputation and regulatory focus 
(F(1,149) = 4.13, p = .044) on concern. Simple effects analysis revealed that for 
prevention-focused respondents a non-coercive strategy led to less concern than a 
coercive strategy (Mnon-coercive = 4.79, Mcoercive = 5.93; F(1,149) = 9.74, p = .002). For 
promotion-focused respondents, non-coercive strategies did not differ from coercive 
strategies in terms of affecting concern (Mnon-coercive = 4.86, Mcoercive = 4.88; F(1,149) = 
.22, p = .640). These findings provide support for H9b, which states that when consumers 
have a prevention-focus (but not a promotion-focus), a non-coercive (vs. coercive) 
influence strategy will lead to lower levels of concern. 
 Simple effects analysis also revealed that for prevention-focused respondents a 
strong brand reputation leads to less concern than a weak brand reputation (Mweak = 6.07, 
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Mstrong = 4.88; F(1,149) = 9.02, p = .003). For promotion-focused respondents, a weak 
brand reputation did not differ from a strong brand reputation in terms of concern (Mweak 
= 5.05, Mstrong = 4.70; F(1,149) = 1.31, p = .254). These findings provide support for 
H10b, which states that when consumers have a prevention-focus (but not a promotion-
focus), a strong (vs. weak) brand reputation will lead to lower levels of concern. 
 
2.7.6.3 Moderating Effects of Brand Reputation 
 The results of a two-way analysis of variance found a significant interaction effect 
between influence strategy and brand reputation on trust (F(1,149) = 3.99, p = .048). 
Simple effects analysis revealed that a non-coercive strategy leads to more trust for a 
company with a strong brand reputation compared to a company with a weak brand 
reputation (Mweak = 3.62, Mstrong = 4.12; F(1,149) = 2.75, p = .099) at the p < .10 level. 
The findings also suggest that a coercive strategy leads to more trust for a company with 
a strong brand reputation compared to a company with a weak brand reputation (Mweak = 
2.43, Mstrong = 3.75; F(1,149) = 15.52, p = .000). These findings provide support for 
H11a, which states that a strong brand reputation (vs. weak reputation) leads to higher 
levels of trust for both a non-coercive, and coercive influence strategy. 
 An interaction effect was also found between influence strategy and brand 
reputation on privacy concern (F(1,149) = 3.96, p = .048). Simple effects analysis 
revealed that a non-coercive strategy leads to less concern for a company with a strong 
brand reputation compared to a company with a weak brand reputation (Mweak = 5.33, 
Mstrong = 4.32; F(1,149) = 8.50, p = .004). However, a strong brand reputation and weak 
brand reputation did not differ in terms of concern for a coercive strategy (Mweak = 5.63, 
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Mstrong = 5.24; F(1,149) = .82, p = .367). These findings provide partial support for H11b, 
which predicted that a strong brand reputation (vs. weak brand reputation) leads to lower 
levels of concern for both a non-coercive and coercive influence strategy. 
 
2.7.6.4 Main and Mediating Effects of Trust and Concern 
 The effects of trust (H3) and privacy concern (H4) on response intentions were 
tested using multiple regression. In support of H3, trust was found to have a positive 
effect on willingness to provide personal information (β = .716, t(151) = 12.58, p = .000), 
and a negative effect on propensity to provide incomplete information (β = -.332, t(151) 
= -4.32, p = .000), and false information (β = -.198, t(151) = -2.47, p = .01). In support of 
H4, concern was found to have a negative effect on willingness to provide personal 
information (β = -.678, t(151) = -11.32, p = .000), and a positive effect on propensity to 
provide incomplete information (β = .608, t(151) = 9.41, p = .000), and false information 
(β = .381, t(151) = 5.06, p = .000). Thus, H3 and H4 are fully supported. 
 To assess whether perceptions of trust and privacy concern mediate the effects of 
influence strategy and brand reputation on response intentions mediation analyses were 
conducted using the bootstrapping method. Trust is found to partially mediate the effect 
of influence strategy on willingness to provide personal information (βaxb = -.625, 95% 
CI = -1.04 to -.231), and to fully mediate the effect of influence strategy on propensity to 
provide incomplete (βaxb = .280, 95% CI = .086 to .608), and false (βaxb = .280, 95% CI = 
.082 to .581) information. Thus, H5a is partially supported, while H5b and H5c are fully 
supported. Trust is also found to partially mediate the effect of brand reputation on 
willingness to provide personal information (βaxb = .722, 95% CI = .328 to 1.13), and to 
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fully mediate the effect of influence strategy on propensity to provide incomplete (βaxb = -
.367, 95% CI = -.665 to -.168), and false (βaxb = -.367, 95% CI = -.666 to -.161) 
information. Thus, H6a is partially supported, while H6b and H6c are fully supported. 
 Concern is found to partially mediate the effect of influence strategy on 
willingness to provide personal information (βaxb = -.425, 95% CI = -.855 to -.055), and 
to fully mediate the effect of influence strategy on propensity to provide incomplete (βaxb 
= .384, 95% CI = .043 to .761), and false (βaxb = .384, 95% CI = .036 to .766) 
information. Thus, H7a is partially supported, while H7b and H7c are fully supported. 
Concern is also found to partially mediate the effect of brand reputation on willingness to 
provide personal information (βaxb = .501, 95% CI = .127 to .903), and to fully mediate 
the effect of influence strategy on propensity to provide incomplete (βaxb = -.483, 95% CI 
= -.866 to -.136), and false (βaxb = -.483, 95% CI = -.872 to -.128) information. Thus, H8a 
is partially supported, while H8b and H8c are fully supported. A summary of the 
mediating effects of trust and concern can be seen in Table 2.13. 
 
2.7.7 Discussion 
 The results from Study 3 offer additional support for the main effects of influence 
strategy and brand reputation on trust and privacy concern. Furthermore, this study 
replicated the results for all two-way interaction effects found in Studies 1 and 2, thus 
providing strong support that the findings are robust. The results also provide full support 
that trust (H3) and privacy concern (H4) have an effect on consumers' response 
intentions. Consistent with the findings from Study 1 and Study 2, trust and privacy 
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concern are found to mediate the effects of influence strategy and brand reputation on 
consumers' response intentions (H5-H8). 
 The previously unexplored two-way interaction between influence strategy and 
brand reputation was found to be significant. In full support of H11a, non-coercive and 
coercive strategies both lead to higher trust for a company with a strong brand reputation, 
as compared to a company with a weak brand reputation. In partial support of H11b, a 
non-coercive strategy leads to less concern for a company with a strong brand reputation, 
but for a coercive strategy levels of trust did not differ when the company had a strong, or 
weak, brand reputation. These findings have important implications as they suggest that 
the effectiveness of strategies for building trust, and reducing privacy concern, are 
contingent upon the company's reputation for trustworthiness. A strong reputation allows 
for greater flexibility in the use of various influence strategies, as the negative effects of 
coercive strategies on trust and concern are mitigated, and the positive effects of non-
coercive strategies on trust and concern are enhanced. A three-way interaction between 
the exogenous variable (i.e., influence strategy, brand reputation, regulatory focus) was 
not found in this study, thus H12 is not supported. 
 In summary, full support is found for hypotheses H1a, H1b, H1c, H2a, H2b, H2c, 
H3, H4, H5b, H5c, H6b, H6c, H7b, H7c, H8b, H8c, H9a, H9b, H10a, H10b, and H11a; 
partial support for H1e, H5a, H6a, H7a, H8a, and H11b; and no support for H1d, H2d, 
H2e, and H12. In general, the results of Study 3 replicate, and extend the findings from 
Studies 1 and 2, by providing evidence of an interaction effect between influence strategy 
and brand reputation. 
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2.8 General Discussion 
 As Table 2.2 reveals, the results of these three studies provide strong support of 
the main effects of influence strategy and brand reputation on trust, privacy concern, and 
consumer response. The moderating effect of regulatory focus is also established. The 
results demonstrate the importance of trust and privacy concern for encouraging self-
disclosure. Overall, full support is found for 19 hypotheses, partial support for 13 
hypotheses, and no support for 4 hypotheses. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate the effects of 
influence strategies and brand reputation on trust, concern, and consumer response. 
Regulatory focus is shown to be a key moderating variable that influences the 
effectiveness of influence strategies and brand reputation for building trust, reducing 
concerns, and encouraging self-disclosure. Study 3 offers a replication of the main effects 
and two-way interactions found in Studies 1 and 2. Study 3 also provides an extension of 
these findings by demonstrating how brand reputation moderates the effects of influence 
strategies on trust and concern.  
 The findings from this essay provide strong evidence that various influence 
strategies and brand reputations have dramatically different effects on privacy, and their 
effectiveness is contingent upon their compatibility with consumers' goals for privacy 
protection or the attainment of benefits. In addition, certain types of influence strategies 
are more effective depending on the reputation of the company. Four key sets of findings 
are addressed in this discussion: 1) the effects of various influence strategies and brand 
reputations on trust, concern, and consumer response, 2) the role of trust and privacy 
concern in self-disclosure decisions, 3) the importance of compatibility between 
consumers' regulatory focus and the types of influence strategies and brand reputations 
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employed by marketers, and 4) the compatibility between a brand's reputation and the 
influence strategies they use to encourage self-disclosure. 
 
 Effects of Influence Strategies and Brand Reputation. Non-coercive types of 
influence strategies (e.g., privacy policies, trust seals) as compared to coercive types 
(e.g., rewards, threats), led to the highest levels of trust, and lowest levels of privacy 
concern. Furthermore, non-coercive strategies resulted in a greater willingness to provide 
personal information, and less propensity to provide false information. As the 
experimental manipulation checks suggest, Web sites that employ non-coercive types of 
strategies are perceived to be safer and more trustworthy than Web sites that use coercive 
strategies. These findings are consistent with studies in the literature that question the 
effectiveness of incentives for gaining consumers' personal information, because they 
may intensity privacy concerns and lead to mistrust (Hoffman et al. 1999; Andrade et al. 
2002; Ward et al. 2005). The findings from this essay suggest that the use of rewards for 
encouraging self-disclosure on the Internet may have unintended, or undesirable, 
consequences for consumer privacy. However, it should be noted that much research has 
found the use of incentives to have a positive impact on online consumers' decision to 
provide personal information (Culnan and Bies, 2003; Hann et al. 2003; Xie et al. 2006), 
and thus its effects are further explored in this essay by considering how consumer goals, 
and brand reputation, may serve as boundary conditions. 
 A strong brand reputation as compared to a weak brand reputation led to the 
highest levels of trust, and lowest levels of privacy concern. Furthermore, a strong brand 
reputation resulted in a greater willingness to provide personal information, and less 
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propensity to provide incomplete information. As the experimental manipulation checks 
suggest a strong brand reputation is perceived to be more credible and trustworthy. These 
results are consistent with studies in the literature that find that a Web site's strong 
reputation positively influences trust and negatively influences privacy concerns 
(Andrade et al. 2002; Eastlick et al. 2006; Xie et al. 2006). The findings from this essay 
suggest that a strong company reputation can be a major advantage in the collection of 
consumer data.  
 
 The Role of Trust and Privacy Concern in Self-Disclosure Decisions. Trust and 
privacy concern are two related, but distinct approaches for encouraging consumers to 
disclose personal information. Although typically negatively correlated, previous 
literature (Milne and Boza 1999; Writz and Lwin 2009) has found individuals to respond 
differently to trust and privacy concern, with trust responses leading to compliant 
behavior (i.e., disclosure), and concern responses leading to protective behavior (i.e., 
refusal to provide information, misrepresentation of data). It has even been suggested by 
Milne and Boza (1999) that building trust may be a more effective strategy for 
encouraging disclosure than reducing privacy concerns.  This essay examined the joint 
effects of both trust and privacy concern and found that while an increase in trust, and 
reduction in concern, each led to more self-disclosure, concern had a greater mitigating 
effect on protective behaviors (i.e., providing incomplete or false information). In each of 
the three studies, regression results showed that trust had a stronger effect on self-
disclosure, as compared to the beta coefficients for privacy concern. On the other hand, 
concern had a stronger effect on the propensity to provide incomplete data, as compared 
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to trust. These findings are consistent with previous studies that found trust to lead to 
compliant responses, and concern to lead to protective responses.  
 In two of the studies an unexpected positive effect of trust was found on 
propensity to provide false information. Milne and Boza (1999) demonstrated that 
consumers can perceive varying degrees of trust and concern at the same time. For 
example, it is possible for an individual to trust the company they are dealing with but be 
concerned about having to provide their sensitive information. Thus, a consumer may 
have high trust, but still choose to provide false information, because they are concerned 
about providing personal information. The findings suggest that while trust is important 
for firms in persuading consumers to provide their information, privacy concerns must be 
alleviated through the use of safety cues in order to ensure that the data provided is 
accurate. Thus, trust may be necessary for encouraging disclosure, but insufficient for 
obtaining quality data. 
 Trust and concern are found to be important mechanisms through which influence 
strategies and brand reputation impact consumer response behavior. Trust and privacy 
concern were found to either partially, or fully, mediate each of the effects of influence 
strategy and brand reputation on response. Specifically, trust and concern serve to fully 
mediate the effects of influence strategy and brand reputation on propensity to provide 
incomplete information, and partially mediate the effects on self-disclosure and 
propensity to provide false information. The findings suggest that privacy perceptions are 
important intervening beliefs that help explain why consumers respond the way they do 
to strategies for encouraging disclosure. 
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 While this research provides strong evidence for the inclusion of trust and concern 
in theoretical models for investigating privacy, the partial mediating effects on response 
behavior suggest that other mediating variables may exist. Potential limitations of trust 
and concern for explaining privacy-related behaviors are that they assume perfect 
rationality in disclosure decisions and the stability of privacy preferences. However, 
studies have shown that there is a disconnect between individuals' privacy beliefs, 
intentions, and their actual behavior (Norberg et al. 2007). Recent work in the privacy 
field has started to examine other possible explanations for disclosure behavior such as 
contextual factors (John, Acquisti, and Loewenstein 2011) and emotions (immediate 
gratification: Acquisti 2004). Future research may want to compare the relative effects of 
cognitive and affective decision-making in self-disclosure situations. 
 
 The Impact of Regulatory Focus on Influence Strategy Effectiveness. The aim of 
this research was to help explain the effectiveness of online strategies for encouraging 
self-disclosure by applying the principle of regulatory fit (Higgins, 2000). It was 
predicted that the effectiveness of marketers' strategies for building trust, and reducing 
privacy concerns, may be contingent upon the degree of regulatory fit (Higgins 2000) 
with consumers' goals for privacy protection, or the attainment of benefits.  
 The results provide evidence that the effect of influence strategy on building trust 
and reducing privacy concerns depends on consumers' regulatory goals. These findings 
help to explain why prior research has found mixed findings for the use of incentives and 
safety cues for encouraging self-disclosure. Specifically, the findings from this research 
show that for prevention-focused individuals, a non-coercive strategy resulted in more 
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trust, and less concern than a coercive strategy. In contrast, promotion-focused 
individuals did not differ in their response to the type of influence strategy. In other 
words, the use of incentives was not found to have any major advantages for promotion-
focused individuals, but yet had detrimental effects for prevention-focused individuals, in 
terms of promoting trust, and mitigating privacy concerns.  
 These results are consistent with findings that prevention-focused consumers are 
more receptive to safety information (Pham and Higgins 2005; Noort et al. 2008), and 
also more sensitive to marketers' manipulative cues (Kirmani and Zhu 2007). The results 
however diverge from some of the past research on regulatory focus (Zhao and 
Pechmann 2007), in that the use of incentive-based information was not found to enhance 
persuasion for promotion-focused individuals, as compared to safety-based information. 
This may be a result of context effects, in that self-disclosure on the Internet makes risk 
perceptions more salient. Prior research has found that when risk is made salient 
prevention-focus and promotion-focused individuals behave more similarly (Kirmani and 
Zhu 2007; Herzenstein et al. 2007).  
 From a managerial point of view, these findings suggest that it may always be 
more effective to emphasize safety and protective information for encouraging self-
disclosure on the Internet. Although many Web sites use incentives and rewards to 
encourage self-disclosure, the current findings indicate that individuals are more easily 
persuaded by safety-oriented information. For firms that currently use incentives to 
promote self-disclosure, it may be prudent to segment individuals based on their 
regulatory focus, so as to avoid any negative outcomes of using incentives. Many Web 
sites currently use software to track consumer behavior on their sites, and this 
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information may be used to determine a person's regulatory focus, and for targeting 
communications that fit that focus. Although the current research measured the regulatory 
focus construct, many studies have shown that a person's regulatory focus can be 
temporarily altered (Higgins 1997; Zhao and Pechmann 2007; Herzenstein et al. 2007; 
Kirmani and Zhu 2007). Marketers may be able to frame communications to encourage 
consumers to adopt a promotion-focus and shift their focus away from seeking safety 
information. While this study examined the separate effects of safety-based information 
and incentive-based information, future research may want to examine how the joint 
effects of these influence strategies fit with a person's regulatory focus.  
 
 The Impact of Regulatory Focus on Brand Reputation Effectiveness. The role of 
brands in the privacy literature has received limited attention (Eastlick et al. 2006). Yet, 
both established and newer firms rely on access to consumer information. The 
effectiveness of reputation for alleviating concerns, and building trust, is not entirely 
clear from prior privacy research. Some studies have found a company's reputation to be 
a crucial factor in building trust and easing respondents' concerns about sharing personal 
information with Web sites (Eastlick et al. 2006; Xie et al. 2006). Andrade et al. (2002), 
however, found that only a small percentage of respondents indicated that a company's 
reputation decreased their concern over disclosure, and affected their propensity to 
disclose personal information to a Web site. Thus, it is possible that certain boundary 
conditions exist for the effects of brand reputation on privacy perceptions and self-
disclosure.  
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 This essay contributes to research on self-disclosure by exploring the interaction 
between a company's reputation for trustworthiness and consumers' regulatory focus. 
This research is also one of the first in the marketing literature to examine the interaction 
effects between regulatory focus and branding. It is predicted in this research that a 
strong reputation should be highly effective in building trust, and reducing concern for 
prevention-focused individuals, because these individuals tend to be more responsive to 
safety and protective cues. However, for promotion-focused individuals who are less risk 
adverse, a company's brand reputation will have less of an effect. 
 The results provide evidence that the effect of brand reputation on building trust 
and reducing privacy concerns depends on consumers' regulatory goals. Specifically, the 
findings show that for prevention-focused individuals, a strong brand reputation resulted 
in more trust, and less concern than a weak brand reputation. In contrast, promotion-
focused individuals did not differ in their response to the different type of brand 
reputation. These results suggest that prevention-focused consumers are more sensitive to 
the brand reputation of Web sites.  
 For firms that do not have an established reputation, the results of this study 
suggest that creating a trustworthy reputation should be a primary objective. In particular, 
less reputable companies may need to emphasize the safety and protective features of 
their Web site, since these features help to relieve concerns for individuals with a 
prevention-focus. The next section in this discussion further explores how a company's 
reputation interacts with the types of strategies used for encouraging self-disclosure. 
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 The Impact of Brand Reputation on Strategy Effectiveness. It has been suggested 
in the privacy literature that the effectiveness of using rewards and privacy policies for 
encouraging self-disclosure may depend on a company's brand reputation (Xie et al. 
2006). Consistent with prior findings, the results of the present research indicate that the 
effectiveness of influence strategies (e.g., privacy notices, rewards) for building trust and 
reducing privacy concerns may depend on the strength of a Web site's reputation for 
trustworthiness. Specifically, the findings show that for a company with a strong brand 
reputation, a non-coercive influence strategy led to the highest levels of trust and lowest 
levels of concern. However, for companies with a weak brand reputation, a coercive 
influence strategy led to the lowest levels of trust and highest levels of concern. 
Compared with a weak brand reputation, a strong brand reputation had higher levels of 
trust and lower levels of concern, regardless of the type of strategy used to encourage 
self-disclosure. Thus, a strong brand reputation may allow companies more flexibility 
over the types of strategies they use to encourage disclosure. However, for newly 
established firms on the Internet, the findings suggest that an emphasis on safety 
information may be the most effective for building trust and reducing concern. Because 
the use of rewards for encouraging self-disclosure are often perceived by consumers with 
a degree of skepticism it may be necessary that a company have an established reputation 
to mitigate any negative effects on privacy. In addition, when a company has a strong 
reputation it may offer credibility to its privacy statement, thereby increasing its 
effectiveness.  
 In general, these findings indicate that the effectiveness of using safety cues and 
rewards for encouraging self-disclosure are contingent on the strength of the company's 
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reputation. It is suggested that marketers consider the image and reputation of their 
company when employing different strategies for soliciting personal information. Future 
research may want to consider the joint effects of safety cues and rewards and the 
moderating effects of brand reputation. It is possible that the use of safety cues may help 
mitigate the negative effects of using rewards for both reputable and new companies. 
Very few studies have examined the relative effectiveness of rewards and safety cues for 
different types of firms, and thus provides an important avenue for additional research. 
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Figure 2.1 
Essay 1: Conceptual Model 
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Table 2.1 
Essay 1: Influence Strategies, Definitions, and Examples 
Influence Strategy Definition Examples 
Information Provision The source discusses general 
issues and procedures to try to 
alter the target's general 
perceptions without stating a 
request. 
- Privacy Statement 
- Trust Seal (e.g., Trust.e, 
WebTrust,VeriSign, 
BizRate, epubliceye, 
BBBOnLine) 
- Customer Testimonials 
 
Recommendations The source predicts that the 
target will be more profitable if 
the target follows the source's 
suggestions. 
- Customization, 
personalization of Web site. 
- Customer feedback 
systems. 
Requests The source simply states the 
actions it would like the target 
to take. 
- Customer satisfaction 
surveys, data forms, site 
registration. 
Threats The source threatens the target 
with a future penalty if the 
target does not comply what a 
request. 
- Denied or limited service 
for failure to provide 
information. 
- Member content areas. 
 Promises The source promises the target 
a reward if the target complies 
with a request. 
- Economic (e.g., discounts, 
coupons, rebates, special 
offers) 
- Non-Economic (e.g., 
convenience, customization, 
personalization, access to 
information) 
Notes: Definitions are from McFarland, Challagalla, and Shervani (2006). Information provision, 
recommendations, and requests are classified in the influence strategy literature as non-coercive forms of 
influence, while threats and promises are classified as coercive. 
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Table 2.2 
Essay 1: Summary of Hypotheses  
Study Hyp. Description Supporta 
1, 3 H1 
 
Main Effects of Influence Strategy 
(a) Non-coercive (vs. coercive) strategy will lead to more trust. 
(b) Non-coercive (vs. coercive) strategy will lead to less concern. 
(c) Non-coercive (vs. coercive) strategy will lead to more willingness to provide. 
(d) Non-coercive (vs. coercive) strategy will lead to less incomplete information. 
(e) Non-coercive (vs. coercive) strategy will lead to less false information. 
 
Full 
Full 
Full 
None 
Partial 
2, 3 H2 Main Effects of Brand Reputation 
(a) Strong (vs. weak) brand reputation will lead to more trust. 
(b) Strong (vs. weak) brand reputation will lead to less concern. 
(c) Strong (vs. weak) brand reputation will lead to more willingness to provide. 
(d) Strong (vs. weak) brand reputation will lead to less incomplete information. 
(e) Strong (vs. weak) brand reputation will lead to less false information. 
 
Full 
Full 
Full 
Partial 
None 
1-3 H3 Main Effects of Trust 
(a) Higher (vs. lower) levels of trust will lead to more willingness to provide. 
(b) Higher (vs. lower) levels of trust will lead to less incomplete information. 
(c) Higher (vs. lower) levels of trust will lead to less false information. 
 
Full 
Partial 
Partial 
1-3 H4 Main Effects of Privacy Concern 
(a) Lower (vs. higher) levels of concern will lead to more willingness to provide. 
(b) Lower (vs. higher) levels of concern will lead to less incomplete information. 
(c) Lower (vs. higher) levels of concern will lead to less false information. 
 
Full 
Full 
Partial 
1, 3 H5 Mediating Effects of Trust on Influence Strategies 
(a) Trust mediates the effect of influence strategy on willingness to provide. 
(b) Trust mediates the effect of influence strategy on incomplete information. 
(c) Trust mediates the effect of influence strategy on false information. 
 
Partial 
Full 
Full 
2, 3 H6 Mediating Effects of Trust on Brand Reputation 
(a) Trust mediates the effect of brand reputation on willingness to provide. 
(b) Trust mediates the effect of brand reputation on incomplete information. 
(c) Trust mediates the effect of brand reputation on false information. 
 
Partial 
Full 
Partial 
1, 3 H7 Mediating Effects of Concern on Influence Strategies 
(a) Concern mediates the effect of influence strategy on willingness to provide. 
(b) Concern mediates the effect of influence strategy on incomplete information. 
(c) Concern mediates the effect of influence strategy on false information. 
 
Partial 
Full 
Partial 
2, 3 H8 Mediating Effects of Concern on Brand Reputation 
(a) Concern mediates the effect of brand reputation on willingness to provide. 
(b) Concern mediates the effect of brand reputation on incomplete information. 
(c) Concern mediates the effect of brand reputation on false information. 
 
Partial 
Full 
Partial 
1, 3 H9 Moderating Effects of Regulatory Focus on Influence Strategy 
(a) Regulatory focus moderates the relationship between influence strategy and trust. 
(b) Regulatory focus moderates the relationship between influence strategy and 
concern.  
 
Full 
Full 
 
2, 3 H10 Moderating Effects of Regulatory Focus on Brand Reputation 
(a) Regulatory focus moderates the relationship between reputation and trust. 
(b) Regulatory focus moderates the relationship between reputation and concern. 
 
Full 
Full 
3 H11 Moderating Effects of Brand Reputation on Influence Strategy 
(a) Reputation moderates the relationship between influence strategy and trust. 
(b) Reputation moderates the relationship between influence strategy and concern. 
 
Full 
Partial 
3 H12 3-Way Interaction: Influence Strategy, Brand Reputation, Regulatory Focus 
(a) There is a three-way interaction between the exogenous variables on trust. 
(b) There is a three-way interaction between the exogenous variables on concern. 
 
None 
None 
a
 Support for hypotheses are based on the associated studies with p < .05 cutoff. 
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Table 2.3 
Essay 1: Study Summary 
Study Description Experimental Designa 
1 Interaction Effects between Influence Strategies 
and Regulatory Focus 
 
2 (IS: coercive vs. non-coercive) x 2 
(RF: promotion vs. prevention) 
n = 93 
2 Interaction Effects between Brand Reputation 
and Regulatory Focus 
 
2 (BR: strong vs. weak) x 2 (RF: 
promotion vs. prevention) 
n = 124 
3 Interaction Effects between Influence Strategies, 
Brand Reputation, and Regulatory Focus (Three-
way factorial) 
2 (IS: coercive vs. non-coercive) x 2 
(BR: strong vs. weak) x 2 (RF: 
promotion vs. prevention) 
n = 153 
a
 IS = Influence Strategy, BR = Brand Reputation, RF = Regulatory Focus. 
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Table 2.4 
Essay 1: Demographics of Respondents 
Variable Frequency Percentage 
 Study 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Age       
<19 4 0 7 4.3 0 4.6 
20-24 17 24 25 18.3 19.4 16.3 
25-34 24 42 56 25.8 33.9 36.6 
35-44 20 18 29 21.5 14.5 19.0 
45-54 18 30 23 19.4 24.2 15.0 
>54 10 10 13 10.7 8 8.5 
       
Gender       
Male 35 50 64 37.6 40.3 41.8 
Female 58 74 89 62.4 59.7 58.2 
       
Education       
High School 13 11 9 13.9 8.9 5.8 
College 65 87 119 69.8 70.1 77.7 
Graduate 15 26 23 16.1 20.9 15.0 
       
Income       
<$20k 22 32 28 23.7 25.8 18.3 
$20-29k 15 15 30 16.1 12.1 19.6 
$30-39k 11 18 21 11.8 14.5 13.7 
$40-49k 11 11 19 11.8 8.9 12.4 
$50-59k 7 19 15 7.5 15.3 9.8 
$60-69k 5 7 5 5.4 5.6 3.3 
>70k 22 22 35 23.7 17.8 22.9 
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Table 2.5 
Essay 1: Results of Manipulation Checks 
 Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
Influence Strategy    
Coercive p = .006 - p = .005 
     Non-Coercive 3.50 (1.64) - 3.69 (1.65) 
     Coercive 4.57 (1.98) - 4.50 (1.87) 
Safe p = .005 - p = .000 
     Non-Coercive 4.16 (1.56) - 4.25 (1.50) 
     Coercive 3.20 (1.56) - 3.26 (1.63) 
Trustworthy p = .003 - p = .002 
     Non-Coercive 4.12 (1.55) - 4.18 (1.44) 
     Coercive 3.09 (1.59) - 3.37 (1.77) 
    
Brand Reputation    
Credible - p = .000 p = .000 
     Weak Reputation - 3.64 (1.10) 3.40 (1.42) 
     Strong Reputation - 5.32 (1.11) 5.08 (1.40) 
Reputable - p = .000 p = .000 
     Weak Reputation - 3.61 (1.07) 3.44 (1.31) 
     Strong Reputation - 5.24 (1.11) 5.36 (1.32) 
    *Mean (standard deviation) 
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Table 2.6 
Essay 1: Correlation Matrix 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Study 1        
   Promotion 1       
   Prevention .075 1      
   Trust .220* .076 1     
   Concern -.186 .096 -.703** 1    
   Willing .329** -.009 .702** -.701** 1   
   Incomplete -.211* -.047 -.452** .471** -.424** 1  
   False .007 .035 .454** -.310** .334** -.222* 1 
        
Study 2        
   Promotion 1       
   Prevention -.031 1      
   Trust -.021 .248** 1     
   Concern .195* -.111 -.520** 1    
   Willing -.071 .076 .657** -.647** 1   
   Incomplete .023 .043 -.306** .484** -.473** 1  
   False -.034 .180* .553** -.294** .422** -.122 1 
        
Study 3        
   Promotion 1       
   Prevention -.046 1      
   Trust .215** -.111 1     
   Concern -.001 .205* -.521** 1    
   Willing .086 -.198* .716** -.678** 1   
   Incomplete -.032 .217** -.332** .608** -.426** 1  
   False .018 .197* -.198* .381** -.195* .655** 1 
 * p<.05, ** p<.01 
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Table 2.7 
Essay 1: Psychometric Properties and CFA Results (Study 1) 
Constructs and Scale Items Mean SD α Std. 
Loading 
t-value Composite  
Reliability 
AVE 
Trust   .92   .93 .82 
I trust the company's Web site to keep my best interest in mind. 3.58 1.70  .91 -   
The company's Web site is trustworthy. 4.03 1.43  .88 12.61   
I can count on this company's Web site to protect my privacy. 3.75 1.64  .93 14.32   
Concern   .91   .92 .79 
I would think twice before providing this company's Web site with my 
personal information. 
5.38 1.48  .90 -   
It bothers me when this company's Web site asks me for personal information. 5.35 1.59  .88 12.09   
I would be concerned about giving information to this company's Web site. 5.02 1.68  .90 12.67   
Willingness to Provide   .96   .97 .91 
I am willing to provide personal information when registering with the 
company's Web site. 
3.77 1.68  .95 -   
I am likely to share my personal information when registering with the 
company's Web site. 
3.77 1.73  .97 21.83   
I would reveal my personal information when registering with the company's 
Web site. 
3.72 1.70  .95 20.29   
Incomplete Information   .86   .87 .70 
I would provide incomplete information when registering with the company's 
Web site. 
4.14 1.76  .90 -   
I would withhold pieces of my personal information when registering with the 
company's Web site. 
4.59 1.67  .89 11.26   
I would not provide complete personal information when registering with the 
company's Web site. 
4.56 1.67  .71 8.06   
False Information   .96   .96 .89 
I would consider falsifying my personal information when registering with the 
company's Web site. 
3.30 1.94  .93 -   
I am likely to provide inaccurate personal information when registering with 
the company's Website 
3.17 1.90  .94 17.79   
I would probably misrepresent my personal information when registering with 
the company's Web site. 
3.17 1.82  .96 18.79   
Model Fit: χ2 = 93.78, df = 80, p = .13, CFI = .99, NFI = .96, GFI = .88, AGFI = .82, RMSEA = .04 
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Table 2.8 
Essay 1: Discriminant Validity Analysis* 
 Trust Concern Willingness Incomplete False 
Study 1      
   Trust .82     
   Concern .56 .79    
   Willingness .53 .54 .91   
   Incomplete .22 .22 .16 .70  
   False .08 .09 .04 .53 .89 
      
Study 2      
   Trust .75     
   Concern .36 .63    
   Willingness .49 .51 .92   
   Incomplete .12 .30 .24 .74  
   False .10 .12 .16 .47 .90 
      
Study 3      
   Trust .69     
   Concern .37 .76    
   Willingness .59 .60 .94   
   Incomplete .10 .37 .16 .81  
   False .04 .16 .04 .49 .89 
*Based on (Fornell and Larcker 1981): AVE in the diagonal and squared correlations off-diagonal. 
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Table 2.9 
Essay 1: Multivariate and Univariate Results 
Multivariate results  Univariate resultsa 
Wilks' λ F p  Trustb  Concernb Independent variables 
    
df MS F p  MS F p 
Study 1             
   IS .90 4.73 .011  1 17.24 9.17 .003  11.95 6.04 .016 
   RF .93 3.00 .054  1 10.67 5.67 .019  8.26 4.18 .044 
   IS x RF .88 5.82 .004  1 22.07 11.74 .001  11.37 5.75 .019 
   Error     89 1.88    1.97   
             
Study 2             
   BR .82 12.73 .000  1 35.36 21.56 .000  21.81 13.09 .000 
   RF .91 5.89 .004  1 11.83 7.21 .008  15.06 9.04 .003 
   BR x RF .87 8.73 .000  1 18.48 11.26 .001  21.47 12.89 .000 
   Error     120 1.640    1.66   
             
Study 3             
    IS .92 6.09 .003  1 18.79 12.09 .001  9.81 4.33 .039 
    BR .91 6.56 .002  1 17.92 11.53 .001  17.82 7.87 .006 
    RF .93 5.40 .005  1 16.53 10.63 .001  9.44 4.17 .043 
    IS x RF .95 3.14 .046  1 7.98 5.13 .025  9.70 4.28 .040 
    BR x RF .89 8.72 .000  1 7.39 4.75 .031  9.35 4.13 .044 
    IS x BR .90 7.81 .001  1 6.20 3.99 .048  8.96 3.96 .048 
    IS x BR x RF 1.00 .003 .997  1 .004 .003 .960  .002 .001 .974 
    Error     149 1.55    2.26   
         
a
 Boldface indicates significant univariate results (p<.05). 
         
b
 Included as a dependent variable in multivariate analysis. 
         IS = Influence Strategy, BR = Brand Reputation, RF = Regulatory Focus 
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Table 2.10 
Essay 1: Univariate Results 
Univariate resultsa 
Willingness  Incomplete  False Independent variables 
df MS F p  MS F p  MS F p 
Study 1             
   IS 1 18.53 7.99 .006  3.95 1.70 .195  2.75 3.90 .051 
   RF 1 24.85 10.71 .002  .322 .139 .710  1.04 1.47 .228 
   IS x RF 1 20.04 8.63 .004  1.32 .573 .451  .485 .686 .410 
   Error 89 2.32    2.31    .707   
             
Study 2             
   BR 1 24.24 10.67 .001  7.19 2.67 .105  7.96 16.47 .000 
   RF 1 10.36 4.56 .035  .971 .361 .549  1.36 2.83 .095 
   BR x RF 1 22.95 10.10 .002  2.24 .833 .363  1.44 2.98 .086 
   Error 120 2.27    2.69    .483   
             
Study 3             
    IS 1 27.55 10.18 .002  3.64 1.20 .274  9.59 2.62 .107 
    BR 1 29.96 11.07 .001  .014 .005 .946  6.23 1.70 .194 
    RF 1 11.71 4.32 .039  18.70 6.18 .014  9.43 2.57 .110 
    IS x RF 1 19.51 7.20 .008  8.21 2.71 .101  8.43 2.30 .131 
    BR x RF 1 .357 .132 .717  2.83 .393 .334  .099 .027 .869 
    IS x BR 1 .127 .047 .829  2.50 .828 .364  2.55 .698 .405 
    IS x BR x RF 1 .791 .292 .590  .066 .022 .883  1.96 .538 .464 
    Error 149 2.70    3.02    3.65   
          a
 Boldface indicates significant univariate results (p<.05). 
                      IS = Influence Strategy, BR = Brand Reputation, RF = Regulatory Focus 
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Table 2.11 
Essay 1: Follow-up Tests in MANOVA 
Trust  Concern Independent  
Variables Coef. SE t-value Sig. t 95% CI Result  Coef. SE t-value Sig. t 95% CI Result 
Study 1              
   IS .902 .297 3.02 .003 (.156, .164) Sig.  -.750 .305 -2.45 .015 (-1.51, .013) n.s. 
   RF .709 .297 2.38 .019 (-.036, 1.45) n.s.  -.624 .305 -2.04 .043 (-1.38, .140) n.s. 
   IS x RF -2.04 .595 -3.42 .000 (-3.53, -.549) Sig.  1.46 .610 2.39 .018 (-.064, 2.99) n.s. 
              
Study 2              
   BR -1.09 .235 -4.64 .000 (-1.67, -.507) Sig.  .858 .237 3.61 .000 (.268, 1.44) Sig. 
   RF -6.32 .235 -2.68 .008 (-1.21, -.046) Sig.  .713 .237 3.00 .003 (.122, 1.30) Sig. 
   BR x RF 1.58 .471 3.35 .001 (.408, 2.75) Sig.  -1.70 .474 -3.59 .000 (-2.88, -5.22) Sig. 
              
Study 3              
    IS .748 .215 3.47 .000 (.214, 1.28) Sig.  -.541 .259 -2.08 .039 (-1.18, .103) n.s. 
    BR -.731 .215 -3.39 .000 (-1.26, -.196) Sig.  .729 .259 2.80 .005 (.084, 1.37) Sig. 
    RF .702 .215 3.26 .001 (.167, 1.23) Sig.  -.530 .259 -2.04 .042 (-1.17, .114) n.s. 
    IS x RF -.976 .430 -2.26 .024 (-2.04, .092) n.s.  1.07 .519 2.07 .040 (-.213, 2.36) n.s. 
    BR x RF -.930 .430 -2.18 .030 (-2.00, .129) n.s.  -1.05 .519 -2.03 .043 (-2.34, .233) n.s. 
    IS x BR .860 .430 1.99 .047 (-.208, 1.92) n.s.  1.03 .519 1.99 .048 (-2.55, 2.32) n.s. 
    IS x BR x RF -.040 .861 -.050 .960 (-2.18, 2.09) n.s.  -.033 1.03 -.032 .974 (-2.61, 2.54) n.s. 
    IS = Influence Strategy, BR = Brand Reputation, RF = Regulatory Focus 
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Table 2.12 
Essay 1: Cell Means and Standard Deviations (Study 1) 
 Coercive Strategy Non-Coercive Strategy 
 Promotion Prevention  Promotion  Prevention 
Trusta 4.01 
(1.28) 
2.28 
(1.34) 
3.89 
(1.49) 
4.20 
(1.33) 
Concernb 5.09 
(1.37) 
6.45 
(.53) 
5.07 
(1.67) 
4.96 
(1.43) 
Cell Size 21 14 26 32 
      aMeasured on a seven-point scale; higher numbers indicate greater trust. 
      bMeasured on a seven-point scale; higher numbers indicate greater concern. 
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Table 2.13 
Essay 1: Mediation Analysis 
 Indirect Effect Direct Effect 
 Coef. 95% CI Coef. t-value 
Mediation Type 
Study 1      
Mediating Effects of Trust      
   Influence Strategy → Willingness -.571 (-1.16,-.090) -.724 -2.07* Partial Mediation 
   Influence Strategy → Incomplete .336 (.051, .763) .425 1.31 Full Mediation 
   Influence Strategy → False -.184 (-.407, -.031) -.319 -1.77 Full Mediation 
      
Mediating Effects of Concern      
   Influence Strategy → Willingness -.479 (-.974, -.018) -.724 -2.07* Partial Mediation 
   Influence Strategy → Incomplete .296 (.300, .669) .425 1.31 Full Mediation 
   Influence Strategy → False -.101 (-.274, .006) -.319 -1.77 No Mediation 
      
Study 2      
Mediating Effects of Trust      
   Brand Reputation → Willingness .844 (.469, 1.29) .997 3.47*** Partial Mediation 
   Brand Reputation → Incomplete -.388 (-.755, -.135) -.505 -1.68 Full Mediation 
   Brand Reputation → False .295 (.159, .497) .545 4.23*** Partial Mediation 
      
Mediating Effects of Concern      
   Brand Reputation → Willingness .664 (.223, 1.07) .997 3.47*** Partial Mediation 
   Brand Reputation → Incomplete -.529 (-.949, -.236) -.505 -1.68 Full Mediation 
   Brand Reputation → False .098 (.016, .235) .545 4.23*** Partial Mediation 
      
Study 3      
Mediating Effects of Trust      
   Influence Strategy → Willingness -.625 (-1.04, -.231) -.811 -2.84** Partial Mediation 
   Influence Strategy → Incomplete .280 (.086, .608) .436 1.52 Full Mediation 
   Influence Strategy → False .280 (.082, .581) .436 1.52 Full Mediation 
   Brand Reputation → Willingness .722 (.328, 1.13) .964 3.43*** Partial Mediation 
   Brand Reputation → Incomplete -.367 (-.665, -.168) -.018 -.063 Full Mediation 
   Brand Reputation → False -.367 (-.666, -.161) -.018 -.063 Full Mediation 
      
Mediating Effects of Concern      
   Influence Strategy → Willingness -.425 (-.855, -.055) -.811 -2.84** Partial Mediation 
   Influence Strategy → Incomplete .384 (.043, .761) .436 1.52 Full Mediation 
   Influence Strategy → False .384 (.036, .766) .436 1.52 Full Mediation 
   Brand Reputation → Willingness .501 (.127, .903) .964 3.43*** Partial Mediation 
   Brand Reputation → Incomplete -.483 (-.866, -.136) -.018 -.063 Full Mediation 
   Brand Reputation → False -.483 (-.872, -.128) -.018 -.063 Full Mediation 
         ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 
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Table 2.14 
Essay 1: Psychometric Properties and CFA Results (Study 2) 
Constructs and Scale Items Mean SD α Std. 
Loading 
t-value Composite  
Reliability 
AVE 
Trust   .90   .90 .75 
I trust the company's Web site to keep my best interest in mind. 3.29 1.60  .82 -   
The company's Web site is trustworthy. 3.88 1.50  .84 11.07   
I can count on this company's Web site to protect my privacy. 3.52 1.69  .94 12.50   
Concern   .83   .84 .63 
I would think twice before providing this company's Web site with my personal 
information. 
5.35 1.65  .88 -   
It bothers me when this company's Web site asks me for personal information. 5.33 1.66  .76 9.40   
I would be concerned about giving information to this company's Web site. 4.99 1.67  .75 9.30   
Willingness to Provide   .97   .97 .92 
I am willing to provide personal information when registering with the company's 
Web site. 
3.43 1.65  .95 -   
I am likely to share my personal information when registering with the company's 
Web site. 
3.41 1.70  .96 24.48   
I would reveal my personal information when registering with the company's Web 
site. 
3.40 1.68  .98 26.93   
Incomplete Information   .89   .89 .74 
I would provide incomplete information when registering with the company's Web 
site. 
4.48 1.84  .91 -   
I would withhold pieces of my personal information when registering with the 
company's Web site. 
4.89 1.77  .90 14.07   
I would not provide complete personal information when registering with the 
company's Web site. 
4.69 1.83  .77 10.91   
False Information   .96   .96 .90 
I would consider falsifying my personal information when registering with the 
company's Web site. 
3.50 2.05  .93 -   
I am likely to provide inaccurate personal information when registering with the 
company's Website 
3.31 1.93  .93 19.86   
I would probably misrepresent my personal information when registering with the 
company's Web site. 
3.25 1.92  .99 25.00   
Model Fit: χ2 = 147.43, df = 80, p = .00, CFI = .98, NFI = .95, GFI = .86, AGFI = .79, RMSEA = .08 
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Table 2.15 
Essay 1: Cell Means and Standard Deviations (Study 2) 
 Strong Brand Reputation Weak Brand Reputation 
 Promotion Prevention  Promotion  Prevention 
Trusta 3.46 
(1.56) 
4.89 
(1.42) 
3.16 
(1.28) 
3.00 
(.94) 
Concernb 5.53 
(1.44) 
3.96 
(1.30) 
5.53 
(1.28) 
5.67 
(1.18) 
Cell Size 22 28 36 38 
  aMeasured on a seven-point scale; higher numbers indicate greater trust. 
  bMeasured on a seven-point scale; higher numbers indicate greater concern. 
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Table 2.16 
Essay 1: Psychometric Properties and CFA Results (Study 3) 
Constructs and Scale Items Mean SD α Std. 
Loading 
t-value Composite  
Reliability 
AVE 
Trust   .87   .87 .69 
I trust the company's Web site to keep my best interest in mind. 3.39 1.63  .77 -   
The company's Web site is trustworthy. 3.86 1.56  .88 11.22   
I can count on this company's Web site to protect my privacy. 3.37 1.63  .85 10.83   
Concern   .91   .90 .76 
I would think twice before providing this company's Web site with my personal 
information. 
5.25 1.75  .91 -   
It bothers me when this company's Web site asks me for personal information. 5.18 1.67  .81 13.64   
I would be concerned about giving information to this company's Web site. 4.90 1.80  .90 16.96   
Willingness to Provide   .98   .98 .94 
I am willing to provide personal information when registering with the company's 
Web site. 
3.44 1.83  .97 -   
I am likely to share my personal information when registering with the company's 
Web site. 
3.40 1.83  .97 35.69   
I would reveal my personal information when registering with the company's Web 
site. 
3.39 1.82  .98 39.24   
Incomplete Information   .92   .93 .81 
I would provide incomplete information when registering with the company's Web 
site. 
4.39 1.87  .94 -   
I would withhold pieces of my personal information when registering with the 
company's Web site. 
4.67 1.87  .94 21.95   
I would not provide complete personal information when registering with the 
company's Web site. 
4.68 1.92  .83 15.39   
False Information   .96   .96 .89 
I would consider falsifying my personal information when registering with the 
company's Web site. 
3.37 2.05  .92 -   
I am likely to provide inaccurate personal information when registering with the 
company's Website 
3.42 1.98  .96 23.16   
I would probably misrepresent my personal information when registering with the 
company's Web site. 
3.39 1.97  .95 22.42   
Model Fit: χ2 = 114.65, df = 80, p = .00, CFI = .99, NFI = .97, GFI = .91, AGFI = .86, RMSEA = .05 
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Table 2.17 
Essay 1: Cell Means and Standard Deviations (Study 3) 
 Promotion Prevention 
3-way 
ANOVA 
Weak 
Reputation 
Strong 
Reputation 
Weak 
Reputation 
Strong 
Reputation 
 NC C NC C NC C NC C 
Trusta 3.55 
(1.29) 
2.87 
(1.36) 
4.33 
(1.31) 
4.49 
(1.33) 
3.81 
(.87) 
2.14 
(.78) 
3.63 
(1.35) 
2.84 
(1.38) 
Concernb 5.19 
(1.46) 
4.69 
(1.61) 
4.48 
(1.65) 
5.00 
(1.75) 
5.72 
(1.27) 
6.28 
(.77) 
3.94 
(1.26) 
5.54 
(1.76) 
Cell Size 32 13 28 21 11 19 12 17 
         
         
2-way 
ANOVA 
Weak 
Reputation 
Strong 
Reputation 
    
 NC C NC C     
Trusta 3.62 
(1.19) 
2.43 
(1.09) 
4.12 
(1.34) 
3.75 
(1.57) 
    
Concernb 5.33 
(1.42) 
5.63 
(1.41) 
4.32 
(1.55) 
5.24 
(1.75) 
    
    aMeasured on a seven-point scale; higher numbers indicate greater trust. 
    bMeasured on a seven-point scale; higher numbers indicate greater concern. 
  NC = Non-Coercive Influence Strategy, C = Coercive Influence Strategy 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE IMPACT OF COMPENSATION ON INFORMATION OWNERSHIP 
PERCEPTIONS AND PRIVACY CONTROL EXPECTATIONS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 Incentives and rewards are frequently used by marketers to encourage consumers 
to provide their personal information (Phelps, Nowak, and Ferrell 2000; Sheehan and 
Hoy 2000). For instance, a host of retailers and restaurants (e.g., Wal-Mart®, Target®, 
Staples®, Applebees®, Taco Bell®, and Burger King®) direct customers to complete 
surveys on their Web site in return for discounts, sweepstakes, prizes, gift cards, and free 
products. These online surveys typically require customers to enter both demographic and 
personal types of information in order to complete the survey and claim their reward. 
Firms often rely on the willingness of consumers to share their personal information in 
order to gather data for building relationships with their customers and developing 
targeted marketing programs. 
 Increasingly consumers are exchanging and sharing their personal data on the 
Internet in return for various services and other benefits. At the same time, however, 
studies have found that consumers are becoming more concerned about their privacy and 
are demanding greater control over how their information is being used by marketers 
(Sheehan and Hoy 2000; Jupiter Research 2002; Harris Interactive 2002). Despite a 
growing trend in compensating consumers for their information, it is not clear what effect 
these rewards are having on consumers' expectations for privacy protection and control 
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over their information. For instance, when a consumer is compensated for providing their 
personal information, does the consumer feel like they are either giving up, or sharing, 
ownership rights or control of their data? Does the presence of a reward impact 
consumers' expectations for privacy protection? Consumers' perspectives on the exchange 
of personal information for benefits may have important implications for how privacy 
policies and data collection strategies are developed by marketers and regulated by policy 
makers. 
 The effects of compensation on consumers' expectations for privacy are not clear. 
While, several marketing scholars have suggested that consumers perceive the disclosure 
of information for benefits as an exchange, privacy tradeoff, or sacrifice of their privacy 
protection in return for receiving rewards (Phelps et al. 2000; Acquisiti and Varian 2005; 
Dinev and Hart 2006; Hann et al. 2007). Other academics, however, have argued that 
consumers do not view their personal data in the context of an economic exchange of 
information for benefits (Hoffman, Novak, and Peralta 1999; Ward, Bridges, and Chitty 
2005). That is, consumers may not evaluate such privacy trade-offs on an economic basis, 
and may actually be uninterested in "selling" their personal data to marketers, either for 
monetary incentives, or other benefits. Thus, there is mixed evidence on whether the offer 
of a reward reduces consumers' privacy expectations. This warrants further research, as 
how consumers and companies perceive privacy exchanges is likely to impact their 
expectations for ownership rights and control over the consumer's personal information. 
 Questions over who controls and has ownership rights to consumer data are 
emerging as important and multifaceted issues that affect consumers, marketers, 
researchers, and policy makers. For instance, Facebook's chief privacy officer, Chris 
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Kelly, released a statement in 2009 addressing users' concerns about data ownership on 
the social networking site (Wortham 2009). A number of lawsuits have also been filled 
against companies (e.g., DoubleClick, CVS Pharmacy, Sears, Facebook, Google) for 
selling consumers' personal information without consent (Gray 2000; Pearson 2011; 
Jacobs 2008 Vascellaro 2009). Studies that have examined information privacy beliefs 
find that "the boundary between when consumers own and control information about 
themselves and when that information becomes the property of marketers is unclear" 
(Sheehan and Hoy 2000). Discrepant views may emerge about who owns and has control 
over information provided by the consumer, and these inconsistent expectations for 
privacy can have negative consequences for company-consumer relationships (Milne and 
Bahl 2010). 
 
3.2 Overview 
 Several studies have investigated the effect of rewards on encouraging consumers 
to disclose personal information on the Internet (Acquisti and Varian 2005; Hann et al. 
2002; Andrade, Kaltcheva, and Weitz 2002), and have found consumers to be more 
willing to provide their information when a reward is offered. There is, however, a lack 
of empirical research that examines the factors underlying consumers' expectations for 
privacy protection following the disclosure of personal information in exchange for 
benefits. Thus, it is uncertain what effect compensation has on consumers' expectations 
for ownership rights and privacy control over their personal data.   
 A number of researchers have called for additional research on the implications of 
gathering personal information by offering financial benefits, as the effects on consumer 
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privacy perceptions are not well understood (Andrade et al. 2002; Hann et al. 2002; 
Olivero and Lunt 2004; Joinson and Paine 2007). This essay addresses this gap in the 
literature by drawing on social exchange (Kelley and Thibaut 1978), and social contract 
theory (Macneil 1974, 1980), for examining how the value and type of compensation 
received influences the extent to which consumers believe they should have ownership 
rights and control over the information they provide to marketers. The purpose of this 
essay is to address, and integrate, two related issues in the privacy literature, 1) who has 
ownership rights and control over consumer information, and 2) do consumers perceive 
information exchanges as a sacrifice of their privacy protection. This is done by 
empirically testing the effect of compensation on consumers' expectations for privacy 
protection. 
 This essay makes four primary contributions to the information privacy and 
exchange literature. The first is an empirical investigation into the essential, yet 
understudied, areas of information ownership rights and privacy control. Empirical 
studies on information ownership rights and privacy control are scarce, and often rely on 
correlation analysis (Sheehan and Hoy 1999). The second is identifying factors that affect 
consumers' expectations for information ownership rights and control within the context 
of information privacy exchanges. The third is to test the effect of compensation structure 
(i.e., monetary and non-monetary types of compensation) on privacy perceptions. The 
fourth is a multi-method approach to investigating online privacy control issues. Four 
experiments and a qualitative study are used to explore the effects of information 
exchanges on consumers' privacy expectations. 
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3.3 Conceptual Framework 
 Social exchange theory (Kelley and Thibaut 1978) and social contract theory 
(Macneil 1974, 1980) are two complementary theories that have been used as a basis in 
the privacy literature for examining the cost-benefit tradeoffs that consumers make in 
privacy exchanges and the implicit agreements that govern those exchanges. Social 
exchange theory seeks to understand the rules governing the exchange of resources 
between parties in a transaction (Emerson 1981). Personal information is considered to be 
a type of intangible resource that can be exchanged for desired benefits, thereby resulting 
in a sacrifice of privacy protection. The theory suggests that consumers will disclose their 
personal information to marketers when the perceived benefits of doing so outweigh the 
perceived costs (White 2004). 
  This essay draws on these theories for developing a model that examines the 
effect of compensation on a consumer's expectations for ownership rights and privacy 
control to information they disclose to marketers.  In the online privacy context, 
exchanges often involve consumers giving up some of their information and privacy in 
order to obtain benefits in which they are interested. These exchanges may result in 
implicit contracts (Milne and Gordon 1993; Culnan 1995; Milne 2000) between the 
consumer and company that establish expectations for ownership rights and privacy 
control. It is proposed in this research that when consumers disclose their personal 
information in exchange for benefits that this leads to a reduction in both perceptions of 
information ownership rights, and lowered expectations for privacy control. 
 The degree to which a reward leads to a reduction in expectations for information 
ownership rights and privacy control is predicted to depend on the type of information 
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provided, relationship with the firm, and the reputation of the firm. These moderating 
variables are likely to influence the importance for maintaining ownership rights and 
control over personal information. For instance, in the case of high-risk situations such as 
providing sensitive information, or dealing with an unfamiliar company, the presence or 
absence of a reward may affect a consumer's willingness to relinquish some of their 
ownership rights and control over their personal information. As consumers relinquish a 
larger degree of their information ownership rights to marketers, their expectations for 
controlling how that information is used by marketers is predicted to diminish. It is 
argued in this research that expectations for privacy control are contingent on the degree 
to which consumers feel that the information they provide still "belongs" to them. The 
conceptual model is presented in Figure 3.1. 
 
3.4 Background Literature 
3.4.1 Compensation and Privacy Exchange 
 Compensating consumers for providing their personal information to businesses is 
a concept that has been widely advocated in the privacy literature (Westin 1992; Hann et 
al. 2003). It is suggested that companies should reward people for the collection and use 
of their private data. Compensation is an important factor that consumers consider in 
determining whether to provide personal information to a marketer (Milne and Gordon 
1993). Theoretical models used in privacy research, such as social exchange theory, have 
suggested that individuals perform a "privacy calculus" to assess the costs and benefit of 
providing personal information (Laufer and Wolfe 1977; Stone and Stone 1990; Milne 
and Gordon 1993; Lwin 2003). Privacy costs consist of the perceived risks of disclosure 
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and the possibility of forgoing privacy protection. Benefits can be any monetary (e.g., 
coupons, discounts, rebates), or non-monetary (e.g., convenience, customization, 
personalization, access to exclusive content) reward that consumers receive from Web 
sites (Hann et al. 2002). Evidence has shown that people are generally willing to disclose 
personal information for a variety of benefits that they are interested in (Russell 1989; 
Milne and Gordon 1993). 
  In several studies, it has been suggested that consumers relinquish, or exchange, 
some of their privacy in return for rewards (Nowak and Phelps 1997; Culnan and Bies 
2003; Phelps et al. 2000; Dinev and Hart 2006). Even privacy concerned individuals have 
been found in studies to be willing to reveal personal information for relatively small 
rewards, such as a chance to win $100 (Tedeschi 2002; Spiekermann et al. 2001). It 
appears that consumers are willing to forgo some of their privacy in exchange for 
receiving benefits that are perceived to be of adequate value (Xie, Teo, and Wan 2006). 
Acquisti, John, and Loewenstein (2009) refer to this as a consumer's "willingness to 
accept" compensation in order to give up privacy protection. In other words, how much 
an individual would need to be compensated to permit a decrease in privacy. 
 Despite the much reported success of offering benefits in return for personal 
information, some researchers have found the use of incentives to be a less effective way 
of gaining consumers' personal data (Ward et al. 2005). A study by Hoffman, Novak, and 
Peralta (1999) found that the majority of survey participants were not interested in 
disclosing their personal data to Web sites in exchange for monetary, or non-monetary, 
rewards. Importantly, their findings question whether consumers view their personal 
information in the context of an economic exchange, as many marketers and privacy 
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scholars have presumed. These findings further suggest that consumers may make 
privacy trade-offs, not purely on an economic basis, but also through the evaluation of 
social and non-economic factors, such as trust and relationship building. Such exchanges 
may be governed by implied social agreements that recognize certain rights and 
responsibilities for consumers and marketers, such as the extent to which consumers 
maintain ownership rights and control over their data on the Internet (Hoffman et al. 
1999). 
 
3.4.2 Information Ownership Rights and Privacy Control 
 Ownership rights and privacy control for personal information are two interrelated 
aspects of privacy protection that have emerged as important areas of study for 
academics, businesses, lawyers, and policymakers with the advance of information 
technology. As the extensive use of consumer information has become prevalent in the 
modern marketplace, the issue of who "owns" and controls consumer information is 
raised (Davis 1997; Joinson and Pain 2007). In particular, the Internet has created an 
unprecedented free flow of information that frequently makes it unclear as to each parties' 
rights and responsibilities for maintaining consumer privacy. For marketers, 
understanding how individuals view their rights and responsibilities to the information 
they disclose is vital as it may impact what a firm can use personal information for and 
what types of rewards they must provide as compensation for that data (Davis 1997). 
Without an understanding of how consumers think about their privacy protection in 
information exchanges, companies may inadvertently violate consumers' perceived 
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rights, which can have a negative impact on the relationship with the firm (Foxman and 
Kilcoyne 1993; Milne and Bahl 2010) 
 Information ownership has been defined in the privacy literature as the legitimate 
right to having control over the access, use, and distribution of information (Davis 1997; 
Lipinski and Britz 2000). The information ownership construct has also been computed 
as the ratio of how much information is perceived to belong to the individual or the 
company (Constant, Kiesler, and Sproull 1994). In the current research information 
ownership is conceptualized as a multifaceted construct in which two countervailing 
facets are taken together to measure the extent to which an individual believes that 
information belongs to themselves, or to the company. It is necessary to consider these 
two dimensions of information ownership in order to assess the propensity and extent to 
which consumers share rights to their information with marketers. 
  In a related manner, privacy control has been defined as an individual's ability to 
exert influence and autonomy over decisions regarding the disclosure and subsequent use 
of their personal information, as well as freedom from unsolicited marketing 
communications (Westin 1967; Altman 1976; Goodwin 1991; Malhotra, Kim, and 
Agarwal 2004). Hence, information ownership rights and control over information are 
intertwined, and positively associated with each other (Jarvenpaa and Staples 2001). 
Factors that may impact perceptions of ownership rights and privacy control include 1) 
the current possession of information, 2) the initial possession of information, and 3) the 
degree of labor that has been exerted in acquiring information (Jarvenpaa and Staples 
2001). In the case of personal information, because it is tied to the identity of an 
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individual, they are seen as having an inherent degree of ownership rights to their 
information. 
 Several perspectives have emerged in the privacy literature for determining the 
extent to which individuals and marketers have rights to own and control the consumers' 
personal information. In one view it has been argued that consumers have absolute 
privacy rights to their information (Hagel and Rayport 1997; Prabhaker 2000; Graeff and 
Harmon 2002). Westin (2001) refers to consumers who expect to have absolute privacy 
rights as 'privacy fundamentalists'. Specifically, some consumers believe that they should 
have the right to know what information a firm has collected about them, access and 
correct any errors, and the ability to specify how the firm can use that information. 
Absolute rights attached to consumers' personal information, however, could have 
dramatic implications for the ability of marketers to use this information. Marketers could 
be required to obtain permission from individuals before using personal information, and 
would be expected to compensate consumers whenever their information is used for 
profit or is used without consent (Davis 1997).  
 An alternative perspective suggests that most consumers and marketers 
acknowledge that the privacy rights of individuals are not absolute, and the boundary 
between when people own information about themselves and when that information 
becomes the property of others is unclear (Milne and Gordon 1993; Foxman and 
Kilcoyne 1993; Davis 1997; Sheehan and Hoy 2000). When a consumer and company 
participate in the exchange process, consumers are likely to believe that the ultimate 
ownership and control of information resides with the individual (Nowak and Phelps 
1992; Sheehan and Hoy 2000). Marketers, however are likely to perceive that they have 
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legitimate ownership rights to the information they have gathered through expenditure of 
their resources, and should control its use and dissemination (Cespedes and Smith 1993; 
Davis 1997;  Sheehan and Hoy 2000). A study by Taylor, Vassar, and Vaught (1995) 
found that companies that collect information from consumers, or purchase information 
from other businesses, often feel that the information belongs to the company and 
therefore are justified in using and selling the information without the consumer's 
consent. Thus, it is clear that consumers and marketers may have discrepant views 
regarding who has ownership rights and control over information collected from the 
consumer (Foxman and Kilcoyne 1993). 
 In an intermediate perspective, several scholars have advocated that control of 
personal information is shared and jointly owned by both the consumer and company 
(Westin 1992; Davis 1997; Foxman and Kilcoyne 1993; Jarvenpaa and Staples 2001). 
Westin (1992) and Masacrenhas et al. (2003) have suggested that consumers can 
willingly transfer control and ownership privileges to marketers when they are adequately 
compensated for the risk of disclosure. Under this economic and market-based approach 
personal information is thought of as property - a valued asset by both individuals and 
marketers - for which ownership rights and control can be traded and exchanged in the 
commercial marketplace (Posner 1978; Lessig 2002). Many online activities such as 
purchase transactions, registering for Web sites, and joining an online community require 
consumers to disclose and share their personal information in order to take advantage of 
these benefits. However, it is often unclear in these privacy exchanges what each party's 
rights are to the provided information. Is it possible that the exchange of personal 
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information for obtaining some benefit from a marketer initiates the transfer of rights to 
that information? 
 Despite the ambiguity and friction in privacy exchanges there is a lack of 
regulation for determining ownership rights and control over information provided by 
consumers (Lessig 2002; Graeff and Harmon 2002; Bergelson 2003). Furthermore, 
although most Web sites now post privacy policies the majority of consumers do not read 
them (Milne and Culnan 2004), and so many consumers may not be aware of marketers' 
expectations for ownership and control over the data they collect. Thus, it is important to 
investigate consumers' expectations for ownership and control over their personal 
information in privacy exchanges, as these expectations may differ between consumers 
and marketers (Milne and Bahl 2010). 
 
3.5 Hypotheses 
3.5.1 Main Effects of Compensation 
 In a privacy exchange, consumers give up information and sacrifice some of their 
privacy in order to obtain benefits that they value (Milne and Gordon 1993; Sheehan and 
Hoy 2000; Chellappa and Sin 2005). A number of studies have found that consumers 
appear to be willing to forgo certain levels of privacy for adequate compensation 
(Sheehan and Hoy 2000). Acquisiti et al. (2009) define this as an individual's 
"willingness to accept" compensation to permit a decrease in their privacy protection. 
Thus, when consumers participate in a privacy exchange it may affect their expectations 
for ownership rights and control over their information. For instance, the acceptance of 
payment for personal data may be seen by individuals as providing consent for marketers 
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to use their information for business purposes beyond the initial transaction. Based on 
social exchange theory, the level and type of compensation is likely to determine the 
impact of compensation on a consumer's expectations for privacy protection (Worthy, 
Gary, and Kahn 1969; Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005). 
 Consumers expect to receive benefits for providing personal information that are 
commensurate with the amount and type of information provided (Phelpts et al. 2000; 
Burke 2002; Culnan and Bies 2003). The level of compensation has been shown in 
studies to be viewed as either sufficient or inadequate for the disclosure of personal 
information and risks associated with trading off privacy (Hann et al. 2002; Andrade et 
al. 2002). A reward may only have an effect on privacy expectations when it exceeds a 
threshold level, as a sufficiently large reward may be viewed as adequate compensation 
for providing information (Hann et al. 2002). It is likely that higher compensation levels 
will make consumers more willing to relinquish some of their ownership rights and 
privacy control to marketers. In receiving a highly valued benefit from a marketer, the 
consumer may feel a sense of obligation for letting the company use and disseminate that 
information as part of the exchange process. However, a low level of compensation may 
have little to no effect on a consumer's expectations for privacy protection. Furthermore, 
when consumers are not compensated for providing information they may perceive that 
they retain absolute ownership rights and control over their information, because an 
exchange did not take place and the information was provided voluntarily.  
 The amount of compensation received in a privacy exchange is expected to 
influence the extent to which an individual believes that ownership rights and control are 
held by the company, or themselves. Specifically, it is predicted in this research that the 
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presence of a reward, as compared to a no reward condition, will lead to lower 
perceptions of self-ownership, and higher perceptions of company-ownership. The 
presence of a reward is also expected to lead to lower expectations for privacy control. 
 In addition to the presence of compensation, the type of compensation may also 
affect expectations for privacy protection. Compensation can be classified as either 
monetary (e.g., discounts, coupons, rebates) or non-monetary (e.g., convenience, 
customization, personalization, access to exclusive content) types of rewards. Sheehan 
and Hoy (2000) have suggested that marketers may wish to test what forms of 
compensation are most valued by customers, as various forms of monetary and non-
monetary benefits may be valued differently by consumers.  
 Receiving economic compensation may make the exchange process more explicit, 
thus increasing the perception that a degree of ownership and control is being transferred 
from the consumer to the company. For instance, when companies provide monetary 
compensation such as discounts or "free" products the company may be perceived as 
sacrificing something of value since economic resources are finite. Findings from social 
psychology indicate that economic rewards often lead to different outcomes, and 
expectations than non-economic rewards (Ariely 2008). Economic exchanges involve 
market norms, whereas non-economic exchanges involve relational and social norms. In 
economic exchanges items that are exchanged are viewed as payment for acquiring 
desired benefits. The sales promotion literature has also found monetary and non-
monetary incentives to be processed differently by consumers (Diamond and Campbell 
1989; Diamond 1992). For instance, monetary types of compensation may be more likely 
to induce consumers to evaluate an exchange using a cost-benefit analysis.  
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 Although both monetary and non-monetary types of compensation may lead to a 
reduction in consumers' expectations for privacy protection, it is expected that monetary 
compensation may have a stronger negative effect. It is predicted that a monetary type of 
compensation, as compared to non-monetary, will lead to lower perceptions of self-
ownership, and higher perceptions of company-ownership. A monetary type of reward is 
also expected to lead to lower expectations for privacy control. 
 
H1: Compared with the absence of a reward, the presence of a reward will  
lead consumers to have:  
 (a) lower perceptions of self-ownership. 
 (b) greater perceptions of company-ownership. 
 (c) lower privacy control expectations. 
 
H2: Compared with a non-monetary reward, a monetary reward will lead  
consumers to have: 
 (a) lower perceptions of self-ownership. 
 (b) greater perceptions of company-ownership. 
 (c) lower privacy control expectations. 
 
 
3.5.2 Main and Mediating Effects of Information Ownership 
 In order to achieve a better understanding of the nature of the relationship 
between compensation and privacy control expectations, it is essential to uncover the 
underlying mechanisms and processes through which this relationship operates. 
Specifically, it is suggested in this essay that the impact of compensation on privacy 
control expectations is mediated by perceived information ownership. Perceived 
information ownership has been conceptualized in the information management literature 
as an individual's subjective belief regarding the ratio of how much the information is 
perceived to belong to the individual or to the company (Constant, Kiesler, and Sproull 
1994; Jarvenpaa and Staples 2000, 2001). In that stream of research "perceived 
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information ownership" is tested as an intervening variable that impacts perceptions of 
information sharing.  
 In accordance with prior research on information ownership (Constant et al. 1994; 
Jarvenpaa and Staples 2000, 2001), this essay partitions the construct of information 
ownership into two competing dimensions: perceptions of self-ownership and company-
ownership. These dimensions measure the extent to which an individual believes that 
information belongs to themselves, or the company. It has been argued in the privacy 
literature that consumers can share ownership rights and control privileges with online 
marketers, and that these rights can be transferred to marketers when compensation is 
received (Mascarenhas et al. 2003). Following previous work that has treated the 
information ownership construct as an intervening variable (Constant et al. 1994; 
Jarvenpaa and Staples 2000, 2001), the construct is measured in this research as a 
mediating variable between compensation and expectations for privacy control. 
 It is expected that compensation may influence consumers' expectations for 
privacy control through its impact on information ownership perceptions. Evidence has 
shown that consumers may be willing to give up a degree of privacy control in exchange 
for adequate compensation (Milne and Gordon 1993; Sheehan and Hoy 2000; Hann et al. 
2002). This reduction in privacy control expectations is likely due to a change in beliefs 
regarding the extent to which each party has ownership rights to that information. Social 
contract theory (Milne and Gordon 1993; Culnan 1995; Milne 1997; Miyazaki 2008) 
suggests that when consumers exchange personal information with a company an implicit 
agreement develops in which consumers and marketers are assumed to have certain rights 
with regard to the consumer's personal information. This implied agreement creates 
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expectations for consumers and marketers in terms of the right and ability to control the 
consumer's information. 
  When consumers receive adequate compensation for providing their personal 
information to marketers, they may feel that marketers take on a legitimate claim to being 
able to control and use that information. Thus, when individuals believe that marketers 
have a legitimate right to the control and use of their information, they then recognize 
that their own ability to control their information has diminished. It is predicted that as 
the extent to which an individual perceives a company to have rights to use their personal 
information, the individual's expectations for privacy control are reduced.   
 
H3a: Compared to lower levels of self-ownership, higher levels of self-ownership will  
 lead consumers to have greater expectations for privacy control. 
 
H3b: Compared to higher levels of company-ownership, lower levels of company- 
  ownership will lead consumers to have greater expectations for privacy control.  
 
H4a: Self-ownership mediates the effects of compensation level on privacy control  
expectations. 
 
H4b: Company-ownership mediates the effects of compensation level on privacy control  
   expectations. 
 
H5a: Self-ownership mediates the effects of compensation type on privacy control    
   expectations. 
 
H5b: Company-ownership mediates the effects of compensation type on privacy control   
   expectations. 
 
 
3.5.3 Moderating Effects of Information Sensitivity 
 An important issue in privacy exchanges is the sensitivity of the information 
disclosed by individuals to marketers. Information sensitivity refers to the level of 
privacy concern an individual feels for a type of information in a specific situation 
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(Sheehan and Hoy 2000). Personally identifiable information (PII) has been defined as 
information that can be used to "distinguish or trace an individual's identity" such as: 
name, street address, email address, phone number, credit card information, and social 
security number (FTC 1998; Caudill and Murphy 2000; NIST 2010). Information about 
an individual that may be linked or is linkable to PII include information such as: age, 
date of birth, gender, occupation, education, and income. Consumer concern and 
willingness to provide marketers with information vary dramatically by information type 
(Phelps, Nowak, and Ferrell 2000; Joinson and Paine 2007). Consumers have been found 
to be most concerned, and less willing, to provide personally identifiable information, as 
compared to providing linkable information (Phelps, Nowak, and Ferrell 2000; Okazaki, 
Li, and Hirose 2009). 
 The type of information affects consumers' concern for privacy and the value they 
place on that information (Chellappa and Sin 2005). Malhotra et al. (2004) find that a 
request for more sensitive information by online marketers reduces trust and increases 
perceived risk, because the request makes consumers more cautious and suspicious about 
the marketer's intended use of that information. Thus, consumers may demand, and 
expect more control over their sensitive information. Therefore, it is likely that when 
more sensitive information is provided, compensation may be necessary for influencing 
consumers' ownership perceptions. On the other hand, when the information provided to 
a Web site is less sensitive consumers may demand, and expect little to no ownership 
rights or control over that information, and thus compensation may not have an effect on 
ownership beliefs.  
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 Following previous work that has examined the moderating effects of information 
sensitivity (Lwin, Wirtz, and Williams 2007), it is proposed that the main effects of 
compensation level and type on perceptions of ownership is moderated by information 
sensitivity. Specifically, compensation is expected to lead to a reduction in perceptions of 
self-ownership, and an increase in perceptions of company-ownership, for more sensitive 
information. However, compensation is not expected to have a significant effect for less 
sensitive information. 
 
H6a: In conditions of high information sensitivity (but not low sensitivity), the presence  
(vs. absence) of a reward will lead to lower perceptions of self-ownership. 
 
H6b: In conditions of high information sensitivity (but not low sensitivity), the presence  
(vs. absence) of a reward will lead to higher perceptions of company-ownership. 
 
H7a: In conditions of high information sensitivity (but not low sensitivity), a monetary  
(vs. non-monetary) reward will lead to lower perceptions of self-ownership. 
 
H7b: In conditions of high information sensitivity (but not low sensitivity), a monetary  
(vs. non-monetary) reward will lead to higher perceptions of company-ownership. 
 
 
3.5.4 Moderating Effects of Company Relationship and Reputation 
 Relationship building and a strong brand reputation are ways that companies can 
establish trust and mitigate the risks of disclosing personal information. Studies have 
found that individuals are less concerned with disclosing personal information to a 
company when they have an existing relationship with the company (Hoffman et al. 
1999; White 2004), or when the company has a reputation for being trustworthy 
(Andrade, Kaltcheva, and Weitz 2002; Xie et al. 2006; Eastlick, Lotz, and Warrington 
2006). For instance, the type of relationship between individuals and companies has been 
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shown to have an effect on their information sharing activities (Rindfleisch and Moorman 
2001). 
 Relationships are important factors in commercial exchanges, and two types of 
relationships defined in the marketing literature are transactional, short-term relationships 
and established, long-term relationships (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987; Doney and Canon 
1997; Moorman, Deshpande, and Zaltman 1993 ). Long-term relationships involve trust 
and include elements of reciprocation, dependence, and commitment. Short-term 
relationships on the other hand entail very little communication or commitment beyond 
the immediate exchange. Individuals are more likely to trust companies with their 
personal information when a close relationship has been established relative to 
relationships where trust has not yet been established (Milne, Rohm, and Boza 1999; 
White 2004). Research has also found that consumers feel more comfortable when 
companies they are familiar with have some control over and use their personal 
information for business purposes (Rogers 1996; Milne and Boza 1999). Because 
established, long-term relationships involve trust, commitment, and reciprocation, it is 
predicted that consumers are more apt to share some of their information ownership 
rights with the company. Thus, compensation is expected to be more effective in 
reducing perceptions of self-ownership, and increasing perceptions of company-
ownership when the relationship with the company is long-term, rather than short-term. 
 A company's brand reputation has also been found to signal trustworthiness, 
reliability, and credibility (Chaudhuri 2002;  Moorman et al. 1992; Veloutsou, and 
Moutinho 2009). Consumers use brand reputation as a means of inferring quality about a 
company (Herbing and Milewicz 1995). Brand reputation has been defined in the 
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marketing literature as the extent to which people believe a firm is honest and concerned 
about its customers (Doney and Cannon 1997; Xie et al. 2006). Because a reputation is 
something that takes time for a company to build over time, it is considered unlikely that 
a reputable firm would behave in ways that would jeopardize its reputation (Xie et al. 
2006). A company's reputation for trustworthiness has been found to alter the consumer's 
cost-benefit analysis in privacy exchanges and encourage them to disclose personal 
information (Andrade et al. 2002). Specifically, the reputation of the company was found 
to decrease concerns for sharing information with the firm. Because consumers tend to 
believe that reputable companies can be trusted with their personal information (Xie et al. 
2006), it is predicted that consumers are more apt to share some of their information 
ownership rights with the company. Thus, compensation is expected to be more effective 
in reducing perceptions of self-ownership, and increasing perceptions of company-
ownership, when the company has a strong, rather than weak, reputation. 
 
H8a: In conditions where consumers have a strong relationship with the company (but  
not for a weak relationship), the presence (vs. absence) of a reward will lead to 
lower perceptions of self-ownership. 
 
H8b: In conditions where consumers have a strong relationship with the company (but  
not for a weak relationship), the presence (vs. absence) of a reward will lead to 
higher perceptions of company-ownership. 
 
H9a: In conditions where the company has a strong brand reputation (but  
not for a weak reputation), the presence (vs. absence) of a reward will lead to lower 
perceptions of self-ownership. 
 
H9b: In conditions where the company has a strong brand reputation (but  
not for a weak reputation), the presence (vs. absence) of a reward will lead to higher 
perceptions of company-ownership. 
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3.6 Method 
 The effects of compensation on information ownership perceptions and privacy 
control expectations are tested in a series of four experimental studies. Study 1 examines 
the main effects of compensation level (H1), and the moderating effect of information 
sensitivity (H6). Study 2 investigates the main effects of compensation type (H2), and the 
moderating effects of information sensitivity (H7). Studies 3 and 4 offer a replication and 
extension of the findings by investigating the moderating effects of relationship (H8) and 
reputation (H9). The main effects (H3) and mediating effects (H4-H5) of information 
ownership are tested across each of the four studies. Table 3.1 offers a visual 
representation of each of the hypothesized relationships, and Table 3.2 presents a 
summary of each study.  
 
3.7 Study 1 - Assessing the Effects of Compensation Level 
 
 This study examines the effect of compensation level on information ownership 
perceptions and privacy control expectations. As compared to no reward, it is expected 
that the presence of a reward will lead to lower perceptions of self-ownership (H1a), and 
privacy control expectations (H1c), and lead to an increase in perceptions of company-
ownership (H1b). The moderating effect of information sensitivity is also investigated in 
this study. A two-way interaction between compensation level and information sensitivity 
on self-ownership (H6a) and company-ownership (H6b) is expected. Specifically, when 
information sensitivity is perceived to be high, the presence (vs. absence) of a reward is 
predicted to lead to lower perceptions of self-ownership, and higher perceptions of 
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company-ownership. The presence of a reward is not expected to have an effect on 
ownership perceptions when information sensitivity is low. 
 
3.7.1 Design and Procedure 
 One hundred and forty-three respondents (55 male, 88 female, 42% ages 25-34) 
participated in this study through an online questionnaire. Demographic information for 
respondents is presented in Table 3.3. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions 
in a 2 (information sensitivity: low vs. high) x 2 (compensation level: absent vs. present)  
between-subjects factorial design in exchange for a small monetary reward. Information 
sensitivity and compensation level were manipulated factors.  
 This study employed an experimental design with a scenario-based method. 
Scenarios have been found to offer a sense of realism and to be effective for evaluating 
perceptions, attitudes, and behavioral intentions in Internet privacy research (Sheehan and 
Hoy 2000; Xie et al. 2006;  Milne and Bahl 2010). In this study four types of scenarios 
were created according to the level of compensation and the sensitivity of the personal 
information requested. A between-subjects design was employed in which respondents 
were presented with only one of the four scenarios. In each scenario participants were 
asked to imagine a situation in which they were asked to fill out a customer satisfaction 
survey while browsing a retail company's Web site. The retail company was described as 
one that sold a variety of products including clothing, housewares, electronics, and food. 
After reading the scenario respondents then completed ratings of their perceptions of 
ownership and control expectations along with manipulation check measures and a 
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standard set of demographics. Respondents were then thanked and compensated for their 
time. Appendix B presents the stimulus materials and scales used in Essay 2. 
 
3.7.2 Independent Variables and Manipulations 
 Compensation Level. Compensation level was manipulated at two levels, absent 
and present. The reward was manipulated by the presence or absence of the following 
statement, "In return for filling out the survey the company provided you with a check for 
$50". Previous studies have used, or suggested, the use of similar rewards in the 
manipulation of compensation level (Hann et al. 2002). For instance, Malhotra et al. 
(2004) used a $50 reward in their analysis. A pretest (n = 113) and t-test analysis was 
used to confirm that respondents perceived a $50 reward to significantly differ in value 
from no reward (Mnoreward = 2.43 vs. Mreward = 5.42; t(120) = 18.32, p < .000). A number 
of prior studies have also used "checks" as a form of monetary reward in their 
hypothetical scenarios (Andrade et al. 2002; Xie et al. 2006; Hui, Teo, and Lee 2007). 
 Information Sensitivity. The type of information requested was manipulated at 
two levels, low sensitivity and high sensitivity. The level of information sensitivity was 
manipulated by asking respondents to provide their "gender and age" for the low 
sensitivity condition, and "telephone number and e-mail address" for the high sensitivity 
condition. The scenarios were created according to the categorization of personal 
information from past studies (Caudill and Murphy 2000; Phelps et al. 2000; Sheehan and 
Hoy 2000; Sheehan 2005). Personally unidentifiable information (e.g., gender, age) are 
commonly found to be perceived as less sensitive than personally identifying information 
(e.g., telephone number, e-mail address). A pretest (n = 85) and t-test analysis was 
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conducted to verify the sensitivity of information results from past literature (Me-mail address 
= 4.38 vs. Mage = 2.84; t(84) = 6.25, p < .000, and Mtelephone number = 5.86 vs. Mage = 2.84; 
t(84) = 13.03, p < .000). 
 
3.7.3 Dependent Variable Measures 
 Information Ownership Perceptions. Information ownership perceptions were 
assessed using two dimensions of information ownership: self-ownership and company-
ownership. Both dimensions of information ownership were examined from the 
respondent's perspective. Self-ownership was used to measure the extent to which 
respondents perceive information belonging to themselves, while company-ownership 
assessed the extent to which respondents perceive information belonging to the company. 
Scale items were adopted from Constant et al. (1994) and measured using 7-point Likert 
scales (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Two items were used to measure self-
ownership and five items for company-ownership. Examples of items to evaluate self-
ownership include, "I feel that the information I provided to the company belongs to me," 
and "I feel that I own the information I provided to the company". Examples of items to 
assess company-ownership include, "I feel that the information I provided belongs to the 
company," and "The company owns the information I provided".  Reliability for both 
self-ownership (α = .92) and company-ownership (α = .97) were acceptable. 
 Privacy Control Expectations. Privacy control expectations were assessed using 
seven items adopted from Phelps et al. (2000) and measured using a 7-point Likert scale 
(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). In accordance with the FTC's (1998) 
guidelines for information privacy control three dimensions were assessed: secondary 
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use, access, and editing of information. Examples of items to measure privacy control 
expectations include, "I expect to have control over how the company uses my 
information," "I expect to have access to information collected about me by the 
company," and "I expect to have the ability to edit the information collected about me by 
the company". The measure demonstrated adequate reliability (α = .95). 
 
3.7.4 Manipulation Checks 
 Analysis of variance showed that, as intended, the presence of a reward was 
perceived to be more valuable than no reward. For conditions that offered a reward 
respondents indicated that they were offered a reward (F(1,141) = 138.37, p = .000; 
Mnoreward = 3.73, SD = 2.02 vs. Mreward = 6.70, SD = .739), and were more fairly rewarded 
(F(1,141) = 106.21,  p = .000; Mnoreward = 3.29, SD = 1.88 vs. Mreward = 6.10, SD = 1.33) 
for providing their information to the company's Web site. Analysis of variance also 
found respondents in the high information sensitivity condition to perceive the 
information as more sensitive (F(1,141) = 32.78, p = .000; Mlow-sensitivity = 3.70, SD = 1.77 
vs. Mhigh-sensitivity = 5.39, SD = 1.74), and personal (F(1,141) = 19.74, p = .000; Mlow-
sensitivity = 4.38, SD = 1.74 vs. Mhigh-sensitivity = 5.68, SD = 1.75) than in the low information 
sensitivity condition. Hence, compensation level and information sensitivity were 
successfully manipulated in this study. Results of the manipulation checks are presented 
in Table 3.4. 
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3.7.5 Measurement Model 
 As an assessment of construct validity, an exploratory factor analysis of all 
constructs achieves the expected factor solutions. A confirmatory factor analysis was 
conducted for all theoretical constructs in the study to examine the structure of the 
measures and to assess their convergent and discriminant validity. The tests were based 
on the covariance matrix and the maximum likelihood method, and were run using 
LISREL 8.80 (Joreskog and Sorbom 1988). The measurement model gives good fit 
indices. The χ2 is significant, (χ2 = 147.08, df = 74, p = .00) and the ratio of χ2 to degree 
of freedom (1.98) is at the level generally required for such analysis. Moreover, other 
indicators of fit indicate that the fit of the measurement model is acceptable, CFI = .98, 
NFI = .96, GFI = .87, AFGI = .82, RMSEA = .08. Based on these results, the 
measurement model provides a satisfactory fit to the data. 
 According to Bagozzi et al. (1991), a construct exhibits substantial convergent 
validity if the t-test value associated with the factor loading of the variables is above 1.96. 
For all items, the t-values were greater than 1.96. Moreover, reliability estimates for each 
construct using coefficient alpha (Cronbach 1951) and composite reliabilities all exceed 
the threshold 0.70 level (Nunnally 1978). All shared variances extracted for each 
construct are acceptable as they exceed the recommended 0.50 value (Fornell and 
Larcker 1981; Bagozzi and Yi 1988). Thus, it can be concluded that these constructs have 
good convergent validity. A correlation matrix of all variables is summarized in Table 
3.5, while Table 3.6 summarizes the statistical outcomes of the measurement model.  
 According to Anderson and Gerbing (1988) and Bagozzi et al. (1991), 
discriminant validity is good if the correlation between two dimensions is not 1. All 
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constructs met this criteria. The second test used is in line with Fornell and Larcker's 
approach (1981). The AVE between two constructs is compared to the square of the 
correlation between the two constructs. This is done to verify that the shared variances 
between all possible pairs of constructs are lower than the average variance extracted for 
the individual constructs . For all the constructs, the AVE is greater than the square 
correlation. It can be seen from Table 3.7 that the measures in this study display 
sufficient discriminant validity (Fornell and Larcker 1981). In summary, all measures 
possess adequate reliability and validity. 
 
3.7.6 Results of Study 1 
 The data were analyzed by MANOVA to assess the multivariate and univariate 
effects of compensation level. The multivariate and univariate results are presented in 
Table 3.8. Self-ownership and company-ownership were included as dependent variables 
in the multivariate analysis. Multivariate effects of compensation level (Wilks' λ = .94, F 
= 3.81, p = .024) and the two-way interaction between compensation level and 
information sensitivity (Wilks' λ = .95, F = 3.03, p = .051) were found to be significant. 
Follow-up tests to the multivariate analysis are presented in Table 3.9, and provide 
additional evidence for the main effect of compensation level on perceptions of self-
ownership. Subsequent univariate analyses were conducted to assess the distinct effects 
for each dependent variable, and are discussed in the following sections.  
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3.7.6.1 Main Effects of Compensation Level 
 An analysis of variance found that the presence of a reward led to lower 
perceptions of self-ownership (Mreward = 4.78, Mno-reward = 5.59; F(1,141) = 6.48, p = 
.012), and greater perceptions of company-ownership (Mreward = 3.82, Mno-reward = 3.14; 
F(1,141) = 3.68, p = .057) at the p < .10 level, compared to no reward. Thus, both 
hypothesis H1a and H1b are supported. The results also demonstrate that the presence of 
a reward led to lower privacy control expectations (Mreward = 4.35, Mno-reward = 5.06; 
F(1,141) = 4.85, p = .029), than no reward. This finding provides support for H1c. Cell 
means and standard deviations are presented in Table 3.10. 
 
3.7.6.2 Moderating Effects of Information Sensitivity 
 The main effects of compensation level on perceptions of self-ownership and 
company-ownership are qualified by the expected interaction effects. The results of a 
two-way analysis of variance found a significant interaction effect between compensation 
level and information sensitivity on self-ownership (F(1,139) = 5.83, p = .017). Simple 
effects analysis revealed that in the high information sensitivity condition, the presence 
(vs. absence) of a reward led to lower perceptions of self-ownership (Mreward = 4.77 Mno-
reward = 6.36; F(1,139) = 12.44, p = .001). In the low information sensitivity condition, the 
presence or absence of a reward did not have an effect on perceptions of self-ownership 
(Mreward = 4.80 Mno-reward = 4.90; F(1,139) = .10, p = .754). These findings provide support 
for H6a, which states that in conditions of high information sensitivity (but not low 
sensitivity), the presence (vs. absence) of a reward will lead to lower perceptions of self-
ownership. 
  
115
 An interaction was also found between compensation level and information 
sensitivity on company-ownership (F(1,139) = 4.12, p = .044). Simple effects analysis 
revealed that in the high information sensitivity condition, the presence (vs. absence) of a 
reward led to higher perceptions of company-ownership (Mreward = 3.82, Mno-reward = 2.40; 
F(1,139) = 7.81, p = .006). In the low information sensitivity condition, the presence or 
absence of a reward did not have an effect on perceptions of company-ownership (Mreward 
= 3.82, Mno-reward = 3.81; F(1,139) = .01, p = .933). These findings provide support for 
H6b, which states that in conditions of high information sensitivity (but not low 
sensitivity), the presence (vs. absence) of a reward will lead to higher perceptions of 
company-ownership. 
 
3.7.6.3 Main and Mediating Effects of Information Ownership 
 The effects of self-ownership (H3a) and company-ownership (H3b) on privacy 
control expectations were tested using regression analysis. In support of hypotheses H3a 
and H3b, self-ownership was found to have a positive effect (β = .359, t(142) = 4.56, p = 
.00), and company-ownership a negative effect (β = -.438, t(142) = -6.44, p = .00) on 
expectations for privacy control. 
 To assess whether perceptions of self-ownership (H4a) and company-ownership 
(H4b) mediate the effects of compensation level on privacy control expectations 
mediation analyses were conducted using the bootstrapping method suggested by Zhao, 
Lynch, and Chen (2010). On the basis of this framework mediation is strongest when 
there is an indirect effect but no direct effect, which indicates full mediation. When there 
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are both indirect and direct effects it is partial mediation. Thus, in order to establish 
mediation, all that matters is that the indirect effect is significant.  
 Self-ownership is found to partially mediate the effect of compensation level on 
privacy control expectations (βaxb = .273, 95% CI = .074 to .571). Company-ownership 
was also found to partially mediate the effect of compensation level on privacy control 
expectations (βaxb = .285, 95% CI = .015 to .629). These findings provide partial support 
for H4a and H4b. A summary of the mediating effects of self-ownership and company-
ownership can be seen in Table 3.11. 
 
3.7.7 Discussion 
 The results from Study 1 provide support for a main effect of compensation level 
on perceptions of self-ownership, company-ownership, and expectations for privacy 
control. Specifically, the presence (vs. absence) of a reward leads to lower perceptions of 
self-ownership (H1a), greater perceptions of company-ownership (H1b), and a reduction 
in privacy control expectations (H1c). These findings have important implications, as 
they demonstrate that rewards can be used to influence the degree to which consumers 
are willing to share ownership rights and control over their personal information with 
marketers. 
 The results of this study also provide evidence that perceptions of self-ownership 
have a positive effect on privacy control expectations (H3a), and company-ownership has 
a negative effect (H3b). Perceptions of self-ownership (H4a) and company-ownership 
(H4b) are also found to partially mediate the effects of compensation level on privacy 
control expectations. These findings suggest that the degree to which consumers believe 
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their information is shared with marketers has an effect on their expectations for privacy 
control, and rewards can be used by marketers to influence these beliefs. 
 The findings provide support for the moderating effects of information sensitivity 
on perceptions of self-ownership and company-ownership, as a two-way interaction was 
found between compensation level and information sensitivity. In support of H6a and 
H6b, in conditions of high information sensitivity (but not low sensitivity), the presence 
(vs. absence) of a reward leads to lower perceptions of self-ownership, and higher 
perceptions of company-ownership. This finding indicates that compensation may be 
necessary for influencing consumers' ownership beliefs when more sensitive information 
is provided, as consumers may desire more control over this type of information. On the 
other hand, when less sensitive information is provided, compensation has no effect on 
ownership beliefs, as consumers may be less concerned about how this type of 
information is used by marketers. The type of information provided by the consumer is 
shown to determine the effectiveness of compensation for influencing privacy beliefs. 
 In summary, full support is found for hypotheses H1, H3, and H6; and partial 
support for H4. In general, the empirical findings from this study provide evidence of a 
main effect of compensation level, and moderating effect of information sensitivity, and 
warrants further investigation into these relationships. 
 
3.8 Study 2 - Assessing the Effects of Compensation Type 
 
 Study 2 extends the findings from Study 1 by examining the effects of 
compensation type on information ownership perceptions and privacy control 
expectations. As compared with a non-monetary type of reward, it is expected that a 
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monetary type of reward will lead to a greater reduction in perceptions of self-ownership 
(H2a) and privacy control expectations (H2c), and lead to an increase in company-
ownership perceptions (H2b). The moderating effect of information sensitivity is also 
investigated. A two-way interaction between compensation type and information 
sensitivity on self-ownership (H7a) and company-ownership (H7b) is expected. 
Specifically, when information sensitivity is perceived to be high, a monetary (vs. non-
monetary) reward is predicted to lead to lower perceptions of self-ownership, and higher 
perceptions of company-ownership. The type of reward is not expected to have an effect 
on ownership perceptions when information sensitivity is low. 
 
3.8.1 Design and Procedure 
 Eighty-six respondents (28 male, 58 females, 57% ages 25-34) participated in this 
study through an online questionnaire. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions 
in a 2 (information sensitivity: low vs. high) x 2 (compensation type: monetary vs. non-
monetary) between-subjects factorial design. This study employed a similar procedure to 
that of Study 1.  
 
3.8.2 Independent Variables and Manipulations 
 Compensation Type. Compensation type was manipulated at two levels, monetary 
and non-monetary. The compensation type was manipulated by the presence of either a 
monetary reward or non-monetary reward. The monetary condition included the 
statement, "In return for filling out the survey the company provided you with a check for 
$50". The non-monetary statement included the statement, "In return for filling out the 
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survey the company provided you with access to exclusive web content (e.g., music, 
movies, software) valued at $50". Respondents were told the value of the non-monetary 
reward in order to verify that both conditions were equivalent in perceived value, thereby 
ensuring that only reward type was manipulated.  
 Information Sensitivity. The type of information requested was manipulated the 
same way as in Study 1 with two levels, low sensitivity and high sensitivity. 
 
3.8.3 Dependent Variable Measures 
 Information ownership perceptions and privacy control expectations were 
measured the same way as in Study 1. The measures for self-ownership (α = .87), 
company-ownership (α = .97), and privacy control expectations (α = .94), demonstrated 
acceptable reliability in this study. 
 
3.8.4 Manipulation Checks 
 Analysis of variance showed that, as intended, respondents recognized the 
presence of a reward regardless whether the type of compensation was monetary or non-
monetary (F(1,86) = 1.15, p = .510; Mmonetary = 6.17, SD = 1.48 vs. Mnon-monetary = 5.96, 
SD = 1.42). Analysis of variance also found respondents in the high information 
sensitivity condition to perceive the information as more sensitive (F(1,86) = 10.80, p = 
.001; Mlow-sensitivity = 3.72, SD = 2.04 vs. Mhigh-sensitivity = 5.12, SD = 1.91), and personal 
(F(1,86) = 10.12, p = .002; Mlow-sensitivity = 4.24, SD = 1.85 vs. Mhigh-sensitivity = 5.45, SD = 
1.64) than in the low information sensitivity condition. Hence, compensation type and 
information sensitivity were successfully manipulated in this study. 
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3.8.5 Measurement Model 
 As an assessment of construct validity, an exploratory factor analysis of all 
constructs achieves the expected factor solutions. A confirmatory factor analysis was 
conducted for all theoretical constructs in the study to examine the structure of the 
measures and to assess their convergent and discriminant validity. The measurement 
model gives good fit indices. The χ2 is significant, (χ2 = 133.38, df = 74, p = .00) and the 
ratio of χ2 to degree of freedom (1.80) is at the level generally required for such analysis. 
Moreover, other indicators of fit suggest that the fit of the measurement model is 
acceptable, CFI = .97, NFI = .94, GFI = .82, AFGI = .74, RMSEA = .09. Reliability 
estimates for each construct using coefficient alpha and composite reliabilities all exceed 
the threshold 0.70 level. Based on these results, all measures in this study possess 
adequate reliability and validity. Table 3.12 presents statistical outcomes of the 
measurement model. 
 
3.8.6 Results of Study 2 
 The data were analyzed by MANOVA to assess the multivariate and univariate 
effects of compensation type. Self-ownership and company-ownership were included as 
dependent variables in the multivariate analysis. Multivariate effects of compensation 
type (Wilks' λ = .93, F = 2.99, p = .055) at the p < .10 level, and the two-way interaction 
between compensation type and information sensitivity (Wilks' λ = .83, F = 7.79, p = 
.001) were found to be significant. Follow-up tests to the multivariate analysis are 
presented in Table 3.9, and provide additional evidence for the interaction between 
compensation type and information sensitivity on self-ownership and company-
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ownership. Subsequent univariate analyses were conducted to assess the distinct effects 
for each dependent variable, as discussed in the following sections. 
 
3.8.6.1 Main Effects of Compensation Type 
 An analysis of variance found that a monetary and non-monetary type of 
compensation led to an equivalent amount of self-ownership perceptions (Mmonetary = 
4.78, Mnon-monetary = 5.35; F(1,84) = 2.30, p = .133). Thus, no support is found for the 
prediction that a monetary type of compensation leads to lower perceptions of self-
ownership (H2a). However, the results demonstrate that a monetary type of compensation 
leads to a greater increase in perceptions of company-ownership (Mmonetary = 4.10, Mnon-
monetary = 3.40; F(1,84) = 2.81, p = .097), and a greater reduction in privacy control 
expectations (Mmonetary = 4.29, Mnon-monetary = 5.01; F(1,82) = 3.30, p = .072) at the p < .10 
level. Thus, both hypothesis H2b and H2c are supported. Cell means and standard 
deviations are presented in Table 3.13. 
 
3.8.6.2 Moderating Effects of Information Sensitivity 
 The main effects of compensation type on perceptions of self-ownership and 
company-ownership are qualified by the expected interaction effects. The results of a 
two-way analysis of variance found a significant interaction effect between compensation 
type and information sensitivity on self-ownership (F(1,82) = 14.28, p = .000). Simple 
effects analysis revealed that in the high information sensitivity condition, a monetary 
(vs. non-monetary) type of reward led to lower perceptions of self-ownership (Mmonetary = 
4.52, Mnon-monetary = 6.52; F(1,82) = 17.80, p = .000). In the low information sensitivity 
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condition, reward type did not have an effect on perceptions of self-ownership (Mmonetary 
= 5.09, Mnon-monetary = 4.53; F(1,82) = 2.90, p = .102). These findings provide support for 
H7a, which states that in conditions of high information sensitivity (but not low 
sensitivity), a monetary (vs. non-monetary) reward will lead to lower perceptions of self-
ownership. 
 An interaction was also found between compensation type and information 
sensitivity on company-ownership (F(1,82) = 9.71, p = .003). Simple effects analysis 
revealed that in the high information sensitivity condition, a monetary (vs. non-monetary) 
type of reward led to higher perceptions of company-ownership (Mmonetary = 4.29, Mnon-
monetary = 2.20; F(1,82) = 14.57, p = .000). In the low information sensitivity condition, 
reward type did not have an effect on perceptions of company-ownership (Mmonetary = 
3.88, Mnon-monetary = 4.24; F(1,82) = 1.30, p = .258). These findings provide support for 
H7b, which states that in conditions of high information sensitivity (but not low 
sensitivity), a monetary (vs. non-monetary) reward will lead to higher perceptions of 
company-ownership. 
 A supplemental analysis found an interaction effect between compensation type 
and information sensitivity on expectations for control (F(1,82) = 8.39, p = .005). Simple 
effects analysis revealed that in the high information sensitivity condition, a monetary 
(vs. non-monetary) type of reward led to lower expectations for control (Mmonetary = 4.14, 
Mnon-monetary = 6.10; F(1,82) = 13.97, p = .000). In the low information sensitivity 
condition, reward type did not have an effect on expectations for control (Mmonetary = 4.47, 
Mnon-monetary = 4.26; F(1,82) = .78, p = .381). These results are analogous to those for self-
ownership and company-ownership. 
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3.8.6.3 Main and Mediating Effects of Information Sensitivity 
 The effects of self-ownership (H3a) and company-ownership (H3b) on privacy 
control expectations were tested using regression analysis. In support of hypotheses H3a 
and H3b, self-ownership was found to have a significant positive effect (β = .472, t(85) = 
4.90, p = .00), and company-ownership a negative effect (β = -.448, t(85) = -4.59, p = 
.00) on expectations for privacy control. 
 To assess whether perceptions of self-ownership (H5a) and company-ownership 
(H5b) mediate the effects of compensation type on privacy control expectations 
mediation analyses were conducted using the bootstrapping method suggested by Zhao, 
Lynch, and Chen (2010). As can be seen in Table 3.11, self-ownership (βaxb = .277, 95% 
CI = -.044 to .728) and company-ownership (βaxb = .286, 95% CI = -.041 to .720) were 
not found to mediate the effect of compensation type on privacy control expectations, as 
no significant indirect effects were found. These results provide no support for the 
mediating effect of self-ownership (H5a) and company-ownership (H5b) on privacy 
control expectations. 
 
3.8.7 Discussion 
 The results from Study 2 provide support for a main effect of compensation type 
on company-ownership, and expectations for privacy control. Specifically, a monetary 
type of compensation led to an increase in perceptions of company-ownership (H2b), and 
a decrease in privacy control expectations (H2c). However, an effect of compensation 
type on perceptions of self-ownership was not found (H2a). These findings have 
important implications, as they suggest that monetary types of rewards can be used to 
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influence the degree to which consumers are willing to share ownership rights and 
control over their personal information with marketers. 
 The results of this study also provide evidence that perceptions of self-ownership 
have a positive effect on privacy control expectations (H3a), and company-ownership has 
a negative effect (H3b). However, perceptions of self-ownership (H5a) and company-
ownership (H5b) were not found to mediate the effect of compensation type on privacy 
control expectations. These findings suggest that the degree to which consumers believe 
their information is shared with marketers has an effect on their expectations for privacy 
control. However, ownership beliefs don't appear to help explain the effects of 
compensation type on expectations for privacy control, as perceptions of ownership were 
not found the mediate the relationship. 
 The findings provide support for the moderating effects of information sensitivity 
on perceptions of self-ownership and company-ownership, as a two-way interaction was 
found between compensation type and information sensitivity. In support of H7a and 
H7b, in conditions of high information sensitivity (but not low sensitivity), a monetary 
(vs. non-monetary) reward leads to lower perceptions of self-ownership, and higher 
perceptions of company-ownership. A supplemental analysis found similar findings for 
the two-way interaction between compensation type and information sensitivity on 
expectations for privacy control. These findings suggest that a monetary type of 
compensation may be more effective for influencing consumers' ownership beliefs when 
more sensitive information is provided. On the other hand, when less sensitive 
information is provided, the type of compensation has no effect on ownership beliefs. 
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 In summary, full support is found for hypotheses H2b, H2c, H3, and H7; and no 
support for H2a and H5. In general, the empirical findings from this study provide 
evidence of a main effect of compensation type, and moderating effect of information 
sensitivity. 
 
3.9 Study 3 - Assessing the Moderating Effects of Relationship Type 
  
 This study replicates the findings from Study 1 by examining the effects of 
compensation level on information ownership perceptions and privacy control 
expectations. As compared with no reward, it is expected that the presence of a reward 
will lead to lower perceptions of self-ownership (H1a), and privacy control expectations 
(H1c), and lead to an increase in company-ownership perceptions (H1b).  
 This study extends the findings from Study 1 by investigating the moderating 
effects of relationship type. A two-way interaction between compensation level and 
relationship type on self-ownership (H8a) and company ownership (H8b) is expected. 
Specifically, when consumers have a strong relationship with the company, the presence 
(vs. absence) of a reward is predicted to lead to lower perceptions of self-ownership, and 
higher perceptions of company-ownership. The presence of a reward is not expected to 
have an effect on ownership perceptions when consumers have a weak relationship with 
the company. 
 
3.9.1 Design and Procedure 
 One hundred and seventy-eight respondents (75 male, 103 female, 32% ages 25-
34) participated in this study through an online questionnaire. Participants were randomly 
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assigned to conditions in a 2 (relationship: weak vs. strong) x 2 (compensation level: 
absent vs. present) between-subjects factorial design. This study employed a similar 
procedure to that of Study 1 and 2.  
 
3.9.2 Independent Variables and Manipulations 
 Compensation Level. Compensation level was manipulated the same as in Study 
1 with two levels, absent and present. 
 Company-Consumer Relationship. The relationship between the company and 
consumer was manipulated at two levels, weak and strong. The weak relationship 
condition was constructed to represent a transactional relationship, and the strong 
relationship to represent an ongoing relationship. The weak relationship was 
operationalized by asking participants to imagine the following: "You don't have a lot of 
experience with this retailer as you have just recently started to purchase products from 
this company." The strong relationship condition included the statement, "You have been 
in an ongoing relationship with this retailer and your experiences with the company have 
been positive. You have found the company associates to be knowledgeable, considerate, 
and concerned about your satisfaction and well-being." The procedure for manipulating 
relationship type was adopted from White (2004), as this method was found to be 
effective for manipulating respondents' relationship perceptions towards a retail Web site. 
 
3.9.3 Dependent Variable Measures 
 Information ownership perceptions and privacy control expectations were 
measured the same way as in Studies 1 and 2. The measures for self-ownership (α = .91), 
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company-ownership (α = .96), and privacy control expectations (α = .93), demonstrated 
acceptable reliability in this study. 
 
3.9.4 Manipulation Checks 
 Analysis of variance showed that, as intended, the presence of a reward was 
perceived to be more valuable than no reward. For conditions that offered a reward 
respondents indicated that they were offered a reward (F(1,178) = 178.67, p = .000; 
Mnoreward = 3.26, SD = 2.08 vs. Mreward = 6.61, SD = .998), and were more fairly rewarded 
(F(1,178) = 140.85,  p = .000; Mnoreward = 3.04, SD = 1.65 vs. Mreward = 5.86, SD = 1.48), 
for providing their information to the company's Web site. Analysis of variance also 
found respondents in the strong relationship condition to perceive the company-consumer 
relationship to be more long-term (F(1,178) = 111.89, p = .000; Mweak = 3.26, SD = 1.64 
vs. Mstrong = 5.64, SD = 1.33), and ongoing (F(1,178) = 96.48, p = .000; Mweak = 3.71, SD 
= 1.54 vs. Mstrong = 5.80, SD = 1.28), than in the weak relationship condition. Hence, 
compensation level and relationship type were successfully manipulated in this study. 
 
3.9.5 Measurement Model 
 As an assessment of construct validity, an exploratory factor analysis of all 
constructs achieves the expected factor solutions. A confirmatory factor analysis was 
conducted for all theoretical constructs in the study to examine the structure of the 
measures and to assess their convergent and discriminant validity. The measurement 
model gives good fit indices. The χ2 is significant, (χ2 = 268.17, df = 74, p = .00) and the 
ratio of χ2 to degree of freedom (1.80) is at the level generally required for such analysis. 
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Moreover, other indicators of fit indicate that the fit of the measurement model is 
acceptable, CFI = .96, NFI = .95, GFI = .82, AFGI = .75, RMSEA = .12. Reliability 
estimates for each construct using coefficient alpha and composite reliabilities all exceed 
the threshold 0.70 level. Based on these results, all measures in this study possess 
adequate reliability and validity. Table 3.14 presents statistical outcomes of the 
measurement model. 
  
3.9.6 Results of Study 3 
 The data were analyzed by MANOVA to assess the multivariate and univariate 
effects of compensation level. Self-ownership and company-ownership were included as 
dependent variables in the multivariate analysis. Multivariate effects of compensation 
level (Wilks' λ = .91, F = 7.68, p = .001), and the two-way interaction between 
compensation level and relationship type (Wilks' λ = .92, F = 6.64, p = .002) were found 
to be significant. Follow-up tests to the multivariate analysis are presented in Table 3.9, 
and provide additional evidence for the main effects of compensation level, and 
interaction effects between compensation level and relationship type, on perceptions of 
self-ownership and company-ownership. Subsequent univariate analyses were conducted 
to assess the distinct effects for each dependent variable, as discussed in the following 
sections. 
 
3.9.6.1 Main Effects of Compensation Level 
 An analysis of variance found that the presence of a reward led to lower 
perceptions of self-ownership (Mreward = 4.75, Mno-reward = 5.48; F(1,176) = 6.28, p = 
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.013), and greater perceptions of company-ownership (Mreward = 4.03, Mno-reward = 2.87; 
F(1,176) = 15.25, p = .000), compared to no reward. Thus, both hypothesis H1a and H1b 
are supported. The results also demonstrate that the presence of a reward led to lower 
privacy control expectations (Mreward = 4.75, Mno-reward = 5.39; F(1,176) = 5.67, p = .018), 
than no reward. This finding provides support for H1c. Cell means and standard 
deviations are presented in Table 3.15. 
 
3.9.6.2 Moderating Effects of Relationship Type 
 The main effects of compensation level on perceptions of self-ownership and 
company-ownership are qualified by the expected interaction effects. The results of a 
two-way analysis of variance found  a significant interaction effect between 
compensation level and relationship type on self-ownership (F(1,174) = 11.97, p = .001). 
Simple effects analysis revealed in the strong company-relationship condition, the 
presence (vs. absence) of a reward led to lower perceptions of self-ownership (Mreward = 
4.22, Mno-reward = 5.89; F(1,174) = 18.00, p = .000). In the weak company-relationship 
condition the presence, or absence, of a reward did not have an effect on perceptions of 
self-ownership (Mreward = 5.33, Mno-reward = 5.06; F(1,174) = .44, p = .510). These findings 
provide support for H8a, which states that in conditions where consumers have a strong 
relationship with the company (but not for a weak relationship), the presence (vs. 
absence) of a reward will lead to lower perceptions of self-ownership. 
 An interaction was also found between compensation level and relationship type 
on company-ownership (F(1,174) = 8.02, p = .005). Simple effects analysis revealed in 
the strong company-relationship condition, the presence (vs. absence) of a reward led to 
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higher perceptions of company-ownership (Mreward = 4.52, Mno-reward = 2.56; F(1,174) = 
22.99, p = .000). In the weak company-relationship condition the presence, or absence, of 
a reward did not have an effect on perceptions of company-ownership (Mreward = 3.50, 
Mno-reward = 3.19; F(1,174) = .60, p = .440). These findings provide support for H8b, 
which states in conditions where consumers have a strong relationship with the company 
(but not for a weak relationship), the presence (vs. absence) of a reward will lead to 
higher perceptions of company-ownership. 
 
3.9.6.3 Main and Mediating Effects of Information Ownership 
 The effects of self-ownership (H3a) and company-ownership (H3b) on privacy 
control expectations were tested using regression analysis. In support of hypotheses H3a 
and H3b, self-ownership was found to have a significant positive effect (β = .259, t(177) 
= 3.55, p = .00), and company-ownership a negative effect (β = -.385, t(177) = -5.54, p = 
.00) on expectations for privacy control. 
 To assess whether perceptions of self-ownership (H4a) and company-ownership 
(H4b) mediate the effects of compensation level on privacy control expectations 
mediation analyses were conducted using the bootstrapping method suggested by Zhao et 
al. (2010). Self-ownership (βaxb = .155, 95% CI = .035 to .366) and company-ownership 
(βaxb = .369, 95% CI = .164 to .656) were found to partially mediate the effect of 
compensation level on privacy control expectations. These findings provide partial 
support for H4a and H4b. A summary of the mediating effects of self-ownership and 
company-ownership can be seen in Table 3.11. 
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3.9.7 Discussion 
 The results from Study 3 provide support for a main effect of compensation level 
on perceptions of self-ownership, company-ownership, and expectations for privacy 
control. Specifically, the presence (vs. absence) of a reward leads to lower perceptions of 
self-ownership (H1a), greater perceptions of company-ownership (H1b), and a reduction 
in privacy control expectations (H1c). These main effect results replicate the findings 
found in Study 1, and provide additional support for the influence of rewards on 
consumers' willingness to share ownership rights and control over their personal 
information with marketers. 
 The results of this study also provide evidence that perceptions of self-ownership 
have a positive effect on privacy control expectations (H3a), and company-ownership has 
a negative effect (H3b). Perceptions of self-ownership (H4a) and company-ownership 
(H4b) are also found to partially mediate the effects of compensation level on privacy 
control expectations. As with Study 1, these findings suggest that ownership beliefs affect 
consumer's expectations for control over their privacy, and that rewards can be used by 
marketers for influencing these beliefs. 
 The findings provide support for the moderating effects of relationship type on 
perceptions of self-ownership and company-ownership, as a two-way interaction was 
found between compensation level and relationship type. In support of H8a and H8b, in 
conditions where consumers have a strong relationship with the company (but not for a 
weak relationship), the presence (vs. absence) of a reward leads to lower perceptions of 
self-ownership, and higher perceptions of company-ownership. This finding indicates 
that compensation may be more effective for influencing consumers' ownership beliefs 
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when the company has an established relationship with the consumer. On the other hand, 
when the company does not have an established relationship with the consumer, 
compensation has no effect on ownership beliefs, as consumers may be more concerned 
with how an unfamiliar company will use their information. 
 In summary, full support is found for hypotheses H1, H3, and H8; and partial 
support for H4. In general, the empirical findings from this study provide evidence of a 
main effect of compensation level, and moderating effect of relationship type. 
 
3.10 Study 4 - Assessing the Moderating Effects of Brand Reputation 
 
 This Study replicates the findings from Studies 1 and 3 by examining the effects 
of compensation level on  information ownership perceptions and privacy control 
expectations. As compared with no reward, it is expected that the presence of a reward 
will lead to lower perceptions of self-ownership (H1a), and privacy control expectations 
(H1c), and lead to an increase in company-ownership perceptions (H1b).  
 This study extends the findings from Studies 1 and 3 by investigating the 
moderating effects of brand reputation. A two-way interaction between compensation 
level and brand reputation on self-ownership (H9a) and company-ownership (H9b) is 
expected. Specifically, when a company has a strong brand reputation, the presence (vs. 
absence) of a reward is predicted to lead to lower perceptions of self-ownership, and 
higher perceptions of company-ownership. The presence of a reward is not expected to 
have an effect on ownership perceptions when the company has a weak brand reputation. 
 
 
 
  
133
3.10.1 Design and Procedure 
 One hundred and nine respondents (42 male, 67 female, 33.9% ages 25-34) 
participated in this study through an online questionnaire. Participants were randomly 
assigned to conditions in a 2 (reputation: weak vs. strong) x 2 (compensation level: 
absent vs. present) between-subjects factorial design. This study employed a similar 
procedure to that of Studies 1-3.  
 
3.10.2 Independent Variables and Manipulations 
 Compensation Level. Compensation level was manipulated the same as in 
Studies 1 and 3 with two levels, absent and present. 
 Brand Reputation. Brand reputation was manipulated at two levels, weak and 
strong. The weak reputation condition was constructed to represent a company's Web site 
as having an inferior reputation, and the strong reputation a superior reputation. The weak 
reputation condition was operationalized by asking participants to imagine the following: 
"This Web site belongs to a new retail company, which has been in business for 6 
months." The strong reputation condition included the statement, "This Web site belongs 
to one of the largest and most successful retailers in the U.S. The company has been in 
business for over 50 years." This procedure for manipulating brand reputation has been 
found to be effective for manipulating respondents' reputation perspectives towards a 
retail Web site (Xie et al. 2006; Eastlick et al. 2006). 
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3.10.3 Dependent Variable Measures 
 Information ownership perceptions and privacy control expectations were 
measured the same way as in Studies 1-3. The measures for self-ownership (α = .95), 
company-ownership (α = .98), and privacy control expectations (α = .96), demonstrated 
acceptable reliability in this study. 
 
3.10.4 Manipulation Checks 
 Analysis of variance showed that, as intended, the presence of a reward was 
perceived to be more valuable than no reward. For conditions that offered a reward 
respondents indicated that they were offered a reward (F(1,107) = 56.69, p = .000; Mno-
reward = 3.62, SD = 2.18 vs. Mreward = 6.23, SD = 1.38), and were more fairly rewarded 
(F(1,107) = 38.80,  p = .000; Mno-reward = 3.54, SD = 2.02 vs. Mreward = 5.68, SD = 1.56), 
for providing their information to the company's Web site. Analysis of variance also 
found respondents in the strong reputation condition to perceive the company's Web site 
to be more credible (F(1,107) = 41.79, p = .000; Mweak = 3.67, SD = 1.45 vs. Mstrong = 
5.44, SD = 1.40), and reputable (F(1,107) = 53.76, p = .000; Mweak = 3.61, SD = 1.49 vs. 
Mstrong = 5.54, SD = 1.21), than in the weak reputation condition. Hence, compensation 
level and reputation type were successfully manipulated in this study. 
 
3.10.5 Measurement Model 
 As an assessment of construct validity, an exploratory factor analysis of all 
constructs achieves the expected factor solutions. A confirmatory factor analysis was 
conducted for all theoretical constructs in the study to examine the structure of the 
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measures and to assess their convergent and discriminant validity. The measurement 
model gives good fit indices. The χ2 is significant, (χ2 = 153.09, df = 74, p = .00) and the 
ratio of χ2 to degree of freedom (2.06) is at the level generally required for such analysis. 
Moreover, other indicators of fit indicate that the fit of the measurement model is 
acceptable, CFI = .98, NFI = .96, GFI = .83, AFGI = .76, RMSEA = .09. Reliability 
estimates for each construct using coefficient alpha and composite reliabilities all exceed 
the threshold 0.70 level. Based on these results, all measures in this study possess 
adequate reliability and validity. Table 3.16 presents statistical outcomes of the 
measurement model. 
 
3.10.6 Results of Study 4 
 The data were analyzed by MANOVA to assess the multivariate and univariate 
effects of compensation level. Self-ownership and company-ownership were included as 
dependent variables in the multivariate analysis. Multivariate effects of compensation 
level (Wilks' λ = .93, F = 3.57, p = .032), and the two-way interaction between 
compensation level and reputation type (Wilks' λ = .90, F = 5.58, p = .005) were found to 
be significant. Follow-up tests to the multivariate analysis are presented in Table 3.9, and 
provide additional evidence for the main effect of compensation level on company-
ownership, and the interaction effects between compensation level and brand reputation, 
on perceptions of self-ownership and company-ownership. Subsequent univariate 
analyses were conducted to assess the distinct effects for each dependent variable, as 
discussed in the following sections. 
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3.10.6.1 Main Effects of Compensation Level 
 An analysis of variance found that the presence of a reward led to lower 
perceptions of self-ownership (Mreward = 5.32, Mno-reward = 5.92; F(1,107) = 3.52, p = .063) 
at the p < .10 level, and greater perceptions of company-ownership (Mreward = 3.60, Mno-
reward = 2.76; F(1,107) = 5.25, p = .024), compared to no reward. Thus, both hypothesis 
H1a and H1b are supported. The results, however, demonstrate that respondents' privacy 
control expectations did not change as a result of the presence, or absence, of a reward 
(Mreward = 5.06, Mno-reward = 5.20; F(1,107) = .154, p = .696). Thus, hypothesis H1c is not 
supported in this study. Cell means and standard deviations are presented in Table 3.17. 
 
3.10.6.2 Moderating effects of Brand Reputation 
 The main effects of compensation level on perceptions of self-ownership and 
company-ownership are qualified by the expected interaction effects. The results of a 
two-way analysis of variance found a significant interaction effect between compensation 
level and brand reputation on self-ownership (F(1,105) = 10.71, p = .001). Simple effects 
analysis revealed that in the strong brand reputation condition, the presence (vs. absence) 
of a reward led to lower perceptions of self-ownership (Mreward = 4.65, Mno-reward = 6.30; 
F(1,105) = 14.02, p = .000). In the weak brand reputation condition the presence, or 
absence, of a reward did not have an effect on perceptions of self-ownership (Mreward = 
5.88, Mno-reward = 5.53; F(1,105) = .76, p = .386). These findings provides support for 
H9a, which states that in conditions where the company has a strong brand reputation 
(but not for a weak reputation), the presence (vs. absence) of a reward will lead to lower 
perceptions of self-ownership. 
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 An interaction was also found between compensation level and brand reputation 
on company-ownership (F(1,105) = 6.52, p = .012). Simple effects analysis revealed that 
in the strong brand reputation condition, the presence (vs. absence) of a reward led to 
higher perceptions of company-ownership (Mreward = 4.48, Mno-reward = 2.66; F(1,105) = 
12.65, p = .001). In the weak brand reputation condition the presence, or absence, of a 
reward did not have an effect on perceptions of company-ownership (Mreward = 2.87, Mno-
reward = 2.86; F(1,105) = .01, p = .919). These findings provide support for H9b, which 
states in conditions where the company has a strong brand reputation (but not for a weak 
reputation), the presence (vs. absence) of a reward will lead  to higher perceptions of 
company-ownership. 
 
3.10.6.3 Main and Mediating Effects of Information Ownership 
 The effects of self-ownership (H3a) and company-ownership (H3b) on privacy 
control expectations were tested using regression analysis. In support of hypotheses H3a 
and H3b, self-ownership was found to have a significant positive effect (β = .489, t(107) 
= 5.80, p = .00), and company-ownership a negative effect (β = -.416, t(107) = -4.73, p = 
.00) on expectations for privacy control. 
 To assess whether perceptions of self-ownership (H4a) and company-ownership 
(H4b) mediate the effects of compensation level on privacy control expectations 
mediation analyses were conducted using the bootstrapping method suggested by Zhao, 
Lynch, and Chen (2010). Self-ownership  (βaxb = .336, 95% CI = .014 to .793) and 
company-ownership (βaxb = .350, 95% CI = .082 to .741) were found to fully mediate the 
effect of compensation level on privacy control expectations. These findings provide full 
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support for H4a and H4b. A summary of the mediating effects of self-ownership and 
company-ownership can be seen in Table 3.11. 
 
3.10.7 Discussion 
 The results from Study 4 provide support for the main effect of compensation 
level on perceptions of self-ownership, company-ownership, and expectations for privacy 
control. Specifically, the presence (vs. absence) of a reward leads to lower perceptions of 
self-ownership (H1a), and greater perceptions of company-ownership (H1b). However, a 
main effect of compensation level on expectations for privacy control was not found in 
this study (H1c), although this result was found to be significant in Studies 1 and 2. 
Overall, these main effect results replicate the findings from previous studies in this 
essay, and provide additional support for the influence of rewards on consumers' 
willingness to share ownership rights over their personal information with marketers. 
 The results of this study also provide evidence that perceptions of self-ownership 
have a positive effect on privacy control expectations (H3a), and company-ownership has 
a negative effect (H3b). Perceptions of self-ownership (H4a) and company-ownership 
(H4b) are also found to fully mediate the effect of compensation level on privacy control 
expectations. As with Studies 1 and 3, these findings suggest that ownership beliefs have 
a strong effect on consumers' expectations for privacy control, and that rewards can be 
used by marketers for influencing these beliefs. Information ownership perceptions serve 
as an important underlying process between compensation level and its impact on privacy 
control expectations. 
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 The findings provide support for the moderating effects of reputation type on 
perceptions of self-ownership and company-ownership, as a two-way interaction was 
found between compensation level and brand reputation. In support of H9a and H9b, in 
conditions where the company has a strong brand reputation (but not for a weak 
reputation), the presence (vs. absence) of a reward leads to lower perceptions of self-
ownership, and higher perceptions of company-ownership. This finding suggests that 
compensation may be more effective for influencing consumers' ownership beliefs when 
the company has a strong brand reputation. On the other hand, when the company has a 
weak brand reputation, compensation has no effect on ownership beliefs, as consumers 
may be less trusting of this type of company with their information. 
 In summary, full support is found for hypotheses H1a, H1b, H3, H4, and H9; and 
no support for H1c. In general the empirical findings from this study provide evidence of 
a main effect of compensation level, and moderating effect of brand reputation. 
 
3.11 Discussion of Quantitative Findings 
 As Table 3.1 reveals, the results of these four studies provide strong support for 
the main effects of compensation level, and type, on ownership perceptions and 
expectations for privacy control. The moderating effects of information sensitivity, 
relationship type, and company reputation are also found. The results demonstrate the 
mediating role of ownership perceptions and their effect on privacy control expectations. 
Overall, full support is found for 14 hypotheses, partial support for 3 hypotheses, and no 
support for 3 hypotheses. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate the effects of compensation level, 
and type, on ownership beliefs and control expectations. Information sensitivity was 
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found to be a key moderating variable that influences the relationship between 
compensation and ownership perceptions. When the type of information provided by 
respondents was perceived to be more sensitive, compensation had a greater effect on 
ownership beliefs. Studies 3 and 4 offer a replication of the main effects of compensation 
and find support for the moderating effects of relationship type, and company reputation. 
 This research explored the effects of compensation on consumers' information 
ownership perceptions, and expectations for privacy control. Although researchers have 
studied the effects of compensation on disclosure, only a few studies have begun to 
examine the role of compensation in privacy protection (Hann et al. 2002; Acquisti et al. 
2009). The results of this essay provide strong support for a privacy exchange 
perspective, as compensation was found to be an important determinant for how much 
control over their information consumers are willing to share with marketers.  
 The findings from this essay support theories that suggest that compensation can 
be used to permit a decrease in privacy protection (Sheehan and Hoy 2000; Hui et al. 
2006; Acquisti et al. 2009), as respondents were found to tradeoff their rights and ability 
to exercise control over their information in return for monetary, and non-monetary, 
incentives. The findings also provide support for the perspective advocated in the privacy 
literature that most consumers recognize that their privacy rights are not absolute (Westin 
1992; Davis 1997; Foxman and Kilcoyne 1993; Jarvenpaa and Staples 2001), by 
empirically demonstrating that consumers are willing to share their ownership rights and 
privacy control with marketers in exchange for monetary benefits.  
 These results have important implications for marketers and policy makers as they 
suggest that compensation may have an effect on how marketers can use personal data 
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without violating consumers' rights to privacy. The results of this research may help to 
clarify the discrepant views that marketer and consumers typically hold concerning who 
has the right to own and control the consumer's personal information (Sheehan and Hoy 
2000; Milne and Bahl 2010). For instance, the results suggest that consumers perceive 
marketers to have more legitimate ownership rights and control over their information 
when they have received financial compensation, as compared to when that information 
is voluntarily provided.  In particular, when monetary types of rewards are present, 
consumers are willing to relinquish and share some of their ownership and control with 
marketers. These findings suggest that consumers may perceive the acceptance of 
compensation in exchange for their personal information as their implied consent for the 
marketer using that information. When consumers receive adequate compensation they 
may feel a sense of obligation for allowing the company to benefit from the exchange by 
using their information for financial gain. 
 Although it has been suggested in the privacy literature that consumers differ in 
the extent to which they share ownership rights and control over their information with 
marketers (Hagel and Rayport 1997; Prabhaker 2000; Graeff and Harmon 2002), little 
research has examined the boundary conditions that lead to these effects. This research 
finds that the effect of compensation on ownership perceptions is contingent on the 
sensitivity of the information provided, relationship with the company, and the reputation 
of the company. In particular, compensation had a greater effect on ownership beliefs 
when the information provided was perceived to be sensitive. This finding may suggest 
that compensation is necessary for altering beliefs when sensitive information is 
involved. However, for non-sensitive information, consumers may not require, or expect 
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much compensation and may in fact be willing to voluntarily give up rights and control 
of this information to marketers. Expectations for privacy protection differ across various 
types of consumer information. These findings suggest that it is necessary for marketers 
to provide rewards that correspond with the type of information provided by the 
consumer. When the consumer has been adequately compensated for the risk of 
disclosure they may be more willing to let the company use their information for business 
purposes.  
 Compensation was found to have a stronger effect on ownership beliefs when the 
consumer had an established, long-term relationship with the company, and when the 
company had a reputable image. In support of Xie and colleague's (2006) findings, the 
effect of incentives on privacy perceptions was found in this research to depend on a 
company's reputation for trustworthiness. Consumers are more willing to share ownership 
rights to their information with companies that they trust. Thus, it may be necessary for 
unfamiliar companies to offer a greater level of compensation for the collection, and use 
of consumers' personal data, in order to offset the risk to privacy protection. 
 While this research serves as a preliminary step towards understanding how 
compensation affects privacy perceptions, it includes certain limitations that offer 
important avenues for future research. First, this research included only two levels of 
monetary compensation in the experimental scenarios: the absence of a reward, and a $50 
check. These levels were used in order to test how voluntary, as compared to incentivized 
disclosure, affects privacy tradeoffs. Future research may want to investigate additional 
levels of monetary, and non-monetary, rewards in order to examine their marginal effects 
on privacy expectations.  
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 Second,  there is a need for additional, empirical research that examines the role 
of compensation and its effects on privacy expectations. In particular, privacy control is a 
key concern for consumers, and consumers feel a growing lack of control over how their 
personal information is being used by companies (Sheehan and Hoy 2000). While this 
research employed a global measure of privacy control, future studies may want to 
examine the effect of compensation on each of the various dimensions of privacy control 
(e.g., secondary use, transfer of data to third parties, price discrimination, marketing 
solicitations). It is also recommended that future studies develop and test a composite 
measure for examining the extent of shared ownership between consumers and 
companies. As with the current research on information ownership, previous studies have 
employed separate, countervailing measures for computing the ratio of how much 
information is perceived to belong to the individual or the company (Constant, Kiesler, 
and Sproull 1994). However, a composite measure of shared ownership may offer 
additional insights for the study of information privacy. As a final recommendation, it is 
suggested that future research test theories of information ownership and privacy control 
by using field-based experiments, in order to provide external validity for results found 
though controlled laboratory conditions.  
 
3.12 Study 5 - Qualitative Analysis of Privacy Exchange 
 
 Information ownership and privacy control are complex and understudied social, 
ethical, and technology-driven phenomenon (Foxman and Kilcoyne 1993; Davis 1997; 
Sheehan and Hoy 2000). Given the relatively sparse empirical research on information 
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ownership and control, semi-structured long interviews were conducted. The interview 
data was used to cross-validate and enrich the interpretation of the quantitative results.  
 In-depth descriptions about privacy exchanges on the Internet offer an important 
source of data that has not been exploited. It is surprising that only a few studies have 
employed qualitative data and interviews for understanding privacy issues on the Internet. 
An extensive search of the expansive privacy literature found only four articles that 
employed qualitative methods (i.e., Sayre and Horne 2000; Olivero and Lunt 2004; Lee, 
Im, and Taylor 2008; Poddar, Mosteller and Ellen 2009). Such research can be very 
valuable for understanding how consumers think about their privacy and the trade-offs 
they make in exchange for benefits. Privacy exchanges often involve complex belief 
systems and situations regarding power, trust, commitment, and goal congruence, that 
may be difficult to fully examine through the use of quantitative studies. Qualitative 
methods, such as personal interviews, and open-ended responses from online 
respondents, have been found to be particularly useful for revealing underlying needs, 
goals, and decision-making processes (Kozinets 2002). Descriptive information on the 
social norms and contracts (e.g., privacy policies) governing privacy exchange 
relationships could be useful for theory development. 
 
3.12.1 Data Collection and Informants 
 
 A qualitative study was used to develop a typology of privacy exchange 
relationships on the Internet. Data were collected with two different methods: open-ended 
survey responses and long-interviews. Following the analysis of open-ended responses 
from the surveys used in studies 1-4, long-interviews were then conducted. Thirteen 
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depth interviews, ranging from 10 to 40 minutes, were conducted during which 
informants, ages 19-49 (seven females and six males), described their experiences with 
providing personal information on the Internet in return for benefits. Informants included 
students and staff who were recruited from the University's business school. A separate 
panel of 156 Internet users were also asked a subset of the open-ended questions that 
were used in the depth-interviews, in order to gather multiple participant perspectives on 
information ownership and control in privacy exchanges. Specifically, the issues explored 
in the qualitative study included: 1) attitudes towards the exchange of information for 
benefits online, 2) the implications of companies offering rewards for self-disclosure on 
the Internet and how the trade of personal information is perceived by consumers, and 3) 
the extent to which participants feel their rights to control their information are "given 
up", or shared with marketers, in these privacy exchanges. 
 Interviews began with a conversation to elicit background information on the 
informant's level of privacy concern, privacy protection, and experiences with revealing 
personal information on the Internet in exchange for benefits. A structured set of 
questions were used for the interviews in this study and appear in Appendix B. Although 
the questions provided a general framework, they were followed by additional questions 
requesting clarifications, examples, and further detail. The questions were carefully 
worded to elicit participants' responses in a nondirective manner, thereby avoiding 
interviewer bias (McCracken 1988). Consistent with the recommendations of Podsakoff 
and colleagues (2003), interview participants were informed that their identity would be 
disguised in the reporting of the findings in order to protect participant anonymity and 
confidentiality. Demographic information for interview participants is reported along 
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with their responses in the findings section. After gaining permission from the 
participants, each interview was audio recorded. Audio recordings of the interviews were 
transcribed for analysis by a professional organization specializing in academic 
transcription services.  
 As the data collection process progressed, notes from the personal interviews and 
open-ended survey responses were reviewed, and emerging ideas and themes were 
identified. Ideas and themes were identified based on the number of times mentioned by 
participants and the interesting insights offered. The process of grounded theory (Glaser 
and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin 1990) was used in analyzing the data by 1) 
examining each participant's verbatim descriptions, 2) developing themes across 
participants, and 3) identifying relationships between the different themes. Several major 
themes emerged from the interviews and are discussed in the following sections. 
 
3.12.2 Findings 
 
 Table 3.18 provides an overview of the major themes and ideas that emerged from 
constant comparative analysis of the qualitative data (Strauss and Corbin 1998). The data 
revealed that interview participants had varying perceptions on how much privacy control 
is given up in exchange for benefits on the Internet. Four main organizing themes 
associated with types of privacy exchange emerged in the research. These themes are 
compatible with the types of exchange relationships defined in the marketing literature: 
unilateral exchanges, bilateral exchanges, contractual exchanges, and complex exchanges 
(Bagozzi 1975; Heide 1994; Weitz and Jap 1995). The typology of four privacy exchange 
relationships are defined by the extent to which control is perceived to be shared with 
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marketers and the mechanisms governing these relationships. A typology of privacy 
exchanges is first described and then factors (reward structure, type of information 
provided, relationship with company, reputation of company) that influence how these 
privacy exchanges are perceived are considered. 
 There are often two parties in an online information exchange - the consumer and 
the firm. Each party has a set of rights and responsibilities for the use and protection of 
disclosed information that defines the type of exchange relationship that exists. It is 
proposed that the privacy exchange agreement may be categorized into four types, based 
on the extent to which their is mutuality in the control over consumer data, and the extent 
to which these agreements are implicitly or explicitly defined. When consumers perceive 
that their right to privacy control is either absolute, or completely given up, the privacy 
exchange has been labeled as 'unilateral exchange'. However, when a consumer perceives 
that some degree of control over their data is shared with the firm, this exchange is 
referred to as 'bilateral exchange'. Both unilateral and bilateral exchanges tend to be 
governed by social, implicit types of agreements (Weitz and Jap 1995). A 'contractual 
exchange' on the other hand reflects a privacy exchange that is governed by explicit 
agreements, such as privacy policies, which state each party's rights and responsibilities 
for the control of information. Finally, a 'complex exchange' describes a privacy 
exchange where consumers think of their personal information as a publicly available 
commodity rather than an exclusive asset. 
 
3.12.2.1 Unilateral Exchange 
 
 A unilateral, or authoritarian, type of exchange has been defined in the marketing 
literature as when one party in the relationship uses its position or power to control and 
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influence the activities of the other party (Heide 1994; Weitz and Jap 1995). The power 
to invoke control is often initiated from a perceived right to that control. In terms of 
individual consumers, the nature of personal information being tied to the individual 
legitimizes the use of this authoritative control mechanism. In an information exchange 
context, individuals may demand total control over how their information is used by 
marketers, and may not even regard the marketer as having any legitimate rights to 
control of their information. On the other hand, marketers may think that their efforts and 
resources used in acquiring the data provides them with certain rights to use and benefit 
from that information. In particular, if a financial incentive is provided in exchange for 
the information, firms may view this as a mechanism that bestows legitimate rights to 
control. Often as a result of goal conflict between the parties, unilateral exchanges 
involve each party acting in its own self-interest rather than in a collaborative manner. 
    
 Consumer has absolute ownership and control (The Autocratic Consumer). Some 
academics have suggested that consumers have absolute privacy rights to their 
information, including the right to specify how the firm can use their information (Hagel 
and Rayport 1997; Prabhaker 2000; Graeff and Harmon 2002). When a consumer and 
company participate in the exchange process, consumers are likely to believe that the 
ultimate ownership and control of information resides with the individual (Nowak and 
Phelps 1992; Sheehan and Hoy 2000). In support of this perspective, one of the interview 
respondents proclaimed, " I feel like I mostly own the information, I would dictate the 
terms of the relationship. I would want to be able to say if [the company] can sell it or 
not." (male, age 30, graduate student). Other respondents offered parallel ideas: 
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 "Even if [a company] pays for my information, it is still my information and not the 
 company's. I feel that I still own that personal information, and should be able to tell 
 the company when they can and cannot share my information" 
 
 "I believe that I still have ownership rights to the information and should have total 
 control  over how it is used and shared." 
 
 These statements reflect that some consumers believe they maintain ownership 
rights and absolute control over their personal information even when a reward is given. 
It is pointed out in the privacy literature that consumers' absolute rights to their personal 
information could result in marketers being expected to obtain permission from 
individuals before using personal information (Davis 1997). For instance one interview 
respondent proclaimed, "I don't care if [a company] pays me for my information, [they] 
can't pass it on to someone else without my consent." (male, age 39, graduate student). 
Similarly, another respondent asserted, "I do not think the company owns the 
information, they can not use it without my consent." Thus, when consumers feel that 
they have absolute rights to control over their personal information, this has implications 
for the ability of marketers to use this information without first obtaining permission. 
 
 Not an economic exchange of privacy control for benefits. Some academics have 
argued that consumers do not view their personal data in the context of an economic 
exchange of their privacy for benefits (Hoffman et al. 1999); Ward et al. 2005). That is, 
consumers may not evaluate such exchanges as involving a tradeoff of privacy, and may 
be uninterested in "selling" their personal data to marketers. As one respondent put it, 
"When I think of a reward, I think of kind of an incentive to bring me in as like a 
customer. So I don't think I feel like I tie the reward with the degree of how much privacy 
there is." (female, age 49, university staff). Another respondent suggested: 
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  "I don't think it's an exchange at all, because the company can give out a million  rewards 
 if they have a ton of money, it might not even affect them in any way. But you give 
 out my information, and who knows how that could affect me down the road. I don't 
 believe it is an equal exchange in giving your personal information to receive a reward. 
 Rewards are temporary and our information is permanent. There's no reward that  could 
 make me say, hey take [my information], give it to whoever you want, do whatever you 
 want with it." 
  
 These verbatim quotations reveal that some consumers may not think of providing 
their personal information in return for benefits as a tradeoff of their privacy control. 
Thus, it is possible that some consumers do not view self-disclosure as an exchange of 
their privacy for desired benefits. Rather, consumers may view marketers' use of 
incentives not as a way to gain control over consumers' information, but as a means to 
entice the potential customer into building a relationship with the company. 
 
 Company has absolute ownership and control (The Autocratic Marketer). It has 
been suggested that consumers and marketers may have discrepant views as to who owns 
and controls the consumers' personal information (Sheehan and Hoy 2000; Milne and 
Bahl 2010). For instance, marketers are likely to perceive that they have legitimate 
ownership rights to the information they have gathered through expenditure of their 
resources, and should control its use and dissemination (Cespedes and Smith 1993; Davis 
1997; Sheehan and Hoy 2000). For instance, it has been found that companies that collect 
information from consumers, or purchase information from other businesses, often feel 
that the information belongs to them and therefore justified in using and selling the 
information without the consumer's consent (Taylor et al. 1995). In the words of one 
respondent, "Many companies would see the reward as payment for your information, 
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and use it as they please. If I am paid for [my information[, they probably think they 
OWN it!" Other respondents offer similar perspectives: 
 "I technically feel that I should have ownership and control of my information. However, 
 I recognize that there are companies that may feel that they own and control it." (male, 
 age 37, graduate student) 
 
 "I feel like it would be looked upon as buying my information which would give [the 
 company] a sense of owning it and having control over it. I expect they would do with it 
 what they want, therefore I would have lost control of how they use it." (female, 32, 
 university staff) 
 
  
 Thus, consumers recognize that individuals and marketers may have discrepant 
views on who has ownership rights and control over the consumers' data. The qualitative 
data also revealed that some consumers feel once they have provided information to a 
firm that they have given up complete control over their information, especially if they 
receive a reward in return. For some consumers, the acceptance of a reward serves as 
implied consent for the company to use their personal information. For example, one 
respondent noted, "Once I provide it, it's their information. I know as a consumer that 
once I provide it they can do what they want with it. I feel like it is owned by them a lot 
of the times." Other respondents offered similar points of view: 
 "I feel that I would be giving up some ownership rights of my personal information. Once 
 I exchange my information for some sort of reward, which is basically my consent, I have 
 no discretion or ability to control how the company uses my information." 
 
 "I would feel like I am selling my ownership rights and control to the information, if I am 
 exchanging my information for a reward. They can pretty much do whatever they want 
 with it, I have no control at that point over how it is being used." 
 
3.12.2.2 Bilateral Exchange 
 Bilateral exchanges are typically characterized in the marketing literature as 
relational types of exchanges that involve collaboration, reciprocity, shared beliefs, and a 
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long-term orientation in which parties frequently take into account the other party's 
interests when making decisions (Williamson 1983; Heide 1994; Weitz and Jap 1995). A 
degree of control and decision-making power is often shared between parties and based 
on an implicit set of principles and norms which help to coordinate and govern the 
relationship. Mutual obligations in a privacy context, may include the recognition of the 
desire of firms to profit from consumers' information, and the company's responsibility 
for protecting the consumer's personal data.  
 It has been advocated that most consumes and marketers recognize that the 
privacy rights of individuals are not absolute, and that control of personal information is 
shared and jointly owned by both the consumer and company (Westin 1992; Davis 1997; 
Foxman and Kilcoyne 1993; Jarvenpaa and Staples 2001). As one respondent put it, "I 
never feel like I have complete control over my information, as I must share at least some 
of it with all kinds of different public and private entities just to function in society." 
Consumers frequently transfer some of their control and ownership privileges to 
marketers when they are adequately compensated for disclosing personal information 
(Masacrenhas et al. 2003).  
 
 Sharing control, but maintaining ownership. The qualitative data suggests that 
while some individuals believe they are giving up a degree of control over their 
information by accepting a reward, they still feel that they own their information. For 
example, one respondent asserted, "I still would believe that I exclusively own all the 
rights to my personal information. However, I would realize that agreeing to such an 
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exchange would, for all practical purposes, be ceding some control of that information to 
the purchasing company." Other respondents offered parallel ideas: 
 "My personal information belongs to me even after accepting a reward from a company. I 
 am letting them use it in exchange for the reward, but the information is still mine - it 
 does not belong to the company." 
 
 "Anytime you give personal information to a third party, you are relinquishing some 
 control over that information. I am sharing control over my information, but I retain 
 ownership. I am merely providing this information for limited use by the  company." 
 
 Recognition of company interests. Consumers understand that companies offer 
benefits and rewards for information, because they plan to profit from the use of that 
information. For instance, one respondent noted, "If you're going to accept something in 
exchange for your personal information, then there has to be some degree of 
understanding that you're giving something up as well, there's some understanding that 
they want that information for some reason and by accepting the offer you are in effect 
allowing them to use your information." (male, age 30, graduate student ). Consumers 
often are aware that when they exchange their information with marketers that it may be 
used for marketing efforts. As one respondent put it, "If [the company] is going to give 
me a reward then I assume I'm getting signed up for some mailing list or I'm going to get 
phone calls. Why else would they be willing to pay me for my information?" He added, 
based on his personal experience, that "I know that even respected professional 
organizations routinely sell out their mailing list, and that's a huge source of income for 
them." (male, age 30, graduate student). In a different perspective, some participants felt 
that the information collected by the marketer should be used to benefit the consumer. In 
the words of one respondent, "I am choosing to share this information with a company 
that provides me benefits: coupons, discounts. I give my consent to receive coupons. 
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However, I would not be happy if they gave [my information] to other people." (female, 
age 36, university staff). 
 
 Limited use and responsibility for protection. Although many consumers feel that 
they give up some control over their information when it is exchanged for benefits, 
respondents indicated that marketers' use of that information is assumed to be restricted 
to certain internal purposes. In addition, it is expected that when consumers take a risk in 
disclosing their information to firms that the firm takes on some responsibility for 
protecting that information. As stated by one informant, "I am giving up control of my 
information, but under the assumption that the information will be used for purposes 
directly related to that company's own marketing efforts. It is implied that you are only 
allowing this company to utilize it for purposes directly related to the company's own 
marketing efforts, and not to pass on to third parties." Other examples include: 
 "I feel like the company owns that information, but I also feel that they have some 
 responsibility with that information. I think it's implied by me in sharing the information 
 with the company that they wouldn't turn around and give that information to somebody 
 else. I don't necessarily think they have the right to sell that information, that's not 
 implied by me." (male, age 29, graduate student) 
 
 "I feel like the company is paying to get access to me, but not to sell that access to 
 a third party. The company does not have the right to pass my information on 
 beyond their internal purposes." (male, age 37, graduate student) 
 
 
3.12.2.3 Contractual Exchange 
 
 While unilateral and bilateral exchanges are often governed by implied 
agreements, contractual exchanges involve explicit agreements, established a priori, that 
define the responsibilities and entitlements for each party in the relationship (Weitz and 
Jap 1995). These contractual terms can be established by one party for governing the 
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relationship, and the terms can be accepted or rejected by the parties involved. It has been 
suggested that contractual terms can be very useful under conditions involving 
uncertainty and risk (Bergen, Dutta, and Walker 1992). In privacy exchanges, it has 
become common for company's Web sites to post privacy notices outlining how the 
company plans to use information that is collected, and the consumer's rights to privacy.  
 
 Privacy policies for specifying control. For many consumers these policies help to 
determine the extent to which they expect to have control over their information. For 
example, one respondent said, "Unless there is some sort of privacy policy, I assume [the 
company] is going to sell my information to marketers. If they explicitly tell me in their 
privacy policy, we do not resell your information then that will give me some more 
comfort that I'm in control of my information." He also added, "Providing information to 
anyone in absence of a privacy policy implies consent, at least in this day in age." (male, 
age 30, graduate student). Other respondents offered a similar sentiment: 
 "Only in cases where there are very specific privacy statements would I feel that I had not 
 lost total control. If there was no stipulation that the information wouldn't be shared or 
 sold, then I would expect they would do with it what they want, therefore I would have 
 lost control of how they use it." (female, age 49, university staff) 
 
 "It depends if there is a non-disclosure agreement in their privacy policy. If they say they 
 reserve the right to share that information with third parties, then I would definitely say 
 I'm exchanging my ownership rights for the reward, since I am giving up control to that 
 information."  
 
 Privacy policies for cost-benefit analysis. Privacy policies and non-disclosure 
agreements are important for consumers in deciding whether to share their information 
with marketers, and for deciding whether the benefits associated are worth the risk of 
disclosure. Consumers expect to be notified of the terms of a privacy exchange 
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agreement. As one respondent put it, "Even if the [company] pays me for my 
information, they need to let me know up front in the fine print how they are going to use 
my information. If they let me know up front how they're going to use my information, 
and the reward is sizable, I may be okay with it." The respondent also added, "If I give 
my consent, I don't have a problem with the company using my information. What I have 
a problem with is [companies] getting your information and deciding, well, it's ours, we 
own it." (male, age 39, graduate student). Other respondents offered a similar 
perspective: 
 "I would have to make a decision am I willing to be paid that much to provide my 
 information, and I need to know up front what the deal is. If the upfront deal says we're 
 going to use it for this and it's going to be passed on, then I'm informed and giving my 
 consent." (male, age 37, graduate student) 
 
 "I think companies have done a very bad job in telling people what information they're 
 actually using about them, and letting people really understand what they're giving up. I 
 would give personal information, as long as they're telling me what information they're 
 taking and how they're going to use it." (female, age 48, university staff) 
 
 Limitations of privacy policies. Although privacy policies provide helpful 
guidelines for consumers in determining whether they want to engage in a relationship 
with the company, privacy policies may have certain limitations. For example, some 
companies frequently change the terms in their privacy policies to suit their own interests, 
some privacy policies use vague jargon that is difficult to decipher, and unlike most 
contracts, many privacy policies do not provide sufficient details on when and how the 
agreement can be terminated by the consumer. Because of these limitations, even when 
these statements are present, consumers often experience feelings of skepticism and may 
still be hesitant to provide their information. As one respondent suggested, "Once you 
give your information out to a company, you don't know what they'll do with it even if 
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they've said they won't sell it, you no longer have control over that." Another respondent 
noted that privacy policies often use ambiguous terminology such as "our partners and 
affiliates" when informing the consumer how their information will be distributed. This 
can make it unclear what restrictions have been set for how the company can use the 
consumer's information, and the extent to which the company has a responsibility for 
protecting that information. Several respondents also described a desire to terminate their 
agreement with the company, especially if the company begins to use their information in 
a disconcerting manner. As one respondent elaborated, "You should still be able to 
terminate the relationship when you want. So it's not permanent - it's almost like you're 
licensing out your personal information for a reward to an organization as long as both 
sides agree that the license is valid, they can do what you've agreed to let them do with it 
and then once that's over that's the end of it." (male, age 30, graduate student). Other 
respondents offered related thoughts: 
 "I don't think that it's ethical for [the company] to change the game later on. It's not a 
 blank check after that they can say well, you already agreed to give us your [personal 
 information], and now we can do anything we want with it. Even if they are paying me, 
 they can't turn around and then go and do anything they please with my information." 
 (male, age 37, graduate student) 
  
 "I would give personal information, as long as they're telling me how they're 
 going to use it. However, I think the original intent sometimes morphs into 
 something else - like you don't even understand the technologies that are there 
 now in the future, because we can't put a crystal ball on it. So, you know, what I'm 
 willing to share with you today might change for both the company and for me, 
 and so I think it's not fair for the company to say, 'Well, five years ago, you gave 
 me this information, there's a new technology and I'm using it in this different 
 way, that you sort of implied that you would let me use it. But, you didn't know 
 that this technology was occurring. So, I think you should be able to go 
 backwards and ask to be deleted from the database, even if they provide you with 
 a reward. To some extent I feel like if you receive compensation for your 
 information you are giving up your rights. However, the company needs to be 
 explicit in what they plan to do with the information and NOT change their 
 procedures. You should also have the right to end the relationship at some point. I 
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 don't think because I get a $20 gift card that I give up rights to my information 
 into perpetuity." (female, age 48, university staff). 
 
3.12.2.4 Complex Exchange 
 
 Unilateral, bilateral, and contractual exchanges in this paper have been 
conceptualized as privacy exchanges between two parties - the consumer and the firm. 
However, these dyadic privacy exchanges between the consumer and firm are often 
embedded in a larger network of exchange relationships, which may have social and 
economic influences on the focal transaction. A complex exchange recognizes that often 
times more than two parties are present in an exchange. A complex exchange perspective 
takes a systemic view of resource exchanges by considering how entire systems and 
networks of relationships may influence how parities perceive the exchange process 
(Bagozzi 1975).  
 With advances in the ability of companies to collect information about consumers 
on the Web, and the willingness of consumers to share their information, a consumer's 
personal data is often times available to a multitude of parties, and available in both 
private and public spheres. The private versus public boundaries of personal information 
are becoming unclear, resulting in a widespread perception by consumers that their 
privacy is being eroded (Acquisti and Gross 2006; Rust, Kannan, and Peng 2002). Some 
have gone as far as asking whether we really have any privacy in this age of digital 
media, and others such as Scott McNealy, CEO of Sun MicroSystems, have even 
suggested that the notion of "privacy is dead" (Meeks 2001). In addition, Mark 
Zuckerburg, founder and CEO of Facebook, has claimed that the age of privacy is over 
  
159
(Bosker 2010). These perceptions may have implications for consumers' feelings of self-
efficacy, and locus of control, for protecting their information and privacy on the Internet. 
 An important aspect of any exchange is the scarcity of the resources being 
exchanged. Resource exchange theory states that "any commodity will be valued to the 
extent that it is unavailable, or scarce" (Brinberg and Wood 1983). The widespread 
availability of a person's information on the Internet may affect that person's valuation of 
their information as a scarce resource or asset that is under their control. For example, 
some respondents were found to place little value on their information, because they 
perceive that much of their information has become a publicly owned commodity that is 
easily accessible and to which they have very little control over.   
 
 Generally low expectations for control. The qualitative data revealed that several 
respondents felt that their privacy was being eroded and that they have very little control 
over their information. For example, one respondent declared, "Generally, I have very 
low expectations of privacy on the Internet." (female, age 48, university staff) Another 
respondent said, "I never feel that I have complete control over my information, as I must 
share at least some of it with all kinds of different public and private entities just to 
function in society." These statements provide support for researchers who have 
suggested that privacy exchanges are unavoidable in the current Internet environment as 
users must be willing to tradeoff their personal information in order to participate in most 
online activities (Rust et al. 2002; Joinson and Paine 2007). 
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 Public ownership of information. While some consumers may feel that they either 
have absolute, or a complete lack, of ownership and control over their personal 
information, other respondents suggested that ownership and control of information may 
be publicly owned. As one respondent noted, "I don't feel like I'm giving up ownership to 
my information in an exchange. No one owns information and if someone wants to find 
my information they will. Provided the information is something that could be obtained 
fairly easily, I would consider it public information." Another respondent said, "I am just 
giving out some basic information that they could probably get some other way. With the 
use of the Internet, anyone can get that information about me, so I don't feel that I have 
ownership rights to that information." Other respondents offered similar statements about 
public ownership of their information: 
 "In reality I think we give up control of our information all the time. The stuff is not truly 
 private. I've revealed information to the public even though I've said I want privacy. It's 
 funny when you think about Facebook and how much personal information I give on that 
 for no reward whatsoever." (male, age 37, graduate student) 
 
 "I think that once you provide information, once you put it out there in the public's 
 domain, then it's now the public's or the company's information. I think once it's in the 
 public domain, now there is no ownership of it. Once something is online, once 
 something is out there, it's somewhere forever, it can never be deleted, it's somewhere in 
 some database forever. So, I think that once that's out there, you no longer have legal 
 ownership of that. Once you put a picture on Facebook, once you put information on 
 Facebook, you don't own it, it's just - everyone owns it. It's sort of a public ownership 
 thing if that makes sense." (male, age 27, graduate student) 
 
3.12.2.5 Factors Affecting Internet Privacy Exchanges 
 
 The qualitative data revealed that how privacy exchanges are perceived may 
depend on the reward, type of information provided, a person's relationship with the 
company, and the company's reputation. Table 3.19 provides an overview of factors 
affecting Internet privacy exchanges. 
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 Reward structure (size, type). For some consumers the size of the reward led to 
expectations for less control over that information. For example, one respondent 
commented, "If the company is going to give me a reward then I expect less control. The 
larger the amount, the more likely I would give up my ownership rights." (male, age 37, 
graduate student) and another informant stated, "The more monetary value of the reward, 
the more obligated and indebted one feels to maintain the agreement for a longer period 
of time." (female, age 48, university staff)  However, for others the level of compensation 
had no effect, as exemplified by quotes from the following informants:  
 
 "I think once you provide a company your information you are giving up control  and 
 ownership rights to that information, no matter what the rewards are. I don't really think 
 the presence or absence of a reward changes my expectations for privacy. Once you give 
 up that information, I think you give up ownership and control." (male, age 27, graduate 
 student) 
 
 "Whether or not you receive a reward, any time you give personal information to  a third 
 party, you are relinquishing some control over that information." 
 
 "The size of the reward may affect my willingness to provide the information, but not 
 how much control I would expect." 
 
 
 For some consumers receiving a larger reward implied that the company will use 
their information heavily for marketing efforts. As one respondent noted, "If the company 
is paying me for my information, they will maybe try harder to sell my personal 
information to marketers, because they need to recoup the costs." (male, age 30, graduate 
student) and one respondent added, "Perhaps a large reward might make it worthwhile to 
open myself up to endless marketing solicitations." In some cases respondents felt that a 
large reward actually made them desire more control over their privacy, because they 
were wary of what the company would do with their information. In the words of these 
respondents:  
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 "Actually it would make me want to have more control with a higher reward. I would 
 think the company is going to do something horrible with my information. If you're 
 willing to pay this much for it, it increases my sensitivity. A large reward would make me 
 suspicious of what they planned on doing with my information"  
 
 "With a large reward it would seem I am being bribed into giving up my personal 
 information." 
 
 
 Most respondents were found to favor monetary types of rewards, and these types 
of rewards typically led to lower expectations for privacy control. As one respondent 
suggested, "I would exchange my information for cash, but I would still want control of 
the information for a gift card," and other respondents said: 
 "The larger the amount, the more likely I would give up my ownership rights. Money is 
 better than all other types of rewards."  
 
 "The reward would probably have to be monetary in value for me to be willing to give up 
 control of my information. The bigger the award, the more likely I am to give up certain 
 pieces of my information." 
  
 For other consumers, regardless of the type of reward they still perceived it as an 
exchange of their privacy, as long as the size of the reward was adequate. As one 
respondent put it, "The type of reward wouldn't make a difference, you are still receiving 
some type of exchange for your information." and another respondent added, "Any type 
of monetary or non-monetary reward, I would feel I would be giving up private 
information, I would be selling my own identity." 
 
 Type of Information Provided. Some respondents indicated that the sensitivity of 
the information they provide to a company has an impact on how much control they 
would expect. For some consumers, when the information is considered to be non-
sensitive they are more willing to let the company use that information, on the other hand 
they expect to have more control over their sensitive information. For example one 
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respondent says, "If the information is non-sensitive, I would be more likely to pass it on 
and less likely to care if the company passed it on or not." (male, age 39, graduate 
student)  Other respondents had similar thoughts on the issue: 
 
 "In the case of demographic information, I feel like I'd have less control than if I provided 
 my full name, or email address. If they are requiring less of me for a reward, I feel they 
 are making a larger commitment, and so in that case they have a little more control over 
 it." (female, age 31, university staff) 
  
 "I would be less likely to give up control of my sensitive information. I would be 
 willing to part with non-sensitive information for much less." 
 
 "I feel non-sensitive information is different, and the company can claim to own it 
 if I provide it." 
 
 
 For highly sensitive information some consumers wouldn't consider sharing or 
giving up control of that information for any price. As one respondent put it, "I'd be more 
willing to give up non-sensitive information over sensitive information. Some 
information would be too sensitive to share at any price." and another respondent added, 
"I think sensitive information is not something that should be easily exchanged for a 
reward. I'd be less willing to give up control of my sensitive information like my email, 
and totally unwilling to give up secure information like my social security number."  
 For other consumers the type of information provided does not have an effect on 
their expectations for control, as they either expect complete control, or alternatively that 
once the company has the information their control is given up entirely. One respondent 
noted, "All the information is mine regardless of what type it is, and I would expect 
complete control." and in a entirely divergent perspective another respondent asserted, "It 
doesn't matter what kind of information I gave them, as long as they have it they have 
control of it."  
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 Company Relationship and Reputation. The reputation of a company is an 
important cue for many consumers as to how much they can trust a company with their 
information and their expectations for how the company will protect their information. 
For many consumers they expected more control over their information from reputable 
companies. As one consumer suggested, "I would have an expectation of a company with 
a better reputation to have better controls. I would expect more control because I would 
think that feeds into their reputation" (male, age 37, graduate student) Other respondents 
have similar perceptions: 
 
 "If it was a reputable company, or I had a stronger relationship with the company, I guess 
 I would have slightly more control, but I think a more important issue would be, I would 
 also expect that they would behave differently with my information." (male, age 29, 
 graduate student) 
 
 "I would expect that the more reputable the company is, the more reputable they're going 
 to be with the usage of my personal information. I would expect more control and more 
 privacy, if the company is very reputable or well-known" (female, age 31, university 
 staff) 
 
 
 There seems to be a general sense across consumers that "if the company is held 
in very high regard, it is expected that they would not want to tarnish that reputation." A 
strong reputation acts as a deterrent, or countervailing force, for the company to not abuse 
consumers' information. For example, a respondent suggested, "I need to have a sense 
that abuse of the information is as harmful to the company as it is to me." Thus, a more 
reputable company risks damaging its reputation by acting carelessly with the personal 
data it collects. 
 For some consumers a more reputable company makes them feel less concerned 
about sharing their information, but it does not have much of an impact on their 
expectations for control over their information. As one respondent asserted, "The 
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relationship with the company or the company's reputation would probably make me feel 
more at ease to give them information, but it would not change how I view the control of 
the information. I would still expect a large degree of control even if it was a reputable 
company." (male, age 39, graduate student)  Another respondent noted, "I think the 
reputation of the company is related to how well they're going to protect that information, 
but I don't think I have any more or less control over that information." (male, age 27, 
graduate student)  Other respondents offered parallel ideas: 
 "I'm not sure that the reputation of the company would make a huge difference. I would 
 like to believe a company with a good reputation would want to hold on to that 
 reputation. But, I still think I would feel as though I lost control of that information." 
 (female, age 49, university staff) 
 
 "A company's reputation probably wouldn't do much to encourage me to give up my 
 information; if their reputation is bad, it's already out of the question, but if it's good, it 
 could possibly mean they haven't been caught doing anything wrong yet." 
 
 "Regardless of the company's reputation, I can't be absolutely sure of what they're 
 going to do with my information, so I am giving up control." 
 
 
 A company's reputation may affect the cost of acquiring consumer data. The 
reputation of a company was found to have an impact on how much of an incentive the 
firm needs to provide consumers in order to entice them to provide their personal 
information. As one informant noted, "The reputation of the company would effect the 
amount of the reward I would require for my personal information. I would be more 
willing to provide my information for less if it was a company I trusted." 
 The relationship with the company is another important factor that influences how 
consumers perceive privacy exchanges. One respondent stated, "If I have a long-term 
relationship with the company then I think I would be ok with them having more 
ownership of my information." (female, age 19, undergraduate student)  Another 
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respondent offered a different perspective by suggesting, "Most of the time I don't expect 
that I would have a lot of control. Again, I might be more apt to feel that I do if it's a 
company that I've dealt with." (female, age 49, university staff)  The type of relationship 
with the company may have an impact on whether incentives are perceived as a privacy 
exchange. As one respondent points out, "If I had a relationship with the company I 
wouldn't feel like it was an exchange because we know each other. Some companies I do 
business with already most likely have a lot of personal information about me." Thus, the 
type of relationship with the company may affect whether a privacy exchange is viewed 
as transactional in nature, or as a reciprocal aspect of the relationship. 
 
3.13 Discussion of Qualitative and Multi-method Findings 
 
 The primary contribution of this study is that it provides a typology of privacy 
exchange relationships that are classified along two dimensions: the extent to which 
consumers perceive control of their information to be shared with marketers, and the 
extent to which these relationships are governed by implicit or explicit agreements. 
Specifically, four different types of privacy exchanges were uncovered: unilateral, 
bilateral, contractual, and complex. The framework from the marketing exchange 
literature was applied for organizing the degree to which consumers share ownership 
rights and control over their information with marketers in privacy exchanges.  
 Several important implications for marketers and policy makers emerged from the 
results. The data reveal that participants' attitudes towards the exchange of personal 
information for benefits online, and its effect on privacy control expectations, vary 
widely. For instance, some interviewees were unwilling to relinquish any of their 
ownership rights or control over their personal information to marketers, even when 
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given some type of reward. These participants view rewards as an inadequate exchange 
for giving up control over their personal information, and do not consider self-disclosure 
in return for benefits on the Internet as an economic exchange that results in a sacrifice of 
their privacy control. Rather than rewards serving as an exchange mechanism for 
acquiring rights to control the consumer's personal information, these participants 
perceived the use of rewards by marketers as a way to encourage consumers to engage in 
a relationship with the firm. 
   On the other hand, many of the interviewees adopted a more pragmatic approach 
concerning their expectations for control in privacy exchanges. Westin (2001) refers to 
these types of consumers as 'privacy pragmatists', as they are willing to make privacy 
tradeoffs. Although these respondents also desire a great deal of control over their 
information, they recognize that when they disclose details about themselves to marketers 
they are giving up, or sharing, some of their ownership rights and control over that 
information with marketers. In particular, when rewards are involved, participants 
considered the acceptance of a reward as implied consent for letting the company use 
their information for marketing purposes. In addition, some individuals had generally low 
expectations for having control of their privacy following disclosure, regardless of 
whether a reward was received or not. 
 The findings highlight the need for marketers to recognize that consumers are 
active participants in privacy exchange relationships in that they take into account both 
their own well-being, and the commercial interests of the firm when determining the 
degree of privacy control they expect. For instance, interviewees acknowledge that 
marketers and consumers tend to hold discrepant views and goals for the use of consumer 
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data. In particular, the participants were aware that marketers often use consumer data for 
commercial gain and marketing purposes. However, at the same time participants felt that 
companies take on some responsibility for protecting consumer data, and that the use of 
data should be limited to what the consumer has agreed to. While compensation may 
serve as an implicit agreement for letting the company use personal data for internal 
marketing purposes, consumers do not feel that a reward gives the company unrestricted 
use of their data. In particular, participants objected to companies sharing or selling their 
information to third-parties, and a reward did little to quell those reservations. 
Participants were more tolerant of firms using their information for internal purposes, 
contacting consumers with solicitations, and in ways that benefit the consumer.  
 The ability to balance the consumer's need for privacy protection with the 
company's need for profitability is a challenge for marketers, as it is difficult to do both 
adequately. These findings may suggest that the use of consumer information that 
simultaneously benefits both the consumer and company may be the most acceptable use 
of consumer data, and such forms may include targeted advertising and promotions. 
Marketers need to make it clear to consumers how their information will be used to 
benefit them in the long-term, beyond the immediate reward. Future research may want 
to test the comparable effects of long-term benefits and immediate rewards on disclosure 
and privacy control expectations. 
 Many participants reported that they look to privacy policies and agreements for 
determining the rights and responsibilities of the parties involved. However, interviewees 
were found to have some concerns with privacy policies, such as the company's ability to 
change the terms without first obtaining consent from consumers, and the inability of the 
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customer to terminate the relationship. Companies that modify their privacy policies to 
suit their changing interests, and the limited consequences for companies in violation of 
their own privacy policies have resulted in some consumers having little faith in these 
types of agreements. Even with the presence of privacy statements and non-disclosure 
agreements, consumers tend to feel that they have lost control over their privacy, as 
means for resolving company violations of privacy are lacking. 
 In support of the quantitative findings from studies 1-4, larger rewards, for some 
participants resulted in lower expectations for ownership rights and privacy control. 
When a larger reward is received, a consumer tends to feel more obligated or indebted to 
the company in letting them use their information. For instance, participants were more 
willing to let the company send them solicitations in return for sizable rewards. 
Interestingly, the findings suggest there may be a curvilinear relationship for reward size, 
as for some respondents, a larger reward makes them more skeptical and suspicious of 
the company's intended use of their information. On one hand compensation can bestow 
rights to marketers for the use of consumer data, but on the other hand the trade of 
information for rewards reinforces a sacrifice in privacy, thereby stimulating a need for 
protection.  Some interviewees suggested that a larger reward indicates that the company 
will use their information more aggressively to recoup their investment. Also, in support 
of the quantitative results, a monetary type of reward is found to be more effective for 
reducing expectations for privacy control, because monetary types of compensation are 
frequently preferred to non-monetary rewards. 
 In addition to the size of the reward, the type of information provided, 
relationship with the company, and reputation of the company were found to impact 
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participants' perceptions of privacy exchanges. For instance, respondents were found to 
be more willing to give up control over their non-sensitive information, as they feel more 
comfortable allowing companies to use this type of information. Thus, a lower amount of 
compensation is required for consumers in yielding some control over their non-sensitive 
information. These findings provide additional support for the quantitative results in that 
compensation appears to be necessary when the information provided is sensitive. 
Respondents were less concerned about how companies use their non-sensitive 
information, and thus compensation did not have an impact on their ownership and 
privacy control beliefs for this type of information. 
 The type of relationship and reputation of the company also affects how much of 
an incentive is required for consumers to share control of their information with 
marketers. Interviewees revealed a higher willingness to share their information with 
companies they have an established relationship with, and companies that are well known 
and have an image to maintain. However, many consumers expect that reputable 
companies will provide the consumer with better privacy controls. Reputation was 
considered to be a factor that leads companies to act more responsibly with consumer 
data, in order to avoid damaging the firm's reputation. Thus, a company's reputation 
serves as a deterrent for misuse of personal data and offers some assurance against risks 
of disclosure. These findings suggest that while consumers are more willing to trust 
reputable companies with their information, they have higher expectations for these 
companies in safeguarding their information.   
 This study set out to understand how consumers perceive Internet privacy 
exchanges in terms of how much control they expect and how those relationships are 
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governed. Specifically, this study examined the factors in a privacy exchange that affect 
the degree to which consumers maintain absolute control and ownership of their 
information, or the extent to which they share those privileges with marketers. Overall, 
the findings from the qualitative study provide support for the empirical findings in this 
essay, and suggest that those findings can be explained using a marketing exchange 
framework. This research suggests that it is useful to view privacy exchanges in terms of 
the degree of mutual ownership and control, and the types of mechanisms for governing 
those relationships. 
 The various methods in this research together produced largely consistent and 
convergent results. The quantitative studies identified the effects of compensation on 
privacy expectations, and the qualitative findings offered additional credibility and 
insights into the underlying mechanisms for these effects. In particular, the qualitative 
research employed a marketing exchange framework for organizing the experimental 
findings in terms of various privacy exchange relationship based upon dimensions of 
shared control and governance mechanisms. 
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Figure 3.1 
Essay 2: Conceptual Model 
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Table 3.1 
Essay 2: Summary of Hypotheses  
Study Hyp. Description Supporta 
1, 3-4 H1 
 
Main Effects of Compensation Level 
(a) Presence (vs. absence) of a reward will lead to lower self-ownership. 
(b) Presence (vs. absence) of a reward will lead to higher company-ownership. 
(c) Presence (vs. absence) of a reward will lead to lower control expectations. 
 
Full 
Full 
Partial 
2 H2 Main Effects of Compensation Type 
(a) Monetary (vs. non-monetary) reward will lead to lower self-ownership. 
(b) Monetary (vs. non-monetary) reward will lead to higher company-ownership. 
(c) Monetary (vs. non-monetary) reward will lead to lower control expectations. 
 
None 
Full 
Full 
1-4 H3 Main Effects of Information Ownership 
(a) Higher (vs. lower) levels of self-ownership will lead to greater control 
expectations. 
(b) Higher (vs. lower) levels of company-ownership will lead to lower control 
expectations. 
 
Full 
 
Full 
1, 3-4 H4 Mediating Effects of Information Ownership on Compensation Level 
(a) Self-ownership mediates the effects of compensation level on control 
expectations. 
(b) Company-ownership mediates the effects of compensation level on control 
expectations. 
 
Partial 
 
Partial 
2 H5 Mediating Effects of Information Ownership on Compensation Type 
(a) Self-ownership mediates the effects of compensation type on control 
expectations. 
(b) Company-ownership mediates the effects of compensation type on control 
expectations. 
 
None 
 
None 
1 H6 Moderating Effects of Information Sensitivity on Compensation Level 
(a) Information sensitivity moderates the relationship between compensation level 
and self-ownership. 
(b) Information sensitivity moderates the relationship between compensation level 
and company-ownership. 
 
Full 
 
Full 
2 H7 Moderating Effects of Information Sensitivity on Compensation Type 
(a) Information sensitivity moderates the relationship between compensation type 
and self-ownership. 
(b) Information sensitivity moderates the relationship between compensation type 
and company-ownership. 
 
Full 
 
Full 
3 H8 Moderating Effects of Company-Relationship 
(a) Relationship moderates the relationship between compensation level and self-
ownership. 
(b) Relationship moderates the relationship between compensation level and 
company-ownership. 
 
Full 
 
Full 
4 H9 Moderating Effects of Brand Reputation 
(a) Reputation moderates the relationship between compensation level and self-
ownership. 
(b) Reputation moderates the relationship between compensation level and company-
ownership. 
 
Full 
 
Full 
a
 Support for hypotheses are based on the associated studies with p < .05 cutoff. 
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Table 3.2 
Essay 2: Study Summary 
Study Description Experimental Design 
1 Interaction Effects between Level of 
Compensation and Information Sensitivity 
 
2 (Level of Comp: low vs. high) x 2 
(IS: low vs. high) 
n = 143 
2 Interaction Effects between Type of 
Compensation and Information Sensitivity 
2 (Type of Comp: monetary vs. non-
monetary) x 2 (IS: low vs. high) 
n = 86 
3 Interaction Effects between Level of 
Compensation and Relationship 
2 (Level of Comp: low vs. high) x 2 
(Relationship: low vs. high) 
n = 178 
4 Interaction Effects between Level of 
Compensation and Reputation 
2 (Level of Comp: low vs. high) x 2 
(Reputation: weak vs. strong) 
n = 109 
         IS = Information Sensitivity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
175
Table 3.3 
Essay 2: Demographics of Respondents 
Variable Frequency Percentage 
 Study 1 2 3 4 Study 1 2 3  4 
Age         
<19 6 6 5 1 4.2 7 2.8 .90 
20-24 21 22 29 17 14.7 25.6 16.3 15.6 
25-34 60 27 57 37 42.0 31.4 32.0 33.9 
35-44 29 14 37 27 20.3 16.3 20.8 24.8 
45-54 18 15 39 19 12.6 17.4 21.9 17.4 
>54 9 2 11 8 6.3 2.3 6.2 7.3 
         
Gender         
Male 55 28 75 42 38.5 32.6 42.1 38.5 
Female 88 58 103 67 61.5 67.4 57.9 61.5 
         
Education         
High School 22 5 17 7 15.3 5.8 9.6 6.4 
College 104 72 132 78 72.7 83.7 74.1 71.5 
Graduate 17 8 29 24 11.8 9.3 16.2 22.0 
         
Income         
<$20k 32 25 44 25 22.4 29.1 24.7 22.9 
$20-29k 25 12 21 17 17.5 14.0 11.8 15.6 
$30-39k 20 9 22 14 14 10.5 12.4 12.8 
$40-49k 19 9 29 19 13.3 10.5 16.3 17.4 
$50-59k 12 8 17 6 8.4 9.3 9.6 5.5 
$60-69k 8 4 7 6 5.6 4.7 3.9 5.5 
>70k 27 19 38 22 18.9 22.1 21.3 20.1 
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Table 3.4 
Essay 2: Results of Manipulation Checks 
 Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 4 
Compensation Level     
Offered Reward p = .000  p = .000 p = .000 
     High Compensation 6.70 (.739) - 6.61 (.998) 6.23 (1.38) 
     No Compensation 3.73 (2.02) - 3.26 (2.08) 3.62 (2.18) 
Fairly Rewarded p = .000 - p = .000 p = .000 
     High Compensation 6.10 (1.33) - 5.86 (1.48) 5.68 (1.56) 
     No Compensation 3.29 (1.88) - 3.04 (1.65) 3.54 (2.02) 
     
Compensation Type     
Offered Reward - p = .510 - - 
     Monetary - 6.17 (1.48) - - 
     Non-Monetary - 5.96 (1.42) - - 
Fairly Rewarded - p = .000 - - 
     Monetary - 6.03 (1.48) - - 
     Non-Monetary - 4.78 (1.61) - - 
     
Information Sensitivity     
Sensitive p = .000 p = .001 - - 
     High Sensitivity 5.39 (1.74) 5.12 (1.91) - - 
     Low Sensitivity 3.70 (1.77) 3.72 (2.04) - - 
Personal p = .000 p = .002 - - 
     High Sensitivity 5.68 (1.75) 5.45 (1.64) - - 
     Low Sensitivity 4.38 (1.74) 4.24 (1.85) - - 
     
Company Relationship     
Long-Term - - p = .000 - 
     Strong Relationship - - 5.64 (1.33) - 
     Weak Relationship - - 3.26 (1.64) - 
Ongoing - - p = .000 - 
     Strong Relationship - - 5.80 (1.28) - 
     Weak Relationship - - 3.71 (1.54) - 
     
Brand Reputation     
Credible - - - p = .000 
     Strong Reputation - - - 5.44 (1.40) 
     Weak Reputation - - - 3.67 (1.45) 
Reputable - - - p = .000 
     Strong Reputation - - - 5.54 (1.21) 
     Weak Reputation - - - 3.61 (1.49) 
   *Mean (standard deviation) 
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Table 3.5 
Essay 2: Correlation Matrix 
Variables 1 2 3 
Study 1    
   Self-Ownership 1   
   Company-Ownership -.711** 1  
   Control .359** -.477** 1 
    
Study 2    
   Self-Ownership 1   
   Company-Ownership -.649** 1  
   Control .472** -.448** 1 
    
Study 3    
   Self-Ownership 1   
   Company-Ownership -.574** 1  
   Control .259** -.385** 1 
    
Study 4    
   Self-Ownership 1   
   Company-Ownership -.639** 1  
   Control .489** -.416** 1 
             * p<.05, ** p<.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1
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Table 3.6 
Essay 2: Psychometric Properties and CFA Results (Study 1) 
Constructs and Scale Items Mean SD α Std. 
Loading 
t-value Composite  
Reliability 
AVE 
Self-Ownership   .92   .92 .85 
I feel that the information I provided to the company belongs to 
me. 
5.20 1.97  .93 -   
I feel that I own the information I provided to the company. 5.16 2.01  .92 15.60   
Company-Ownership   .97   .97 .88 
I feel that the information I provided belongs to the company. 3.42 2.17  .94 -   
The company owns the information I provided. 3.50 2.25  .98 27.53   
The company has ownership rights to the information I provided. 3.47 2.22  .88 18.16   
The information I provided is now property of the company. 3.55 2.24  .93 21.47   
The information I provided is now owned by the company. 3.52 2.24  .97 26.71   
Control   .95   .95 .74 
I expect to have control over how the company uses my 
information. 
4.58 2.18  .95 -   
I expect to have control over whether the company uses my 
information to send me unsolicited promotions. 
5.13 2.16  .78 13.59   
I expect to have control over whether the company shared my 
information with other companies. 
4.83 2.25  .94 23.06   
I expect to have control over whether the company sells my 
information to other companies 
5.03 2.27  .94 23.69   
I expect to have control over whether the company shares my 
information with other divisions of the company. 
4.15 2.16  .80 14.03   
I expect to have access to information collected about me by the 
company. 
4.55 2.21  .78 13.58   
I expect to have the ability to edit the information collected about 
me by the company. 
4.66 2.22  .82 15.10   
Model Fit: χ2 = 147.08, df = 74, p = .00, CFI = .98, NFI = .96, GFI = .87, AGFI = .82, RMSEA = .08 
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Table 3.7 
Essay 2: Discriminant Validity Analysis* 
        *Based on (Fornell and Larcker 1981): AVE in the diagonal and squared correlations off-diagonal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Self-Ownership Company-Ownership Control 
Study 1    
   Self-Ownership .85   
   Company-Ownership .54 .88  
   Control .14 .25 .74 
    
Study 2    
   Self-Ownership .78   
   Company-Ownership .47 .89  
   Control .31 .24 .70 
    
Study 3    
   Self-Ownership .83   
   Company-Ownership .34 .85  
   Control .06 .16 .69 
    
Study 4    
   Self-Ownership .90   
   Company-Ownership .44 .90  
   Control .26 .19 .78 
 1
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Table 3.8 
Essay 2: Multivariate and Univariate Results 
 
 
a
 Boldface indicates significant univariate results (p<.05). 
 
b
 Included as a dependent variable in multivariate analysis. 
 CL = Compensation Level, IS = Information Sensitivity, CR = Company Relationship, BR = Brand Reputation 
 
Multivariate results  Univariate resultsa 
Wilks' λ F p  Self-Ownershipb  Company-Ownershipb  Control Independent variables 
    
df MS F p  MS F p  MS F p 
Study 1                 
   CL .94 3.81 .024  1 25.54 7.61 .007  18.21 4.28 .040  18.61 4.98 .027 
   IS .96 2.87 .060  1 18.18 5.41 .021  17.53 4.13 .044  1.04 .280 .597 
   CL x IS .95 3.03 .051  1 19.59 5.83 .017  17.50 4.12 .044  1.99 .534 .466 
   Error     139     4.24    3.73   
                 
Study 2                 
   CT .93 2.99 .055  1 10.53 4.50 .037  15.48 4.92 .029  15.58 5.44 .022 
   IS .93 2.77 .068  1 10.32 4.42 .039  13.59 4.32 .041  11.62 4.06 .047 
   CT x IS .83 7.79 .001  1 33.36 14.28 .000  30.54 9.71 .003  24.02 8.39 .005 
   Error     82 2.33    3.14    2.86   
                 
Study 3                 
    CL .91 7.68 .001  1 21.72 6.19 .014  56.69 15.19 .000  17.87 5.65 .019 
    CR .99 .237 .789  1 .896 .255 .614  1.65 .444 .506  .959 .303 .582 
    CL x CR .92 6.64 .002  1 42.01 11.97 .001  29.94 8.02 .005  .003 .001 .976 
    Error     174 3.50    3.73    3.16   
                 
Study 4                 
    CL .93 3.57 .032  1 11.53 4.55 .035  22.74 6.66 .011  .674 .185 .668 
    BR .96 2.10 .127  1 1.45 .575 .450  13.53 3.96 .049  5.53 1.52 .220 
    CL x BR .90 5.58 .005  1 27.16 10.71 .001  22.27 6.52 .012  .385 .106 .746 
    Error     105 2.53    3.41    3.64   
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Table 3.9 
Essay 2: Follow-up Tests in MANOVA 
Self-Ownership  Company-Ownership Independent  
Variables Coef. SE t-value Sig. t 95% CI Result  Coef. SE t-value Sig. t 95% CI Result 
Study 1              
   CL -.848 .307 -2.75 .006 (-1.61, -.084) Sig.  .716 .345 2.07 .040 (-.142, 1.57) n.s. 
   IS .715 .307 2.32 .021 (-.047, 1.47) n.s.  -.702 .345 -2.03 .044 (-1.56, .156) n.s. 
   CL x IS -1.48 .614 -2.41 .016 (-3.01, .041) n.s.  1.40 .691 2.02 .044 (-.313, 3.12) n.s. 
              
Study 2              
   CT -.718 .338 -2.12 .036 (-1.56, .130) n.s.  .871 .392 2.21 .029 (-.113, 1.85) n.s. 
   IS .711 .338 2.10 .038 (-.137, 1.56) n.s.  -.816 .392 -2.07 .040 (-1.80, .168) n.s. 
   CT x IS -2.55 .676 -3.77 .000 (-4.25, -.859) Sig.  2.44 .785 3.11 .002 (.477, 4.41) Sig. 
              
Study 3              
    CL -.700 .281 -2.48 .013 (-1.39, -.003) Sig.  1.13 .290 3.89 .000 (.412, 1.85) Sig. 
    CR -.142 .281 -.503 .613 (-.839, .554) n.s.  .193 .290 .666 .506 (-.525, .912) n.s. 
    CL x CR -1.94 .563 -3.46 .000 (-3.34, -.554) Sig.  1.64 .580 2.83 .005 (.207, 3.08) Sig. 
              
Study 4              
    CL -.652 .305 -2.13 .035 (-1.41, .110) n.s.  .916 .355 2.58 .011 (.030, 1.80) Sig. 
    BR -.232 .305 -.758 .449 (-.995, .531) n.s.  .706 .355 1.98 .049 (-.179, 1.59) n.s. 
    CL x BR -2.00 .611 -3.27 .001 (-3.52, -.475) Sig.  1.81 .710 2.55 .012 (.041, 3.58) Sig. 
         CL = Compensation Level, IS = Information Sensitivity, CR = Company Relationship, BR = Brand Reputation 
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Table 3.10 
Essay 2: Cell Means and Standard Deviations (Study 1) 
 Low Compensation High Compensation 
 High IS Low IS  High IS  Low IS 
Self-Ownershipa 6.36 
(1.18) 
4.90 
(1.84) 
4.77 
(2.29) 
4.80 
(1.82) 
Company-Ownershipb 2.40 
(1.73) 
3.81 
(1.99) 
3.82 
(2.40) 
3.82 
(2.05) 
Cell Size 33 37 33 40 
            aMeasured on a seven-point scale; higher numbers indicate greater perceptions of self-ownership. 
            bMeasured on a seven-point scale; higher numbers indicate greater perceptions of company-ownership. 
        IS = Information Sensitivity. 
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Table 3.11 
Essay 2: Mediation Analysis 
 
 
 
              ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 
 
 Indirect Effect Direct Effect 
 Coefficient 95% Confidence Interval Coefficient t-value 
Mediation Type 
Study 1      
Mediating Effects of Self-Ownership      
   Compensation Level → Control .273 (.074, .571) .709 2.20* Partial Mediation 
      
Mediating Effects of Company-Ownership      
   Compensation Level → Control .285 (.015, .629) .709 2.20* Partial Mediation 
      
Study 2      
Mediating Effects of Self-Ownership      
   Compensation Type → Control .275 (-.044, .728) .725 1.81 No Mediation 
      
Mediating Effects of Company-Ownership      
   Compensation Type → Control .286 (-.041, .720) .725 1.81 No Mediation 
      
Study 3      
Mediating Effects of Self-Ownership      
   Compensation Level → Control .155 (.035, .366) .633 2.38* Partial Mediation 
      
Mediating Effects of Company-Ownership      
   Compensation Level → Control .369 (.164, .656) .633 2.38* Partial Mediation 
      
Study 4      
Mediating Effects of Self-Ownership      
Compensation Level → Control .336 (.014, .793) .143 .391 Full Mediation 
      
Mediating Effects of Company-Ownership      
Compensation Level → Control .350 (.082, .741) .143 .391 Full Mediation 
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Table 3.12 
Essay 2: Psychometric Properties and CFA Results (Study 2) 
Constructs and Scale Items Mean SD α Std. 
Loading 
t-value Composite  
Reliability 
AVE 
Self-Ownership   .87   .88 .78 
I feel that the information I provided to the company belongs to me. 5.12 1.81  .81 -   
I feel that I own the information I provided to the company. 5.13 1.82  .96 8.55   
Company-Ownership   .97   .97 .89 
I feel that the information I provided belongs to the company. 3.79 2.03  .87 -   
The company owns the information I provided. 3.66 1.99  .95 13.65   
The company has ownership rights to the information I provided. 3.52 2.01  .96 14.14   
The information I provided is now property of the company. 3.76 2.07  .97 14.41   
The information I provided is now owned by the company. 3.71 2.08  .97 14.51   
Control   .94   .94 .70 
I expect to have control over how the company uses my information. 4.57 2.07  .95 -   
I expect to have control over whether the company uses my 
information to send me unsolicited promotions. 
5.16 2.06  .81 11.31   
I expect to have control over whether the company shared my 
information with other companies. 
4.90 2.19  .96 20.03   
I expect to have control over whether the company sells my 
information to other companies 
5.01 2.11  .96 19.99   
I expect to have control over whether the company shares my 
information with other divisions of the company. 
4.16 2.22  .79 10.58   
I expect to have access to information collected about me by the 
company. 
4.71 2.08  .72 8.80   
I expect to have the ability to edit the information collected about me 
by the company. 
4.56 2.16  .62 6.89   
Model Fit: χ2 = 133.38, df = 74, p = .00, CFI = .97, NFI = .94, GFI = .82, AGFI = .74, RMSEA = .09 
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Table 3.13 
Essay 2: Cell Means and Standard Deviations (Study 2) 
 Monetary Compensation Non-Monetary Compensation 
 High IS Low IS High IS Low IS 
Self-Ownershipa 4.52 
(1.87) 
5.09 
(1.68) 
6.52 
(.66) 
4.53 
(1.62) 
Company-Ownershipb 4.29 
(2.04) 
3.88 
(2.07) 
2.20 
(1.20) 
4.24 
(1.74) 
Cell Size 19 16 21 30 
     aMeasured on a seven-point scale; higher numbers indicate greater perceptions of self-ownership. 
     bMeasured on a seven-point scale; higher numbers indicate greater perceptions of company-ownership. 
   IS = Information Sensitivity. 
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Table 3.14 
Essay 2: Psychometric Properties and CFA Results (Study 3) 
Constructs and Scale Items Mean SD α Std. 
Loading 
t-value Composite  
Reliability 
AVE 
Self-Ownership   .91   .91 .83 
I feel that the information I provided to the company belongs to me. 5.17 2.04  .93 -   
I feel that I own the information I provided to the company. 5.12 2.03  .90 12.29   
Company-Ownership   .96   .96 .85 
I feel that the information I provided belongs to the company. 3.29 2.14  .89 -   
The company owns the information I provided. 3.39 2.21  .89 18.15   
The company has ownership rights to the information I provided. 3.47 2.16  .90 18.82   
The information I provided is now property of the company. 3.50 2.19  .95 21.56   
The information I provided is now owned by the company. 3.43 2.16  .98 23.43   
Control   .93   .94 .69 
I expect to have control over how the company uses my information. 5.10 2.03  .94 -   
I expect to have control over whether the company uses my 
information to send me unsolicited promotions. 
5.38 2.03  .87 18.71   
I expect to have control over whether the company shared my 
information with other companies. 
5.48 1.97  .93 22.98   
I expect to have control over whether the company sells my 
information to other companies 
5.46 2.00  .93 23.27   
I expect to have control over whether the company shares my 
information with other divisions of the company. 
4.47 2.29  .71 12.31   
I expect to have access to information collected about me by the 
company. 
4.96 2.14  .71 12.27   
I expect to have the ability to edit the information collected about me 
by the company. 
4.84 2.18  .71 12.39   
Model Fit: χ2 = 268.17, df = 74, p = .00, CFI = .96, NFI = .95, GFI = .82, AGFI = .75, RMSEA = .12 
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Table 3.15 
Essay 2: Cell Means and Standard Deviations (Study 3) 
 Low Compensation High Compensation 
 Strong 
Relationship 
Weak 
Relationship 
Strong 
Relationship 
Weak 
Relationship 
Self-Ownershipa 5.89 
(1.57) 
5.06 
(2.03) 
4.22 
(1.95) 
5.33 
(1.90) 
Company-Ownershipb 2.56 
(1.73) 
3.19 
(1.86) 
4.52 
(2.02) 
3.50 
(2.12) 
Cell Size 48 47 43 40 
     aMeasured on a seven-point scale; higher numbers indicate greater perceptions of self-ownership. 
     bMeasured on a seven-point scale; higher numbers indicate greater perceptions of company-ownership. 
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Table 3.16 
Essay 2: Psychometric Properties and CFA Results (Study 4) 
Constructs and Scale Items Mean SD α Std. 
Loading 
t-value Composite  
Reliability 
AVE 
Self-Ownership   .95   .95 .90 
I feel that the information I provided to the company belongs to me. 5.62 1.72  .95 -   
I feel that I own the information I provided to the company. 5.60 1.72  .95 16.22   
Company-Ownership   .98   .97 .90 
I feel that the information I provided belongs to the company. 3.14 2.02  .97 -   
The company owns the information I provided. 3.17 2.03  .95 24.88   
The company has ownership rights to the information I provided. 3.29 2.05  .94 22.86   
The information I provided is now property of the company. 3.20 2.01  .95 24.89   
The information I provided is now owned by the company. 3.22 2.06  .95 25.73   
Control   .96   .96 .78 
I expect to have control over how the company uses my information. 5.06 2.06  .92 -   
I expect to have control over whether the company uses my 
information to send me unsolicited promotions. 
5.42 2.00  .87 14.37   
I expect to have control over whether the company shared my 
information with other companies. 
5.42 2.09  .95 18.90   
I expect to have control over whether the company sells my 
information to other companies 
5.28 2.08  .96 19.90   
I expect to have control over whether the company shares my 
information with other divisions of the company. 
4.58 2.24  .79 11.65   
I expect to have access to information collected about me by the 
company. 
5.09 2.05  .90 16.12   
I expect to have the ability to edit the information collected about me 
by the company. 
5.04 2.15  .81 12.15   
Model Fit: χ2 = 153.09, df = 74, p = .00, CFI = .98, NFI = .96, GFI = .83, AGFI = .76, RMSEA = .09 
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Table 3.17 
Essay 2: Cell Means and Standard Deviations (Study 4) 
 Low Compensation High Compensation 
 Strong 
Reputation 
Weak 
Reputation 
Strong 
Reputation 
Weak 
Reputation 
Self-Ownershipa 6.30 
(1.14) 
5.53 
(1.50) 
4.65 
(1.62) 
5.88 
(1.92) 
Company-Ownershipb 2.66 
(1.91) 
2.86 
(1.45) 
4.48 
(1.78) 
2.87 
(2.11) 
Cell Size 26 26 26 31 
           aMeasured on a seven-point scale; higher numbers indicate greater perceptions of self-ownership. 
           bMeasured on a seven-point scale; higher numbers indicate greater perceptions of company-ownership. 
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Table 3.18 
Essay 2: A Typology of Internet Privacy Exchanges 
Type of Privacy Exchange Examples 
Unilateral Exchange: Definition: Consumers' privacy control is either absolute, or 
non-existent 
   The Autocratic Consumer "I still have ownership rights to the information and should have 
total control over how it is used and shared." 
   Not an Economic Exchange "I don't think I feel like I tie the reward with the degree of how 
much privacy there is." 
   The Autocratic Marketer "Many companies would see the reward as payment for your 
information, and use it as they please. If I am paid for [my 
information], they probably think they OWN it! 
Bilateral Exchange: Definition: Consumers' privacy control is shared with 
marketers. 
   Sharing control, but    
   maintaining ownership 
"I am sharing control over my information, but I retain ownership." 
   Recognition of company   
   interests 
"There's some understanding that they want that information for 
some reason and by accepting the offer you are in effect allowing 
them to use your information." 
   Limited use and responsibility    
   for protection 
" I also feel that they have some responsibility with that 
information. I think it's implied by me in sharing the information 
with the company that they wouldn't turn around and give that 
information to someone else." 
Contractual Exchange: Definition: Consumers' privacy control is determined by 
explicit agreements. 
   Privacy policies for specifying  
   control 
"Only in cases where there are very specific privacy statements 
would I feel that I had not lost total control." 
   Privacy policies for cost-benefit    
   analysis 
"I would have to make a decision am I willing to be paid that much 
to provide my information, and I need to know up front what the 
deal is." 
   Limitations of privacy policies "The company needs to be explicit in what they plan to do with the 
information and NOT change their procedures. You should also 
have the right to end the relationship at some point." 
Complex Exchange: Definition: Consumers' privacy control is publicly controlled. 
   Generally low expectations for  
   control 
"I never feel that I have complete control over my information, as I 
must share at least some of it with all kinds of different public and 
private entities just to function in society." 
   Public ownership of information "Once you put it out there in the public's domain...you don't own it 
- everyone owns it. It's sort of a public ownership." 
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Table 3.19 
Essay 2: Factors Affecting Internet Privacy Exchanges 
Type of Privacy Exchange Examples 
Reward Structure: Size and type of compensation 
   Reward Size leads to less control "If the company is going to give me a reward then I expect less 
control. The larger the amount, the more likely I would give up my 
ownership rights.." 
   Reward Size has no impact on    
   relinquishing control 
"Whether or not you receive a reward, any time you give personal 
information to a third party, you are relinquishing some control 
over that information." 
   Reward Size creates suspicion of  
   intent 
"A large reward would make me suspicious of what they planned 
on doing with my information. It would make me want to have 
more control with a higher reward." 
   Reward Type leads to less   
   control 
"The reward would probably have to be monetary in value for me 
to be willing to give up control of my information." 
   Reward Type has no impact on  
   relinquishing control 
"The type of reward wouldn't make a difference, you are still 
receiving some type of exchange for your information." 
Type of Information Provided: Sensitivity of Information Provided 
   Less control for non-sensitive  
   information 
"If the information is non-sensitive, I would be more likely to pass 
it on and less likely to care if the company passed it on or not." 
   More control for sensitive  
   information 
"I would be less likely to give up control of my sensitive 
information. I would be willing to part with non-sensitive 
information for much less." 
   Complete control, regardless of  
   information type 
"All the information is mine regardless of what type it is, and I 
would expect complete control." 
   No control, regardless of   
   information type 
"It doesn't matter what kind of information I gave them, as long as 
they have it they have control of it." 
Company Relationship: Type of Relationship with the Company 
   Strong relationship leads to less  
   control 
"If I have a long-term relationship with the company then I think I 
would be ok with them having more ownership of my 
information." 
   Strong relationship leads to more  
   control 
"Most of the time I don't expect that I would have a lot of control. 
Again, I might be more apt to feel that I do if it's a company that 
I've dealt with." 
   Relationship affects how privacy  
   exchange is viewed 
"If I had a relationship with the company I wouldn't feel like it was 
an exchange because we know each other. Some companies I do 
with business with already have a lot of personal info about me." 
Brand Reputation: Type of Company Reputation 
   Expect more control from   
   reputable companies 
"I would expect more control and more privacy, if the company is 
very reputable or well-known." 
   Strong reputation as a deterrent   
   for privacy violations 
"If the company is held in very high regard, it is expected they 
would not want to tarnish that reputation." 
   Reputation affects amount of  
   reward required 
"The reputation of the company would effect the amount of the 
reward I would require for my personal information. I would be 
more willing to provide my information for less if it was a 
company I trusted." 
   Reputation has no impact on   
   control expectations 
"I think the reputation of the company is related to how well 
they're going to protect that information, but I don't think I have 
any more or less control over that information." 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
4.1 Theoretical Contributions 
 The purpose of essay 1 (Chapter 2) was to examine the effects of marketers' 
influence strategies and brand reputation on trust, privacy concern, and disclosure. The 
key research question explored was whether the persuasiveness of influence strategies 
and brand reputation are contingent upon consumers' goals (privacy protection vs. 
acquisition of benefits), and thus more effective when compatible with those goals. Three 
primary contributions to the privacy exchange literature are offered in this essay. First, 
this research addresses conflicting findings in the literature concerning the effectiveness 
of safety cues (e.g., privacy policies, trust seals) and rewards for encouraging consumers 
to provide their personal information to Web sites (Andrade et al. 2002; Montoya-Weiss 
2003; Milne and Culnan 2004; Schlosser et al. 2006).  
 A second, and related contribution, is the use of regulatory focus theory (Higgins 
1997) for investigating the impact of consumers' goals on how they respond to marketers' 
online influence strategies and a company's brand reputation. The results of essay 1 
provide evidence of the importance of consumer goals in decisions to disclose personal 
information to marketers. The compatibility between consumers' motivations and 
marketers' influence strategies impact the effectiveness of these efforts on encouraging 
self-disclosure. This work answers the call by Wirtz and Lwin (2009) for additional 
research that examines the role that consumer goals play in privacy exchanges and cost-
benefit tradeoffs. This essay demonstrates the importance of examining consumers' 
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psychological factors for examining why marketers' online strategies differ in their ability 
to promote self-disclosure. Consumers' psychological characteristics are found in this 
study to help explain how consumers respond to marketers' influence strategies and a 
company's brand reputation. Furthermore, investigating the fit between regulatory focus 
and brand cues helps to address Swaminathan et al.'s (2009) call for research that 
explores how individual characteristics affect the relationship between brands and brand 
outcomes. This is the first study to examine the interaction effects, and compatibility, 
between influence strategies, brand reputation, and regulatory focus. A third contribution 
of this essay is that it addresses a methodological gap in the privacy exchange literature 
by empirically examining the causal relationship between marketers' influence strategies 
and consumer response. Although correlational studies have examined the relationship 
between marketers' strategies and privacy concerns, as Sheehan and Hoy (1999) note 
causality can not be inferred from correlational studies. 
 The purpose of Essay 2 (Chapter 3) is to address, and integrate, two related issues 
in the privacy literature, 1) who has ownership rights and control over consumer 
information, and 2) do consumers perceive information exchanges as a sacrifice of their 
privacy protection. This is done by empirically testing the effect of compensation on 
consumers' expectations for privacy protection. This essay addresses the call by several 
researchers for additional research on discrepant views regarding who owns and controls 
the consumer's personal information (Sheehan and Hoy 2000; Milne and Bahl 2010), and 
the implications of offering rewards on these privacy perceptions (Andrade et al. 2002; 
Hann et al. 2002; Olivero and Lunt 2004; Joinson and Paine 2007). 
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 This essay makes four primary contributions to the information privacy and 
exchange literature. The first is an empirical investigation into the essential, yet 
understudied, areas of information ownership rights and privacy control. Empirical 
studies on information ownership rights and privacy control are scarce, and often rely on 
correlation analysis (Sheehan and Hoy 1999). The second is identifying factors that affect 
consumers' expectations for information ownership rights and control within the context 
of information privacy exchanges. The third is an examination of the effects of 
compensation structure (i.e., monetary and non-monetary types of compensation) on 
privacy perceptions. This essay addresses Sheehan and Hoy's (2000) call for research that 
examines consumers' perceived value of monetary and non-monetary types of 
compensation in privacy exchanges. The fourth is a multi-method approach to 
investigating online privacy control issues. Four experiments and a qualitative study are 
used to explore the effects of information exchanges on consumers' privacy expectations.  
 The results of essay 2 reveal that privacy exchanges may affect the degree to 
which consumers believe ownership and control over their information is shared with 
marketers. A primary contribution of this research for academics is the development of a 
typology of privacy exchange relationships that are classified along two dimensions: the 
extent to which consumers perceive control of their information to be shared with 
marketers, and the extent to which these relationships are governed by implicit or explicit 
agreements. A marketing exchange framework was employed for organizing the 
experimental findings in terms of various privacy exchange relationships based upon 
dimensions of shared control and governance mechanisms.  
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4.2 Managerial Contributions 
 Essay 1 offers several managerial insights by evaluating the relative effectiveness 
of safety cues (e.g., privacy policies, trust seals) and rewards for encouraging self-
disclosure on the Internet. Identifying effective strategies for encouraging individuals to 
disclose their personal information on the Internet is important for marketers. In today's 
information-based economy, access to consumer data is imperative for organizations in 
conducting marketing activities. Thus, a critical question facing marketers is under what 
conditions are certain influence strategies most effective for encouraging consumers to 
provide their personal information online. However, the extant privacy literature has 
offered little guidance for marketers on how to develop effective strategies. In particular, 
there is a limited amount of academic work in the privacy literature that examines the 
relative effectiveness of these various strategies, and their boundary conditions.  
 The findings from this research emphasize the importance of compatibility 
between marketers' influence strategies, brand reputation, and consumers' goals. This 
essay calls attention to the importance of examining consumers' psychological factors 
(i.e., goals, motivations) for examining why marketers' online strategies differ in their 
ability to promote trust, reduce privacy concerns, and encourage self-disclosure. The 
findings from this research suggest to marketing practitioners that it is important to 
consider consumers' goals (privacy protection, acquisition of benefits) for developing 
strategies in the Internet environment. The findings show that the effectiveness of these 
strategies for encouraging self-disclosure are contingent on the degree to which they are 
compatible with these goals. Specifically, the findings reveal that strategies that promote 
protection and security through the use of safety cues (privacy statements, trust seals) 
 196
may be more persuasive for prevention-focus consumers, while the use of incentives may 
be more persuasive for promotion-focused consumers. There is a strong literature base 
demonstrating that a consumer's regulatory focus can be temporarily manipulated, and 
thus future research in privacy may want to explore the ability of marketers to align their 
strategies with consumers' goals. 
 The findings from this research also suggest that a company's brand reputation 
influences the effectiveness of these various strategies for encouraging self-disclosure. In 
particular, incentives were found to be more effective for established firms, and 
potentially damaging for companies that were unfamiliar to the consumer. These findings 
may be helpful for practitioners as they demonstrate the importance of compatibility 
between a company's brand image and the type of strategy used by that company. In 
addition, this essay provides causal linkages showing how consumers respond to various 
influence situations. For instance, multiple ways in which consumers could respond to 
various influence strategies were explored including self-disclosure and the propensity to 
provide incomplete and false information. Thus, the results are informative for marketers 
in terms of consumers' intended response to various strategies. In general, the results 
suggest that safety cues, as compared to incentives, are more effective for building trust, 
reducing privacy concerns, and encouraging self-disclosure on the Internet. Future 
research, however, may want to test the effectiveness of these strategies in a more 
realistic environment in order to demonstrate whether behavioral intentions actually 
correlate with behavior. It is possible that while safety cues are more effective for 
reducing the perceived costs of self-disclosure, incentives may be more effective for 
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increasing the perceived benefits. Further research is needed for uncovering whether the 
costs, or benefits, of disclosure are more indicative of actual disclosure behavior. 
 Essay 2 offers several key insights of interest to practitioners and policymakers. 
In particular, this research addresses contemporary policy issues related to the ownership 
and control of consumer data. Questions over who controls and has ownership rights to 
consumer data is emerging as an important policy issue, as demonstrated by the publicity 
and legal action surrounding how companies are using personal information. It is 
important for companies to understand what consumers' expectations for privacy control 
are following the disclosure of personal information for benefits on the Internet. 
Discrepant views may emerge about who owns and has control over information 
provided by the consumer, and these inconsistent expectations for privacy can have 
negative consequences for company-consumer relationships (Milne and Bahl 2010). The 
lack of government regulation in terms of data ownership and control make it vital for 
companies to be aware of consumers' privacy perceptions and expectations. 
 The results of this essay are informative for practitioners and policymakers as 
they demonstrate that the level and type of compensation influences the degree to which 
consumers expect to share their ownership rights and control with marketers. Sensitivity 
of the information provided, relationship with the company, and the company's reputation 
were identified as important boundary conditions. A framework for classifying privacy 
exchange relationships in terms of shared control and governance mechanisms is 
developed in the hope that it will assist practitioners in avoiding the violation of 
individual rights to privacy. These findings are also informative for practitioners as they 
reveal consumers' general attitudes towards the exchange of personal information for 
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benefits online. For instance, implications for companies offering rewards for 
encouraging self-disclosure on the Internet, and how these rewards are perceived by 
consumers, were examined. The results also offer important insights concerning the 
extent to which participants feel their rights to control their information are "given up", or 
shared with marketers, in these privacy exchanges. Marketing managers can use insights 
from this research in developing privacy exchange agreements and in managing those 
relationships. In particular, the findings from this research begin to delineate the 
boundaries between when consumers believe that they own and control information about 
themselves and when control is shared with marketers (Sheehan and Hoy 2000). 
 
4.3 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
 While this dissertation employed the use of validated scales, sizeable non-student 
samples, and multiple methods for analysis, this research contains certain limitations. 
Many of these limitations provide opportunities for future research opportunities. One 
limitation of this research is that it employs scenario-based experiments. While scenarios 
have been found to offer a sense of realism and to be effective for evaluating perceptions, 
attitudes, and behavioral intentions in Internet privacy research (Sheehan and Hoy 2000; 
Xie et al. 2006; Milne and Bahl 2010), field studies are likely to offer more accurate 
measures of actual behavior. For instance, Norberg, Horne, and Horne (2007) found that 
intentions to disclose personal information differed from actual disclosure behavior. That 
individuals do not always act in accordance with their intentions is a common 
observation, and additional research may be able to offer insights into these 
discrepancies. 
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  A second limitation is the use of a paid online panel. These individuals may not 
be representative of the larger Internet population, because of their inherent willingness 
to share information in return for payment. The generalizability of the results is also 
limited in that a U.S. sample of respondents was used. It is possible that cultural 
differences may exist concerning issues of Internet privacy. For example, perceptions of 
privacy control, ownership, and privacy exchange are likely to differ by country. Few 
studies have conducted cross-cultural comparisons on Internet privacy issues (Newell 
1998; Harris, Hoye, and Lievens 2003). Evaluating how cultural and social norms affect 
privacy exchanges may be a fruitful avenue for additional research on data collection 
strategies. It is likely that cultural dimensions of collectivism and individualism may 
affect how consumers perceive the exchange of personal information for benefits. 
 There are a number of research opportunities in the areas of privacy exchange and 
information management. While this dissertation focused on the use of information 
technology for the collection of consumer data, it would be interesting to see how 
influence strategies operate in a multi-channel context. It is common for companies to use 
offline mechanisms for encouraging consumers to go online to share their personal 
information in return for possible prizes, contests, and free samples. Often time 
consumers receive receipts from their offline purchases that direct them to a company's 
Web site in order to complete a customer satisfaction survey in return for benefits. 
Comparative analyses on how privacy attitudes change based on the marketing channel 
(e.g., online, offline, multi-channel) have received limited attention in the privacy 
literature. 
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 The current research examined the compatibility between influence strategies for 
encouraging self-disclosure, consumer goals (prevention-focus vs promotion-focus), and 
a brand's reputation. The findings from this research suggest that online firms should 
employ different strategies to solicit information according to the nature of the firm. 
While the branding literature is rich in terms of brand related cues, and consumer-brand 
relationships, the privacy literature has only begun to investigate the impact of brand cues 
on privacy attitudes and disclosure. It is suggested that the brand personality literature 
(Aaker 1997; Brakus, Schmitt, and Zarantonello 2009) may offer an interesting and new 
dimension for exploring how consumer-brand relationships affect disclosure decisions. 
For instance, daring and exciting types of brands may be more compatible with 
promotion-focused consumers, while sincere and competent brands may be more 
effective for persuading prevention-focused consumers. The brand personality construct 
may serve as a possible moderating effect of self-disclosure, in that it may influence the 
effectiveness of various strategies. 
 The persuasiveness of marketers' strategies for encouraging self-disclosure in this 
dissertation was tested using an experimental design where Web sites either contained 
safety cues (e.g., privacy policies, trust seals) or incentives. However, in real-life settings 
Web sites often contain both safety cues and incentives for encouraging self-disclosure. 
Future research can examine the joint effects of these influence strategies on privacy 
attitudes. Interesting questions concern the moderating effect of regulatory focus when 
both prevention and promotion compatible cues are present. The regulatory focus 
literature has typically studied the effects of promotion and prevention-focused strategies 
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in isolation from each other, and thus an examination of their joint effects may contribute 
to theory. 
 This dissertation offers one of the first empirical investigations into the effects of 
rewards on privacy perceptions related to ownership rights and control. Data ownership 
and control are privacy issues that companies are currently dealing with, and which can 
have important legal and social implications for the use of consumer information. 
Additional research is needed for understanding how the exchange of personal 
information for benefits influences privacy expectations. In particular, research is needed 
for identifying conditions in which consumers feel that they either relinquish or share 
some control over their personal information with marketers. Theories of ownership and 
control from the marketing channels literature can be brought to bear on this 
phenomenon. The marketing channels literature offers a number of concepts for the study 
of marketing exchange that are relatively unexplored in the privacy literature. Some of 
these concepts include notions of power, control, ownership, governance, countervailing 
power, and dependency. Several established marketing theories such as agency theory, 
resource exchange theory, transaction cost theory, and relational contracting theory can 
offer useful theoretical frameworks for examining how privacy exchange relationships 
are structured. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 202
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A 
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Stimulus Materials 
Essay 1, Study 1  
 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please take a minute to imagine yourself in the following situation. You 
will then be asked several questions regarding this situation. 
 
Scenario 1 (Non-Coercive Influence Strategy): 
Imagine that you visit the Web site of a retail store that sells a variety of products (e.g., clothing, 
housewares, electronics, food). While browsing the website you are invited to register with the 
website. To complete the registration process the company asks you to provide your personal 
information (e.g., telephone number, and e-mail address). The company's Web site displays a 
privacy statement and privacy seal assuring you that your personal information will be protected. 
 
Scenario 2 (Coercive Influence Strategy) 
Imagine that you visit the Web site of a retail store that sells a variety of products (e.g., clothing, 
housewares, electronics, food). While browsing the website you are invited to register with the 
website. To complete the registration process the company asks you to provide your personal 
information (e.g., telephone number, and e-mail address). The company's Web site requires you 
to provide your personal information in order to have full access to the site content. In return for 
providing your personal information the Web site promises that you will receive a special 
discount. 
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Stimulus Materials 
Essay 1, Study 2  
 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please take a minute to imagine yourself in the following situation. You 
will then be asked several questions regarding this situation. 
 
Scenario 1 (Strong Brand Reputation): 
Imagine that you visit the Web site of a retail store that sells a variety of products (e.g., clothing, 
housewares, electronics, food). This Web site belongs to one of the largest and most successful 
retailers in the U.S. The company has been in business for over 50 years. While browsing the 
website you are invited to register with the website. To complete the registration process the 
company asks you to provide your personal information (e.g., telephone number, and e-mail 
address). 
 
Scenario 2 (Weak Brand Reputation) 
Imagine that you visit the Web site of a retail store that sells a variety of products (e.g., clothing, 
housewares, electronics, food). This Web site belongs to a new retail company, which has been in 
business for 6 months. While browsing the website you are invited to register with the website. 
To complete the registration process the company asks you to provide your personal information 
(e.g., telephone number, and e-mail address). 
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Stimulus Materials 
Essay 1, Study 3  
 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please take a minute to imagine yourself in the following situation. You 
will then be asked several questions regarding this situation. 
 
Scenario 1 (Non-Coercive Influence Strategy, Weak Brand Reputation): 
Imagine that you visit the Web site of a retail store that sells a variety of products (e.g., clothing, 
housewares, electronics, food). This Web site belongs to a new retail company, which has been in 
business for 6 months. While browsing the website you are invited to register with the website. 
To complete the registration process the company asks you to provide your personal information 
(e.g., telephone number, and e-mail address). The company's Web site displays a privacy 
statement and privacy seal assuring you that your personal information will be protected. 
 
Scenario 2 (Coercive Influence Strategy, Weak Brand Reputation) 
Imagine that you visit the Web site of a retail store that sells a variety of products (e.g., clothing, 
housewares, electronics, food). This Web site belongs to a new retail company, which has been in 
business for 6 months. While browsing the website you are invited to register with the website. 
To complete the registration process the company asks you to provide your personal information 
(e.g., telephone number, and e-mail address). The company's Web site requires you to provide 
your personal information in order to have full access to the site content. In return for providing 
your personal information the Web site promises that you will receive a special discount. 
 
Scenario 3 (Non-Coercive Influence Strategy, Strong Brand Reputation): 
Imagine that you visit the Web site of a retail store that sells a variety of products (e.g., clothing, 
housewares, electronics, food). This Web site belongs to one of the largest and most successful 
retailers in the U.S. The company has been in business for over 50 years. While browsing the 
website you are invited to register with the website. To complete the registration process the 
company asks you to provide your personal information (e.g., telephone number, and e-mail 
address). The company's Web site displays a privacy statement and privacy seal assuring you that 
your personal information will be protected. 
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Scenario 4 (Coercive Influence Strategy, Strong Brand Reputation): 
Imagine that you visit the Web site of a retail store that sells a variety of products (e.g., clothing, 
housewares, electronics, food). This Web site belongs to one of the largest and most successful 
retailers in the U.S. The company has been in business for over 50 years. While browsing the 
website you are invited to register with the website. To complete the registration process the 
company asks you to provide your personal information (e.g., telephone number, and e-mail 
address). The company's Web site requires you to provide your personal information in order to 
have full access to the site content. In return for providing your personal information the Web site 
promises that you will receive a special discount. 
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Essay 1 
Independent Variable Measures 
 
Regulatory Focus Scale (Lockwood, Jordon and Kunda 2002; Zhao and Pechmann 2007) 
 
9-point scale, 1 = not at all true of me, 9 = very true of me. 
 
1. In general, I am focused on preventing negative events in my life. 
2. I am anxious that I will fall short of my responsibilities and obligations. 
3. I frequently imagine how I will achieve my hopes and aspirations. * 
4. I often think about the person I am afraid I might become in the future. 
5. I often think about the person I would ideally like to be in the future. * 
6. I typically focus on the success I hope to achieve in the future. * 
7. I often worry that I will fail to accomplish my academic goals.a 
8. I often think about how I will achieve academic success. *a 
9. I often imagine myself experiencing bad things that I fear might happen to me. 
10. I frequently think about how I can prevent failures in my life. 
11. I am more oriented toward preventing losses that I am toward achieving gains. 
12. My major goal in school right now is to achieve my academic ambitions. *a 
13. My major goal in school right now is to avoid becoming an academic failure.a 
14. I see myself as someone who is primarily striving to reach my "ideal self" - to fulfill my hopes, wishes, 
and aspirations. * 
15. I see myself as someone who is primarily striving to become the self I "ought" to be - fulfill my duties, 
responsibilities, and obligations. 
16. In general, I am focused on achieving positive outcomes in my life. * 
17. I often imagine myself experiencing good things that I hope will happen to me. * 
18. Overall, I am more oriented toward achieving success than preventing failure. * 
* promotion item 
a
 dropped item (adult sample) 
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Essay 1 
Dependent Variable Measures 
 
Trust (Malhotra, Kim, and Agarwal 2004; Pan and Zinkham 2006; Wirtz and Lwin 2009) 
 
7-point scale, 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree. 
 
1. I trust the company's Web site to keep my best interest in mind. 
2. The company's Web site is trustworthy. 
3. I can count on this company's Web site to protect my privacy. 
 
 
 
Concern (Malhotra, Kim, and Agarwal 2004; Pan and Zinkham 2006; Wirtz and Lwin 2009) 
 
7-point scale, 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree. 
 
1. I would think twice before providing this company's Web site with my personal information. 
2. It bothers me when this company's Web site asks me for personal information. 
3. I would be concerned about giving information to this company's Web site. 
 
 
 
Willingness to Provide (adapted from Malhotra, Kim, and Agarwal 2004) 
 
7-point scale, 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree. 
 
1. I am willing to provide personal information when registering with the company's Web site. 
2. I am likely to share my personal information when registering with the company's Web site. 
3. I would reveal my personal information when registering with the company's Web site. 
 
 
 
Provide Incomplete Information (adapted from Malhotra, Kim, and Agarwal 2004) 
 
7-point scale, 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree. 
 
1. I would provide incomplete information when registering with the company's Web site. 
2. I would withhold pieces of my personal information when registering with the company's Web site. 
3. I would not provide complete personal information when registering with the company's Web site. 
 
 
 
Provide False Information (adapted from Malhotra, Kim, and Agarwal 2004) 
 
7-point scale, 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree. 
 
1. I would consider falsifying my personal information when registering with the company's Web site. 
2. I am likely to provide inaccurate personal information when registering with the company's Web site. 
3. I would probably misrepresent my personal information when registering with the company's Web site. 
 
 209
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B 
MATERIALS FOR ESSAY 2 
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Stimulus Materials 
Essay 2, Study 1  
 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please take a minute to imagine yourself in the following situation. You 
will then be asked several questions regarding this situation. 
 
Scenario 1 (Reward, Sensitive Information Request): 
Imagine that you recently visited the Web site of a retail store that sells a variety of products (e.g., 
clothing, housewares, electronics, food). While browsing the website you were invited to fill out a 
customer satisfaction survey. To complete the survey the company asked you to provide your 
telephone number, and e-mail address. In return for filing out the survey the company provided 
you with a check for $50. 
 
Scenario 2 (No Reward, Sensitive Information Request) 
Imagine that you recently visited the Web site of a retail store that sells a variety of products (e.g., 
clothing, housewares, electronics, food). While browsing the website you were invited to fill out a 
customer satisfaction survey. To complete the survey the company asked you to provide your 
telephone number, and e-mail address. 
 
Scenario 3 (Reward, Non-Sensitive Information Request): 
Imagine that you recently visited the Web site of a retail store that sells a variety of products (e.g., 
clothing, housewares, electronics, food). While browsing the website you were invited to fill out a 
customer satisfaction survey. To complete the survey the company asked you to provide your 
gender and age. In return for filing out the survey the company provided you with a check for 
$50. 
 
Scenario 4 (No Reward, Non-Sensitive Information Request): 
Imagine that you recently visited the Web site of a retail store that sells a variety of products (e.g., 
clothing, housewares, electronics, food). While browsing the website you were invited to fill out a 
customer satisfaction survey. To complete the survey the company asked you to provide your 
gender and age. 
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Stimulus Materials 
Essay 2, Study 2  
 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please take a minute to imagine yourself in the following situation. You 
will then be asked several questions regarding this situation. 
 
Scenario 1 (Monetary Reward, Sensitive Information Request): 
Imagine that you recently visited the Web site of a retail store that sells a variety of products (e.g., 
clothing, housewares, electronics, food). While browsing the website you were invited to fill out a 
customer satisfaction survey. To complete the survey the company asked you to provide your 
telephone number, and e-mail address. In return for filing out the survey the company provided 
you with a check for $50. 
 
Scenario 2 (Non-Monetary Reward, Sensitive Information Request): 
Imagine that you recently visited the Web site of a retail store that sells a variety of products (e.g., 
clothing, housewares, electronics, food). While browsing the website you were invited to fill out a 
customer satisfaction survey. To complete the survey the company asked you to provide your 
telephone number, and e-mail address. In return for filing out the survey the company provided 
you with access to exclusive web content (e.g., music, movies, software) valued at $50. 
 
Scenario 3 (Monetary Reward, Non-Sensitive Information Request): 
Imagine that you recently visited the Web site of a retail store that sells a variety of products (e.g., 
clothing, housewares, electronics, food). While browsing the website you were invited to fill out a 
customer satisfaction survey. To complete the survey the company asked you to provide your 
gender and age. In return for filing out the survey the company provided you with a check for 
$50. 
 
Scenario 4 (Non-Monetary Reward, Non-Sensitive Information Request): 
Imagine that you recently visited the Web site of a retail store that sells a variety of products (e.g., 
clothing, housewares, electronics, food). While browsing the website you were invited to fill out a 
customer satisfaction survey. To complete the survey the company asked you to provide your 
gender and age. In return for filing out the survey the company provided you with access to 
exclusive web content (e.g., music, movies, software) valued at $50. 
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Stimulus Materials 
Essay 2, Study 3  
 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please take a minute to imagine yourself in the following situation. You 
will then be asked several questions regarding this situation. 
 
Scenario 1 (Reward, Short-Term Relationship): 
Imagine that you recently visited the Web site of a retail store that sells a variety of products (e.g., 
clothing, housewares, electronics, food). You don't have a lot of experience with this retailer as you 
have just recently started to purchase products from this company. While browsing the website you 
were invited to fill out a customer satisfaction survey. To complete the survey the company asked you 
to provide your telephone number, and e-mail address. In return for filing out the survey the company 
provided you with a check for $50. 
 
Scenario 2 (No Reward, Short-Term Relationship): 
Imagine that you recently visited the Web site of a retail store that sells a variety of products (e.g., 
clothing, housewares, electronics, food). You don't have a lot of experience with this retailer as you 
have just recently started to purchase products from this company. While browsing the website you 
were invited to fill out a customer satisfaction survey. To complete the survey the company asked you 
to provide your telephone number, and e-mail address. 
 
Scenario 3 (Reward, Long-Term Relationship): 
Imagine that you recently visited the Web site of a retail store that sells a variety of products (e.g., 
clothing, housewares, electronics, food). You have been in an ongoing relationship with this retailer 
and your experiences with the company have been positive. You have found the company associates 
to be knowledgeable, considerate, and concerned about your satisfaction and well-being. While 
browsing the website you were invited to fill out a customer satisfaction survey. To complete the 
survey the company asked you to provide your telephone number, and e-mail address. In return for 
filing out the survey the company provided you with a check for $50. 
 
Scenario 4 (No Reward, Long-Term Relationship): 
Imagine that you recently visited the Web site of a retail store that sells a variety of products (e.g., 
clothing, housewares, electronics, food). You have been in an ongoing relationship with this retailer 
and your experiences with the company have been positive. You have found the company associates 
to be knowledgeable, considerate, and concerned about your satisfaction and well-being. While 
browsing the website you were invited to fill out a customer satisfaction survey. To complete the 
survey the company asked you to provide your telephone number, and e-mail address. 
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Stimulus Materials 
Essay 2, Study 4  
 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please take a minute to imagine yourself in the following situation. You 
will then be asked several questions regarding this situation. 
 
Scenario 1 (Reward, Weak Reputation): 
Imagine that you recently visited the Web site of a retail store that sells a variety of products (e.g., 
clothing, housewares, electronics, food). This Web site belongs to a new retail company, which has 
been in business for 6 months. While browsing the website you were invited to fill out a customer 
satisfaction survey. To complete the survey the company asked you to provide your telephone 
number, and e-mail address. In return for filing out the survey the company provided you with a check 
for $50. 
 
Scenario 2 (No Reward, Weak Reputation): 
Imagine that you recently visited the Web site of a retail store that sells a variety of products (e.g., 
clothing, housewares, electronics, food). This Web site belongs to a new retail company, which has 
been in business for 6 months. While browsing the website you were invited to fill out a customer 
satisfaction survey. To complete the survey the company asked you to provide your telephone 
number, and e-mail address. 
 
Scenario 3 (Reward, Strong Reputation): 
Imagine that you recently visited the Web site of a retail store that sells a variety of products (e.g., 
clothing, housewares, electronics, food). This Web site belongs to one of the largest and most 
successful retailers in the U.S. The company has been in business for over 50 years. While browsing 
the website you were invited to fill out a customer satisfaction survey. To complete the survey the 
company asked you to provide your telephone number, and e-mail address. In return for filing out the 
survey the company provided you with a check for $50. 
 
Scenario 4 (No Reward, Strong Reputation): 
Imagine that you recently visited the Web site of a retail store that sells a variety of products (e.g., 
clothing, housewares, electronics, food). This Web site belongs to one of the largest and most 
successful retailers in the U.S. The company has been in business for over 50 years. While browsing 
the website you were invited to fill out a customer satisfaction survey. To complete the survey the 
company asked you to provide your telephone number, and e-mail address. 
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Essay 2 
Dependent Variable Measures 
 
Self-Ownership (adapted from Constant et al. 1994; Jarvenpaa and Staples 2000, 2001) 
 
7-point scale, 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree. 
 
1. I feel that the information I provided to the company belongs to me. 
2. I feel that I own the information I provided to the company. 
 
 
 
Company-Ownership (adapted from Constant et al. 1994; Jarvenpaa and Staples 2000, 2001) 
 
7-point scale, 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree. 
 
1. I feel that the information I provided belongs to the company. 
2. The company owns the information I provided. 
3. The company has ownership rights to the information I provided. 
4. The information I provided is now property of the company. 
5. The information I provided is now owned by the company. 
 
 
 
Control Expectations (adapted from Phelps et al. 2000) 
 
7-point scale, 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree. 
 
1. I expect to have control over how the company uses my information. 
2. I expect to have control over whether the company uses my information to send me unsolicited 
promotions. 
3. I expect to have control over whether the company shares my information with other companies. 
4. I expect to have control over whether the company sells my information to other companies. 
5. I expect to have control over whether the company shares my information with other divisions of 
the company. 
6. I expect to have access to information collected about me by the company. 
7. I expect to have the ability to edit the information collected about me by the company. 
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Questions for Interview Respondents 
Essay 2, Study 5  
 
 
Interview Guide 
 
Primary Investigator: Jason Gabisch 
University of Massachusetts 
Marketing Department 
 
Statement of participants' rights and consent: 
 
This interview is being conducted as a part of a dissertation project at the University of Massachusetts. 
Your participation in this interview is entirely voluntary and you may withdraw at any time without 
penalty. All responses you provide in this interview will be kept anonymous and seen only by the 
researchers involved in this project. To insure reliability, this interview will be audio recorded with 
your permission. By participating in this survey you provide consent that the information can be used 
in this research project. 
 
The questions in this interview will ask you for your opinions in regards to issues of Internet privacy. 
This interview is estimated to take about 10-15 minutes to complete. 
 
Print Name _____________________________________ Date _____________ 
Signature ______________________________________ 
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Demographic Questions: 
 
What is your Gender? _______________________________ 
 
What is your Age?__________________________________ 
 
What is your Occupation?_____________________________ 
 
Introduction Questions: 
 How often do you use the Internet? 
 
 What do you typically use the Internet for? 
 
 How concerned are you about your privacy on the Internet?  
 
 Do you take actions to protect your privacy? 
 
Compensation Questions: 
 What do you think about companies offering rewards for people to provide their personal 
information, online or offline? 
 Can you recall situations where you have provided information to a company for a reward, 
online or offline? 
  If so, what information did you provide? 
  If so, what type of reward did you receive? 
  If so, what were your expectations for control over the information you provided? 
 How likely are you to provide information when you are promised a reward? 
 Are there types of rewards that you find most and least attractive 
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Ownership & Control Questions: 
 If you voluntarily provide your information to a company on the Internet... 
• Who do you believe owns this information? 
- You, the company, or both? 
• How much control over that information would you expect? 
• What types of control would you expect to have? 
- How the company uses the information (shares, sells)? 
- Access to the information you provided? 
- Ability to edit the information you provided? 
 
 If a company gives you a reward for providing your information on the Internet... 
•  Who do you believe owns this information? 
- You, the company, or both? 
• How much control over that information would you expect? 
• What types of control would you expect to have? 
- How the company uses the information (shares, sells)? 
- Access to the information you provided? 
- Ability to edit the information you provided? 
 
 Are there any factors that might change your beliefs about who owns or controls the 
information you provide to a company on the Internet? 
o Amount of the reward? 
o Type of information you provide? 
o Your relationship with the company? 
o The company's reputation? 
 
 
 If a company provides you with a reward for your personal information do you believe the 
company needs to get consent from you to use that information? 
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General Questions: 
 Do you believe people maintain absolute ownership and control over their information, 
even if they are given compensation? 
 
 When you purchase a product do you feel the company has ownership or control over the 
information collected from that transaction?  
 
 When a company purchases information about consumers from another company do you 
feel the company has ownership or control over that information? 
 
 If you voluntarily provide personal information or content on a social network site do you 
feel the site has ownership or control over that information? How about if your friends 
post content about you on the site? 
 
 Do you have any other comments about companies offering rewards for people's 
information that have not been addressed in this interview? 
 
--- Thank You --- 
 
 
Follow-up Questions: emailed to all interview participants 
Thank you for participating in the Interview about Internet privacy. Your input has been extremely 
helpful. After looking through your responses I was wondering if you could take a moment to respond 
to a follow-up question, in order to provide some additional clarification to your original responses. 
Even a short response would be incredibly helpful. 
 
If you receive a reward from a company for providing your information, do you feel like you are 
exchanging, or giving up, control or ownership rights to that information? Please explain. 
Would the following factors have an impact on your response to the follow-up question? Please 
explain: 
a) size, or type, of the reward. 
b) type of information you provided (sensitive vs. non-sensitive). 
c) your relationship with the company. 
d) reputation of the company. 
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